Punctuating the Congressional Agenda: Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders

• Published date: 01 June 2003
• Author: Susan Webb Yackee
• Date: 01 June 2003
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290305600203
• Subject Matter: Articles

Punctuating the Congressional Agenda:
Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders
SUSAN WEBB YACKEE, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Despite general agreement that indicates deadlines “matter” to legislative behavior, there have been few empir-
ical investigations of the use of deadlines in Congress. This study focuses on the use of recess deadlines (such
as the August recess). I hypothesize that congressional leaders schedule votes before major recesses to create
additional deadlines within the congressional term where votes can be taken under the pressures of time con-
straint. Using negative binomial regression, I demonstrate that “rushes” of roll call votes do take place before
major recesses, and this preliminary evidence suggests that congressional leaders in the House use recesses as
deadlines for most roll call votes. Initial findings also suggest that the powers of House leaders to control their
voting schedule before recess deadlines outweigh the powers of their counterparts in the Senate.
Do House of Representatives and Senate leaders sures of time constraint. Using negative binomial regression,
strategically use deadlines to force votes? There is
I demonstrate that “rushes” of roll call votes do take place
general agreement among some Members of Con-
before major recesses, and this preliminary evidence sug-
gress, Capital Hill staffers, and journalists that congressional
gests that congressional leaders, particularly in the House,
leaders intentionally use intra-session recess breaks as dead-
use recesses as deadlines for most roll call votes.
lines to force congressional action.1 As one Member states,
“In Congress there aren’t a lot of deadlines, so the deadlines
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC RUSH HYPOTHESIS
that do exist are normally self imposed. Normally they (con-
gressional leaders) put legislation up against a recess. . . .
Little work properly merges the use of legislative dead-
They do that as a ‘carrot and a stick’ to get this stuff done.”2
lines with the tactical calculations of congressional leaders.
Students of politics have also long suspected that deadlines
In fact, while a good deal of current scholarship identifies
matter to legislative behavior (Oleszek 2001; Oppenheimer
congressional leaders as important actors in the policymak-
1985; Loomis 1994).
ing process, not enough attention is paid to the particular
Surprisingly, however, despite this contention that dead-
powers that these leaders use to advance their agendas. In
lines “matter,” there has been no rigorous examination of
this section, I lay the groundwork for an explanation of the
the use of deadlines by party leaders in Congress. In this
use of recess deadlines that combines ideas from the broader
article, I develop an explanation of the deliberate schedul-
work concerning the strategic calculations of congressional
ing of votes, the Strategic Rush Hypothesis, to clarify why
leaders and the small legislative deadline literature.
we might see this strategic vote scheduling behavior. I argue
that congressional leaders schedule roll call votes before
Party Leaders
major recesses to create additional deadlines within the con-
gressional term where votes can be taken under the pres-
Research on party leaders in Congress often points to
the leadership’s role in overcoming a collective action prob-
lem by organizing members under a common party plat-
form and providing mechanisms to accomplish the party’s
1 I gathered background information for this article in four interviews with
agenda. One prominent theory from this research tradition
Members of Congress during the summer of 1999. I also conducted sev-
eral informal interviews with congressional staffers in the summer of
is the Conditional Party Government theory (Rohde 1991;
1999 and during the spring and summer of 1998. I do not assert that
Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Aldrich and Rohde
these interviews provide a representative sample of congressional opin-
2001).3 This theory predicts that under certain conditions
ion; however, the meetings were quite useful for the theoretical develop-
House leaders deliberately use rules and scheduling tech-
ment of this paper and provide solid, albeit anecdotal, examples of the
niques to make progress on their political party’s agenda,
opinion of a few members. For news reports related to the importance of
recess deadlines see, for example: “Bush Claims Victory, If Not Credit, As
thereby increasing their members’ likelihood of reelection.
Deadline Breaks Deadlock on Hill.” The New York Times. By David E.
Cox and McCubbins (1993) also emphasize the importance
Rosenbaum. 7/28/02; “Lott Threatens to Delay NATO Vote; Senate
of party record as an election advantage or disability. They
Leader Wants Democrats to End Blockage of School Bill.” The Washing-
suggest that “. . . party records often can be changed in ways
ton Post. By Helen Dewar. 5/21/98; “Health Plan Inches Toward Deadline;
But Democrats Are Denouncing GOP for Gridlock And Some Republi-
cans Are Worried.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. By Charlotte Grimes Post.
6/19/94.
3
2
In this study, I utilize a strong party leader theoretical framework over a
See note 1.
theory of majoritarian legislatures. However, for an opposing view, see
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2003): pp. 139-149
Krehbiel 1991, 1993, 1996, 1997, 2000.
139

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140
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
that affect the vast majority of party members’ reelection
time a break is forthcoming, there is a wish to finish up as
probabilities in the same way (either helping all or hurting
much pending business as possible.” In other words, con-
all)” (1993: 112).
g ressional recesses may serve as intra-session legislative
Both research lines predict that party leaders, as agents
deadlines that help push votes and force legislative decisions.
of their members, will use the powers of their offices to
make progress on the party’s legislative agenda in order to
THE STRATEGIC RUSH HYPOTHESIS
increase the reelection advantage of their party’s members.
Many scholars have found that one power, the scheduling
Past research, as well as the current perceptions of some
power, can be a particularly important tool for congres-
Members, congressional staffers, and journalists, suggests
sional leaders to influence legislative outcomes. For exam-
that deadlines matter to legislative behavior and outcomes
ple, Sinclair (1994) and Dion and Huber (1996, 1997) find
in Congress. Yet perceptions and past research provide no
evidence that strategic scheduling exists in their work on
theoretical tie between the scheduling of votes and vote pat-
the use of restrictive rules by majority party leaders. Work
terns leading up to major deadlines. As a result, we do not
by Cox and McCubbins (1993: 243-48) ties the power of
understand when, how, and more importantly, why dead-
scheduling more directly to the use of deadlines in the
lines matter to congressional behavior. This section intro-
House. They write that the agenda setting power of the
duces the Strategic Rush Hypothesis that predicts the delib-
Speaker of the House is most concentrated when time is
erate scheduling of votes before intra-session re c e s s
scarce and argue that the Speaker can threaten only to take
deadlines, as well as end of the session deadlines, by con-
up bills on the floor that fit his or her preferences during
gressional leaders.
periods before deadlines. The work of Sinclair (2000),
The logic behind the Strategic Rush Hypothesis is
Oleszek (2001), Evans and Oleszek (2000) and others,
simple. A rational congressional leader’s primary goal is to
however, calls attention to the institutional differences
retain control of his or her branch of the legislature, and in
between House and Senate leaders concerning scheduling.
general to optimize future election outcomes for the party.
Their research suggests that the Senate’s rule concerning the
Leaders act on the belief that positive legislative results will
filibuster, its use of unanimous consent agreements, and the
assist overall party reelection outcomes and retention of
lack of an equivalent to the House Rules Committee con-
majority party control. In other words, to accomplish his or
strains the ability of Senate leaders to use scheduling to the
her primary goal a rational leader must achieve progress on
majority party’s advantage.
their party’s legislative agenda, which in turn provides a
stronger record for Members to use in their campaigns.
Congressional Deadlines
However, a leader’s work is constrained by several factors.
One important constraint is the size of the leader’s voting
Connor and Oppenheimer (1993:316) maintain that
coalition, which varies according to the contents of the spe-
“[t]he legislative game, which had been for all practical
cific bill that is up for a vote. This constraint is continually
purposes an untimed game, has become a timed game.”
present since some Members in any legislative coalition may
C u rre n t l y, however, there is only a small, fragmented liter-
benefit more individually (either for constituency or donor
a t u re exploring time pre s s u res in Congress. This lack of
reasons) by defecting from a winning coalition on any single
scholarly inquiry is surprising, especially given that most
vote. The number of Members wishing to defect varies
Members agree that the sequencing of events is an impor-
depending on the underlying proposal, and as a result,
tant component of their work (Fenno 1978,...