Public Participation in Policing: The Impact of Citizen Oversight on the Incidence of Lethal Force over Time in the Largest U.S. Cities

• Author: Holona LeAnne Ochs
• Published date: 01 December 2009
• Date: 01 December 2009
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.3818/JRP.11.2009.105
• Subject Matter: Article

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PublicParticipationinPolicing:

 TheImpactofCitizenOversightontheIncidence

 ofLethalForceOverTimeintheLargestU.S.Cities

Holona LeAnne Ochs

Lehigh University

* Abstract

Does public participation through citizen review boards result in more responsible po-

licing or does public oversight in this form amount to political “interference” resisted

by the police? How do the various models of reactive external review impact police use

of lethal force in a democratic society? In this article, I argue that citizen participation

has the potential to serve the public and the police well when adequately designed and

that reactive approaches to external review of the police may not have the intended

effect on the incidence of lethal force over time. Specif‌ically, the random effects nega-

tive binomial regression reveals that the process audit model of citizen review increases

the incidence of lethal force. This study highlights the need for future investigations

that focus on the few proactive approaches to citizen review in which the patterns and

trends in policies, supervision, and training may offer more lucrative opportunities for

participation that generates innovative problem-solving. Future study is also needed to

determine the requisite circumstances for fostering mutually benef‌icial monitoring. The

setting for this study on the long-run monitoring role of citizen review is a sample of 30

of the largest U.S. cities from 1994 to 2004.

JUSTICE RESEARCH AND POLICY, Vol. 11, 2009

© 2009 Justice Research and Statistics Association

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Democratic theorists have debated the necessity of public participation for cen-

turies, with the resulting search for participation structures that lend the greatest

legitimacy to democratic governance. Public participation has long been held out

as both a cause of and a solution to the problem of matching political wishes with

policy reality. On the one hand, citizen participation in decision making may result

in more opposition, more negotiation, and greater chance of failure; moderate and

irregular participation may destabilize government (Crain & Rosenthal, 1967).

On the other hand, public participation may increase the likelihood of successful

policy implementation (Langton, 1978) and contribute to the legitimacy of the

government’s actions (Gellhorn, 1972; Jaffe, 1968), and so proactive measures like

participation mechanisms are meant to involve the public in the practice of gov-

ernance (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970). Skolnick (1966), for example, highlights

“democratic bureaucracy” as a means for balancing the problems associated with

police professionalism with the problems associated with political interference.

The anomaly of citizen participation is that it may strain institutions that were

not designed to function democratically (Kweit & Kweit, 1981). The bureaucracy

is as responsible as elected institutions for consistency with democratic principles

(Wood & Waterman, 1994), but the implementation process requires rules, pro-

cedures, and discretion that can make it more diff‌icult to assess and maintain that

consistency. The constant shift between the political or professional leadership of

the bureaucracy (Kaufman, 1963) appears to be an attempt to balance the counter-

vailing tendencies of complex organizations (March & Olsen, 1976; Scott, 1987).

The motivation for the structural changes of the Progressive Era1 was based

on the desire to break the political machine that depended on inducements—

trading votes for favors (Banf‌ield & Wilson, 1963). The democratized force prior

to the reforms calling for the professionalization of the police was characterized

by heavy political inf‌luence on the enforcement of the law and low prestige for

law enforcement off‌icers. Alternatively, the rigor and reputation instilled in the

Forest Service is a primary example of the importance of the professional leader-

ship that contributed to the success of the New Deal (Kaufman, 1960). Although

the Forest Service is not exempt from controversy, the agency overcame signif‌i-

cant “centrifugal forces” that are also common in policing, such as distance from

monitoring, context variation, and the ideology of decentralization, and the Forest

Service has long been thought of as a model of bureaucratic effectiveness due to

the successful professionalization of the work. Attempts to insulate the police bu-

reaucracy from political interference and establish policing as a profession began

with August Vollmer’s 1917 proposal to foster occupational prestige through edu-

cation. Vollmer’s proposal was based on the idea that higher education require-

ments may foster the kind of professional values, self-esteem, and prestige in police

1 The period of reform in the United States that lasted from the 1880s to the 1920s.

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work that facilitate greater compliance with the law. Over time, an emphasis on

professional principle over political principals can translate into greater levels of

discretion being passed on to the bureaucracy, resulting in the bureaucracy actually

leading (Carpenter, 2001). However, history has also shown that the public may

inf‌luence the police through democratic majorities in ways that undermine demo-

cratic liberty, particularly for minorities (see, e.g., Skolnick, 1994; Walker, 1998).

Consequently, the balance between the political and professional implementation

of the law is a critical factor in democratic policing.

Balancing the dual obligations of responsiveness and stability is particularly

precarious in the administration of justice. Impartial administration and profes-

sional competence are necessary to insulate the police from improper political in-

terference that can generate corruption. At the same time, oversight is crucial to

ensuring that the public is not being led by the police. Historical evidence demon-

strates that the routines inherent in bureaucratic processes can provide the impetus

for abuses like those experienced with the U.S. internment camps during WWII,

the My Lai incident during the Vietnam War, McCarthyism, Abu Ghraib, and even

atrocities like the Holocaust. Likewise, off‌icers have oftentimes gained respect by

upholding local standards in contrast to bureaucratic ideals, and such democratic

policing was not necessarily positive (Miller, 1973; Haller, 1976). For example,

policing according to the prevailing ideology of the area citizens has in the past

resulted in innumerable lynchings, the Zoot Suit Riots, the extension of the use of

lethal force under the f‌leeing felon rule, and the brutalization of peaceful protestors

during the Civil Rights Era. Experimental evidence shows def‌initively that authori-

tarianism and conformity are not conf‌ined to certain “types” of people or even to

types of situations (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo & Lieppe, 1991), so there is reason

to be as concerned about the authority of political oversight because latent tenden-

cies toward dehumanization exist in the routinization of any process (Adams &

Balfour, 1998). Consequently, the police need the protection of the public as much

as the public needs the protection of the police.

Does public participation through citizen review boards result in more respon-

sible policing or does public oversight in this form amount to political interfer-

ence? Is citizen oversight a signif‌icant contribution to the outcomes of democratic

policing or does it undermine law enforcement? The literature is notably silent on

this. Saltzstein (1989) examines the role that black mayors play in instituting citi-

zen controls of the police department, but political science has largely overlooked

the impact of this form of citizen control. The use of discretion by the police (see

Skolnick, 1966; LaFave, 1965; Culp-Davis, 1975; Bittner, 1970; Wilson, 1987;

Black, 1980; Klinger, 1995; Fyfe, Klinger, & Flavin, 1997), political control, su-

pervision, and compliance (see Ostrom & Whitaker, 1973; Brehm & Gates, 1993;

Chaney & Saltzstein, 1998), encounters between the police and the public (Reiss,

1971), patterns of policing in metropolitan areas (Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker,

1978), police brutality, excessive use of force, and lethal force (Robin, 1963; Fyfe,

1978, 1982; National Research Council, 2004; McLaughlin, 1992; Skolnick &