Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1665
• Author: Scott Davidson
• Published date: 01 November 2017
• Date: 01 November 2017

ACADEMIC PAPER

Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and

regulation of the influence game

Scott Davidson

Media and Communication, University of

Leicester, Leicester, UK

Correspondence

Dr Scott Davidson, Media and

Communication, University of Leicester,

Bankfield House, 132 New Walk, Leicester,

LE1 7JA UK.

Email: sd310@leicester.ac.uk

Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of

democracy, it is widely perceived that resource‐rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair

advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participa-

tion and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars

to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This

paper takes up Moloney0s call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative econ-

omy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying

inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence

advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by

democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and

professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms

to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying

resources.

1|INTRODUCTION

Although effective lobbying by groups within society is essential for

the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource‐rich

groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages. This percep-

tion damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the

integrity of policymaking. As access to lobbying services is typically

determined by ability to pay, practitioners are equally perceived as a

group who primarily assists the interests of elites. The Organisation

for Economic Co‐operation and Development (2012) described this

situation as a “sharp and damaging ethical schism”that has emerged

between practitioners and the public. It is difficult to imagine any sys-

tem of government that does not in some way reflect hegemonic rela-

tionships that are constitutive of any society. Nonetheless, democratic

legitimacy and public trust require a belief that the rules of the influ-

ence game are fair and open.

Lobbying canbe simply defined as communicative acts that attempt

to influence decision‐making by governments and parliaments

(Milbrath, 1963). Practitioners will often refer to their work as public

affairs; this is because communication with a wider range of issue stake-

holders and the media, in order to influence organisational reputation

and wider public opinion environments, are considered as essential

tools of the job (Harris & Moss, 2001). In the absence of intervention,

we should expect public policy spaces will become dominated by social

and economic elites. But lobbying reforms tend to primarily focus on the

prevention of political corruption and only have inequality of influence

as a secondary objective, if at all. As Thomas (2004) notes, traditional

regulatory approaches typically “constrain the actions of lobbyists and

public officials alike, even if they do not ultimately affect which groups

are powerful and which ones are not”(p. 287).

This paper accepts the continued relevance of Moloney0s (2006)

call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy

to either subsidise or transfer resources to groups who are profoundly

impacted upon by legislation and policy but historically have not had

sufficient access to lobbying resources. More recently, Gandy (2015)

has returned to publishing to expand upon public policy initiatives that

might balance the advantages that some groups enjoy in terms of the

ability to frame issues or provide information subsidies. It directly

addresses the problem of lobbying inequality. First, it considers the

extent of lobbying inequalities and frameworks for understanding how

resources enable influence, before assessing the types of approach that

have been used by governance institutions primarily in the United

Kingdom and European Union (EU). Voluntary measures are also con-

sidered. The final discussion looks for ways to link digital platforms

and public preferences to methods for addressing lobbying inequalities.

2|THE PROBLEM OF LOBBYING

INEQUALITIES

There is a strong logic to nurturing lobbying in democratic systems.

Individual citizens do not typically have the resources to hold expertise

Received: 15 February 2017 Accepted: 16 July 2017

DOI: 10.1002/pa.1665

J Public Affairs. 2017;17:e1665.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1665

Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of9