Prudential Standing, the Zone of Interests, and the New Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction

• Publication year: 2013

Prudential Standing, the Zone of Interests, and the New Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction

Micah J. Revell

PRUDENTIAL STANDING, THE ZONE OF INTERESTS, AND THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION

ABSTRACT

Threshold limitations on the availability of judicial review are ubiquitous in the modern federal court system. While many are fact-specific and malleable, the most foundational one, jurisdiction, is not. The D. C. Circuit recently held that prudential standing, specifically the zone of interests test, is a jurisdictional limitation on the court's power to decide a case. This holding directly contradicts several other circuits, which have held that prudential standing is not jurisdictional and may be waived when the parties fail to raise it. Twenty years ago, this decision likely would not have garnered much attention because jurisdictional dismissals were common for a wide swath of reasons. However, the Supreme Court has recently honed its concept of jurisdiction and has cautioned courts to use the label sparingly.

The Supreme Court has referred to the zone of interests test repeatedly as a prudential consideration—one that is judge-made. However, scholars and courts alike have questioned this categorization and applied the test in a conflicting manner. The categorization of the zone of interests test as a constitutional, statutory, or prudential limitation is fundamental to determining its function within the newly refined law of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, courts have largely ignored this determination in recent treatments.

This Comment addresses that paucity, arguing that the Supreme Court has built and sustained the zone of interests test on prudential standing grounds. Prudential standing, properly understood in the context of the larger prudential body of law, cannot function in a jurisdictional manner under the Court's recent cases. Accordingly, the zone of interests test, as currently defined, should not be wielded in a jurisdictional manner.

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INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................223

I. THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST AS A PRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE...........226

A. The Inception of the Zone of Interests Test................................227
B. Confusion in Its Development...................................................231
C. Recent Cases: Consistently Applying the Zone of Interests Test as a Prudential Requirement.............................................................235

II. JURISDICTION'S NEW SCOPE.............................................................238

A. The Harsh Consequences of Jurisdictional Deficiency.............239
B. Reining in a Severe Doctrine.....................................................241

III. PRUDENTIAL STANDING AND THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST: DISTINCT FROM JURISDICTION...........................................................................251

A. Because Prudential Standing Is a Judicial Self-Imposition, It Does Not Fit in the New Framework of Jurisdiction..........................252
B. Practical Illustrations Demonstrate that Prudential Standing Is Not Jurisdictional ............................................................................. 254

1. Prudential Standing, Unlike Jurisdiction, Is Subject to Exceptions ...........................................................................255
2. Prudential Standing May Be Addressed in a Different Order than Jurisdiction .................................................................. 256
3. Other Prudential Doctrines (Besides Standing) Are Not Jurisdictional ....................................................................... 257

C. Overcoming Potential Hurdles for Accepting the Zone of Interests Test as Nonjurisdictional...........................................................259

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................261

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INTRODUCTION

"Unlike the Article III standing inquiry . . . prudential standing is not a jurisdictional limitation on our review."¹

"[T]he theory plainly fails to demonstrate prudential standing. . . . We therefore dismiss all petitions for lack of jurisdiction."²

Litigants and courts alike face threshold limitations on the availability of judicial review. Litigants, among other requirements, must possess standing to bring their claims. Standing always requires plaintiffs satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article III—injury in fact, causation, and redressability.³ In addition to this constitutional minimum, plaintiffs must often satisfy a second set of standing requirements, referred to as prudential standing. Prudential standing is judge-made law and generally encompasses several separate guidelines.⁴

courts, on the other hand, have the responsibility to ensure that they only intervene in cases when they have jurisdiction to do so. Jurisdiction can be defined as the court's power to hear and decide a case.⁵ Because courts must refuse to hear a case when that power is lacking, they have an independent responsibility to ensure their jurisdiction exists.⁶ Moreover, if jurisdiction is found wanting at any point in litigation, the court must dismiss the case immediately, sometimes even vacating a final judgment.⁷ Accordingly, a court's decision to interpret any doctrine or rule as a jurisdictional limitation has sweeping consequences—it can yield untold hours of litigation moot and

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deny parties with uncontested Article III standing the opportunity to seek or gain relief.⁸

Recently, food and automotive interest groups experienced this sting firsthand in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA.⁹ Several groups across industry lines challenged the EPA's partial waivers of requirements for the introduction of E15 gasoline into the energy market.¹⁰ While two of the D.C. Circuit judges found that one group satisfied the requirements of Article III standing,¹¹ the split panel held that the same group failed to satisfy the zone of interests test of prudential standing.¹² Accordingly, the majority dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.¹³

Judge Kavanaugh dissented, writing, "[P]rudential standing is not jurisdictional, meaning that it can be forfeited and need not be considered by the court if the defendant or respondent does not assert it."¹⁴ For Judge Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court's pronounced effort to refine the application of the "jurisdictional label" in recent years foreclosed its use in dismissing a case for a lack of prudential standing.¹⁵ He highlighted the split that the decision solidified between the D.C. Circuit and its sister circuits.¹⁶ Moreover, he

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stressed, this determination was far from an ethereal or hypothetical one—the EPA likely would have lost on the merits had the court reached them.¹⁷

on the surface, whether the zone of interests test is jurisdictional should be an easy question. The Court has repeatedly described the test as a prudential consideration.¹⁸ As this Comment will discuss, the foundation of prudential considerations rests not in external limitations imposed upon the Court, such as those imposed by Article III of the Constitution, but in the Court's caution to exercise its own legitimate authority.¹⁹ However, the Court has also provided seemingly conflicting foundations for the zone of interests test and called into question its proper home among the prudential doctrines.²⁰ Because of this confusion, scholars have called for the Court to relocate the test to a more appropriate position within its standing jurisprudence.²¹

This Comment will argue that the Court has planted and cultivated the zone of interests test in the soil of prudential considerations. While several cases may cast doubt on this determination, the Court's recent jurisprudence legitimizes the prudential reading as the correct one. This understanding is

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pivotal in determining how the zone of interests test functions in light of the Court's recent articulation of jurisdiction. In parsing the zone of interests test to determine whether it is jurisdictional, the circuit courts have failed to give proper credence to the Supreme Court's clearly articulated view that the test is prudential. However desirable and important it may be, prudential standing, properly understood in the context of the larger prudential body of law, cannot function in a jurisdictional manner under the Court's recent cases. Accordingly, the zone of interests test cannot, and should not, be used by courts to abdicate jurisdiction over a case or controversy.

To that end, Part I of this Comment examines the development of the zone of interests test, tracing the Court's justification for it at each iteration. It will give particular attention to whether the test is constitutional, statutory, or prudential. Part II examines the Court's recent movement to refine jurisdiction, focusing on the potential sources for jurisdictional rules. It will explain how the Court analyzes those sources to determine whether they are jurisdictional, deducing an essential framework for application.

Part III applies the new framework of jurisdiction to the salient points of prudential standing, concluding that the two doctrines function in a complementary but distinct fashion. It then presents compelling examples of this distinction and addresses why the zone of interests test functions more efficiently when viewed as a prudential standing doctrine. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the zone of interests test, as currently defined, is a prudential standing doctrine and cannot function in a jurisdictional manner.

I. THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST AS A PRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE

The zone of interests test can be succinctly stated: "The interest [the plaintiff] asserts must be 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute' that he says was violated."²² However, that simple phrase belies the complexity and deep unrest implicated...