Prospect Theory and Civil–Military Conflict

• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16670693
• Date: 01 October 2017
• Published date: 01 October 2017
• Author: Gregory Winger
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Prospect Theory and

Civil–Military Conflict:

The Case of the 1976

Korean Axe Murder

Incident

Gregory Winger

1

Abstract

This article investigates the potential use of prospect theory to understand civil–

military disputes over the use of force. Specifically, I argue that distinct realms of

responsibility can lead civilian and military authorities to inhabit different frames of

reference when confronting the same crisis. This divergence in perspective causes

each to asses risk in fundamentally disparate ways and ultimately produces com-

peting policy recommendations. To illustrate this theory, I analyze the case of the

1976 Korean tree cutting incident. During this crisis, American military authorities

define the situation narrowly as pertaining to the Korean peninsula, whereas the

civilian leadership viewed it as part of a global challenge to American resolve. As a

result, each party weighed the risks of escalation differently and promoted con-

flicting policy prescriptions.

Keywords

theories of civil–military relations, prospect theory, Korean conflict, governmental

organization, military organization

1

Boston University, MA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Gregory Winger, Boston University, 232 Bay State Rd., Boston, MA 02215, USA.

Email: ghwinger@bu.edu

Armed Forces & Society

2017, Vol. 43(4) 734-757

ªThe Author(s) 2016

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16670693

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As a field of inquiry, civil–military affairs has been hamstrung by its disengage-

ment from the conceptual and theoretical advances made by other social science

disciplines. This article endeavors to chip away at this barrier by introducing

prospect theory to civil–military affairs. Prospect theory holds that how we assess

risk is not a constant but rather varies dramatically based on whether a question is

framed as either a potential gain or a loss. Specifically, when a dilemma is depicted

as a possible gain, individuals exhibit risk-averse behavior. However, the same

individual will become risk acceptant when an identical predicament is posed as a

potential loss.

I maintain that prospect theory holds particular promise for the field of civil–

military affairs. Not only does the theory enhance our understanding of how indi-

viduals assess risk, but it also provides a potential explanation for conflict between

civilian and military leaders. Although ostensibly facing the same crisis, political

and military leaders can frame the situation differently and consequently inhabit

contrasting realms of gains and losses. These divergent perspectives not only pro-

duce conflicting assessments of risk but often radically different policy prescrip-

tions. Specifically when confronted with the same scenario, civil–military leaders

may frame the situation differently and exhibit strikingly different behavior that

reflects their divergent attitudes toward risk.

To illustrate how prospect theory can help explain civil–military disputes, I

utilize plausibility probe of the 1976 Korean Axe Murder incident. The crisis

illustrates how it is possible for the same situation to be perceived differently by

military and civilian leaders. Amid the debate on how to respond to North Korea’s

provocation, the military leadership based their analysis around conditions on the

Korean peninsula, while the civilian leadership, particularly Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger, placed the incident in the context of a global test of American

resolve. Beyond explaining why the two groups disagreed on how to respond to

this incident, recognizing the rival frames produced by these differing perspectives

allow us to understand the specific arguments advanced by each party. I conclude

by discussing other areas of research within civil–military affairs where prospect

theory may prove useful.

Prospect Theory

Prospect theory is a behavioral economics theory which arose in response to

expected utility theory and addresses how individuals perceive risk. Expected utility

theory argues that when an individual is faced with a ch oice that has uncertain

outcomes, that person will weigh the potential results and select the option likely

to return the highest expected payoff. Consider an individual who is given a choice

between receiving $35 and having a 1 in 20 chance of receiving $1,000. Expected

utility theory says the person should select the 1 in 20 chance which has an expected

return of $50.

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This also holds true for losses with individuals selecting the option

expected to yield the least amount of harm. For our example, that means it is

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