Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies

• Published date: 01 December 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231174842
• Author: George A. Krause,Jason S. Byers
• Date: 01 December 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2023, Vol. 76(4) 1707–1722

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129231174842

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Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics

of Administrative Leadership Turnover in

U.S. Executive Agencies

George A. Krause

1

and Jason S. Byers

2



Abstract

Administrative leader turnover adversely affects the organizational stability of U.S. federal executive agencies, as well as

undermines presidents’policy goals. An incentive compatibility theory of administrative leader turnover is proposed that

distinguishes between proponent (policy priority) versus caretaker (non-policy priority) loyalist executive appointees. This

theory predicts that the proponents’tenure will be comparatively more stable since it ref‌lects incentive compatibility for

both the president and executive appointee compared to caretakers where such a relationship is lacking. The evi dence

comports with this logic by demonstrating that appointee loyalty results in a longer tenure in off‌ice when their agency

constitutes a stated policy priority for the president at the time of agreed upon service compared to when this happens

not to be the case. Responsive competence in executive administration requires incentive compatibility that benef‌its both

the president and executive appointees for ensuring stable leadership of U.S. federal agencies.

Keywords

incentive compatibility, U.S. federal executive branch, organizational stability, administrative leader turnover

A crucial element of executive authority granted by the U.S.

Constitution is the concept of “duration”advocated by

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 70, 72, and 77.“Dura-

tion”refers to length of tenure in off‌ice by executive branch

off‌icials, and hence is a measure of the degree of continuity

and change involving executive administration. “Duration”

is necessary for ensuring suff‌icient time and stability such

that the government can both prepare and act upon its ad-

ministrative activities (Green 2002:549).“Duration”not

only refers to the length of service of presidents, but also that

of appointed executive off‌icials (Caldwell 1964:90;seealso

Green 1990: 514). Modern U.S. presidents value both the

continuity necessary to ensure effective, coherent executive

administration (e.g., Aberbach and Rockman 1988,2000;

Bertelli and Lewis 2013;Resh 2015). Turnover within the

executive branch naturally transpires within a presidency, yet

excessive turnover among appointed agency leaders signi-

f‌ied by short tenures in off‌ice generates adverse conse-

quences for executive administration (e.g., Heclo 1977;

Seidman and Gilmour 1986).

The rapid turnover of presidential appointed leadership

positions not only undermines the president’s policy

initiatives and implementation, but also executive

agencies’performance. Presidents enter off‌ice with policy

agendas that often require years to both enact and ad-

minister for purposes of attaining desired policy out-

comes. Churn within these appointed positions generates

bureaucratic stasis, which negatively impacts both ad-

ministrative governance and public policy (Dull, et al.

2012;O’Connell 2009). Further, it is costly for presidents

to f‌ill vacant positions, whether these positions are f‌illed

with PAS or acting off‌icials (Kinane 2021;O’Connell

2020). Higher turnover of U.S. federal agency appointees

thus induces instability in matters of executive branch

governance.

This study proposes a theory of incentive compatibility

between presidents and executive appointees to under-

stand turnover among the latter (see also, Dixit 2002;

Department of Public Administration and Policy, University of Georgia,

Athens, GA, USA

2

Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT,

USA

Corresponding Author:

Jason S. Byers, Department of Political Science, University of

Connecticut, 365 Fairf‌ield Way, U-1024, Storrs, Connecticut 06269,

USA.

Email: jason.byers@uconn.edu

Gailmard and Patty 2013). This theory maintains that

presidential appointment choices, in conjunction with

whether these appointees’agencies are responsible for

administering policy priorities, exert considerable inf‌lu-

ence on administrative leadership turnover within U.S.

federal agencies. Presidents are privy to public infor-

mation regarding each nominee’s background that can

assist them in facilitating executive administration that is

responsive to their policy interests. Loyalist political

executives enjoy strong incentives to facilitate the pres-

ident’s agenda, albeit also incur costs related to govern-

ment service ranging from personal stress, to foregoing

f‌inancially lucrative careers outside of government, to

greater diff‌iculty operating within the formal structure of

government (Gill and Waterman 2004). Loyalist political

executives wish to serve as proponents insofar that they

can facilitate the president’s policy agenda. Yet, some

loyalist political executives might serve as caretakers

when placed in non-policy priority (i.e., “off-agenda”)

agencies that nominally advance the president’s policy

agenda. Therefore, proponent administrative leaders do

not experience an incentive compatibility problem,

whereas caretaker counterparts do encounter this di-

lemma. This logic predicts that proponent appointees will

serve longer tenures than compared to caretaker ap-

pointees since loyalty to the president confers greater

(lesser) benef‌its associated with executive administration

to proponent (caretaker) appointees. That is, tenure sta-

bility of administrative leaders is jointly determined by

them and presidents.

Using a sample of 860 U.S. federal agency leadership

at-will appointments spanning 41 major U.S. federal

executive agencies and subagencies covering the Carter

through Bush, 43 administrations, compelling empirical

support is obtained for the importance of reconciling the

mutual interests of presidents and their loyalist political

executives when it comes to continuity of U.S. federal

executive leadership appointees. Greater presidential

loyalty displayed by administrative leaders is associated

with longer service when an agency is a presidential

policy priority, while such loyalty results in shorter service

when the agency is not part of the president’s policy

agenda.

This study underscores a key tension underlying ex-

ecutive branch governance—presidential efforts to ensure

responsive competence and continuity in the leadership of

U.S. federal executive agencies require aligning policy

incentives among both elected and appointed off‌icials.

Both the logic and evidence underscore the limits of an

effective top-down politicization strategy premised solely

on presidential authority, void of incentives that affect

administrators’propensity to exit from appointed service.

Next, the importance of continuity and change among

U.S. federal executive appointees is discussed.

On the Importance of U.S. Federal

Executive Appointees’Tenure:

Continuity and Change in Administrative

Leadership Positions

Personnel continuity is of the utmost importance to the

president, and ultimately for coherent executive branch

governance, especially for those individuals serving in

administrative leadership positions within government

agencies. Appointing loyalists is requisite for ensuring

presidents’policy goals are to be faithfully executed by

the federal bureaucracy (Gallo and Lewis 2012;

Hollibaugh, et al. 2014;Moe 1985;Nathan 1983). Longer

tenured administrative leaders enhance the probability of

policy success while reducing the potential of bureau-

cratic drift that a president may incur when high-level

administrative off‌icials must be routinely replaced

(Bertelli and Lewis 2013). It is benef‌icial for individuals

serving in administrative leadership positions to serve for

a substantial amount of time in their appointed leadership

positions within U.S. federal agencies so that they can

cultivate trust with careerist civil servants (Aberbach and

Rockman 2000;Heclo 1977;Resh 2015). Administrative

leadership continuity also mitigates turnover problems

resulting in agency inactivity, loss of agency expertise,

and disruption to implementing either new or nascent

policies (Bertelli and Lewis 2013;Dull, et al. 2012;

O’Connell 2009). Presidential appointment choices shape

both stability and change in executive governance. The

duration of executive appointee service has broad con-

sequences for public agencies. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina

made land fall in the Gulf Coast region of the United

States, causing vast destruction to both life and property.

What followed was one of the largest failures in gov-

ernment response in U.S. history. At the time of the di-

saster, it is estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the positions

in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

were vacant (Bertelli and Lewis 2013). Without stable

leadership in the upper-level positions, an agency is

poorly equipped to handle the routine policy and man-

agement tasks required of all federal agencies. The 2006

bipartisan congressional report, Failure of Initiative,

noted that the confusion within FEMA, and among its

leadership, was exacerbated by such problems relating to

“inexperienced”political appointees (U.S. House of

Representatives 2006: 298). Although the failures asso-

ciated with an inadequate emergency response was nu-

merous, clearly much of FEMA’sfail ures can be traced to

inexperienced leadership resulting from high levels of

personnel turnover.

Considerable variation occurs in the tenure distribution

of U.S. federal executive leadership appointees analyzed

in this study. For instance, the Department of Education

has a median leadership appointee tenure of 718 days,

1708 Political Research Quarterly 76(4)