Private Property in the Context of Community

Published date01 January 2018
Date01 January 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12214
AuthorMatthew Hoffman
Private Property in the Context
of Community
By MATTHEW HOFFMAN*
ABSTRACT. The dominant philosophy of private land ownership—
that private property exists for the benefit of its owner and that use
and ownership should be determined by market forces—is not the
only philosophy in the American tradition. Classical republicanism’s
proprietarian perspective was equally in favor of private property,
but held that private property exists for the benefit of society. This
article begins by presenting the proprietarian view of private
property rights, drawing on the legal scholarship where this
perspective has been revived. Next, I use the case of contemporary
land reform in Scotland to exemplify the rationale for this
perspective. Lastly, I attempt to import the lessons of Scottish land
reformers without importing their model, instead considering ways in
which private land ownership might be embedded in non-market
institutions in the United States.
Introduction
In the introduction to A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold (1949:
viii) says that “we abuse land because we regard it as a commodity.
We know what a commodity is—something that is bought and sold
in the marketplace and valued in terms of the price it fetches there—
but what is wrong with seeing land as a commodity? And what else
might it be? Many Americans who, like Aldo Leopold, are concerned
about the stewardship of land, are also strong believers in private
*Assistant Professor, Dept. of Sociology and Economics, University of Southern
Maine. Guest Researcher, RURALIS—Institute for Rural and Regional Research, Norwe-
gian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway. Education: MS and
PhD in Rural Sociology from Cornell University. Current research focus: property
rights, natural resource governance, and institutions for collaborative decision making
in landscapes fragmented by private property. Email: matthew.hoffman@fulbrightmail.
org
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January, 2018).
DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12214
V
C2018 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
property. Wendell Berry (1995: 49), for example, asserts that land
“should be divided into small parcels among a lot of small owners.”
But does being private property necessarily mean that land needs to
be a commodity?
There are many kinds of property other than public and private, and
even the distinction between these two categories can be blurry (Geisler
2000). Private property itself can also take different forms, reflecting dif-
ferent ideas about what the institution of property is for. While private
property was central to the classical republicanism of the American rev-
olutionary period, the reasons for its importance were very different
than those that undergird the commodity perspective tod ay.
The “proprietarian” perspective of classical republicanism, in which
property rights are expected to enable good citizenship, has experi-
enced a revival in American jurisprudence, raising the question of how
it might be enacted in practice (Simon 1991; Rose 1994; Alexander
1997, 1998; Singer 2000a; Freyfogle 2003, 2011; Blomley 2005). The
institutional context in which the vision of property as a commodity
finds its fullest expression is the free market. In what institutional con-
text would the proprietarian visionbe expressed?
This article begins by first summarizing criticism of the commodity
perspective of land ownership and then presenting the proprietarian
perspective. Next, I use the example of Scotland’s recent land reform
to illustrate the community development rationale for decommodify-
ing land, as well as one institutional mechanism for doing so. Lastly,
I open the question of how the proprietarian model of private prop-
erty might be enacted in the United States today.
The Commodity View of Property
“It’s my property, and I can do whatever I want with it!” This popular
view of ownership has its roots in a conception of property that tends
to assume one easily identifiable person having complete control over
a well-defined material sphere. While many variations on this situation
are readily accepted, this is still the ideal to which we default in the
absence of any further specification. Such a person is said to have title,
and the establishment or identification of clear title is thought to be a
useful way of organizing and adjudicating conflict regarding property.
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology126

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