Primary Unit Cohesion Among the Peshmerga and Hezbollah

• Date: 01 October 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17720922
• Author: Marco Nilsson
• Published date: 01 October 2018
• Subject Matter: Forum on Cohesion

Forum on Cohesion

Primary Unit Cohesion

Among the Peshmerga

and Hezbollah

Marco Nilsson

1

Abstract

This study analyzes the creation of primary unit cohesion among the Kurdish

Peshmerga soldiers fighting the Islamic State in northern Iraq and among Hezbollah

fighters active in Syria. For this comparative study, Kurdish soldiers were inter-

viewed on three fronts outside Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk in February 2015 and May

2016, and Hezbollah fighters were interviewed in Lebanon in March 2016. In con-

trast to many studies’ depictions of unit cohesion as relating to shared experiences

of training and battle, this study argues that the Kurdish soldiers also import into

their units various ideas relating to Kurdish identity. These include ideas about

nationalism and religion produced through discourses within the Kurdish military

and society. However, Hezbollah seeks to minimize political damage in the multi-

sectarian political context in Lebanon while conducting domestically contested

military operations abroad. This has led to a downplaying of the sectarian aspects of

the conflict, which could be imported from the Shia community to increase unit

cohesion, and to an ideological framing of the conflict. The general ideas circulating in

society and the political context therefore matter for the strategies that can be used

to increase primary unit cohesion and soldiers’ fighting power.

Keywords

cohesion/disintegration, military organization, military effectiveness, strategy

1

Jo

¨nko

¨ping University, Jo

¨nko

¨ping, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Marco Nilsson, Jo

¨nko

¨ping University, Gjuterigatan 5, 553 18 Jo

¨nko

¨ping, Sweden.

Email: Marco.Nilsson@ju.se

Armed Forces & Society

2018, Vol. 44(4) 647-665

ªThe Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17720922

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

This study analyzes the creation of primary unit cohesion among the Kurdish Pesh-

merga soldiers in northern Iraq and Hezbollah fighters active in Syria. In contrast to

many studies’ depictions of primary unit cohesion as relating to shared experiences

of training and battle, it argues that the Kurdish soldiers also import into their units

various ideas relating to Kurdish identity. However, Hezbollah seeks to minimize

political damage in the multisectarian political context in Lebanon while conducting

domestically contested military operations abroad. This has led to a downplaying of

the sectarian aspects of the conflict, which could be imported from the Shia com-

munity to increase unit cohesion, and to an ideological framing of the conflict. The

general ideas circulating in society and the political context matter for the strategies

that can be used to increase primary unit cohesion and soldiers’ fighting power.

Shils and Janowitz’s (1948) pioneering study of the German army during the

Second World War (WWII) attributed its exceptional performance to the strength of

small primary groups held together by a strong sense of camaraderie. Since at least

the 1980s, researchers have increasingly sought to understand primary unit cohesion,

how to measure it, and how it is developed (Siebold, 2007). Broadly defined, it is the

tendency of groups to stick together and involves interpersonal bonds, trust, and a

sense of obligation to group members. At least two basic types of bonding can be

distinguished in military units: horizontal bonding (relationships among peers in

primary groups) and vertical bonding (relationships between leaders and subordi-

nates). These can be distinguished from organizational bonding (relationships

between unit members and their unit as a whole) and institutional bonding (relation-

ships between soldiers and their military branch; Siebold, 2007; Siebold &

Kelly, 1988).

Much of the early researchinto unit cohesion was the outcome of interest in combat

performance, as successfully coping wi th battle-related stress during comba t can

increase soldiers’ motivation to fight (Ben-Shalom& Benbenisty, 2016, p. 669). Sev-

eral possible coping mechanisms have been identified, for example, intoxicati on,

inappropriate violence, weapons games, apathy, numbness, dissociation, fatalism,

magical beliefs, and prayer (Ben-Shalom, 2015; Ben-Shalom & Glicksohn, 2013;

Holmes, 1984; Nash, 2006; Taylor & Morgan, 2014). Primary unit cohesion created

by bonding in small militaryunits during drills and combat has also been considereda

significant factor contributing to military units’ fighting power (Noy, 1991; Oliver,

Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999; Van Creveld, 1982). However, King does

not distinguish between cohesion and battlefield performance, as “task cohesion”

refers to group members’ shared commitment to a shared mission (King, 2007,

p. 643). Moreover, the relationship of unit cohesion to motivation and battlefield

performance may be circular, as performance can affect cohesion (Siebold, 1999,

p. 21). It may thereforebe difficult to measure how cohesionreinforces fighting power

(Siebold, 1999), and ad hoc military units comprising soldiers who lack previous

interpersonalbonds can also be effective(Ben-Shalom, Lehrer & Ben-Ari, 2005,p. 77).

Most studies of unit cohesion and combat motivation have focused on the

Western context. Shils and Janowitz (1948) argued that unit cohesion in the German

648 Armed Forces & Society 44(4)