Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival

• Author: Nam Kyu Kim
• Date: 01 February 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002720957064
• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Previous Military

Rule and

Democratic Survival

Nam Kyu Kim

1

Abstract

Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of

democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes

two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types

of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts.

Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their

subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain

organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the

risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses

a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military

rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more

likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist

military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of mil-

itary rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

Keywords

democracy, democratic survival, military rule, civil-military relations

Political scientists have long been interested in why some democracies survive long

enough to consolidate while others revert to authoritarianism after only a brief

democratic period. Many scholars emphasize the threat posed by the military, which

1

Department of Political Science & International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Corresponding Author:

Nam Kyu Kim, Department of Political Science & International Relations, Korea University, Seoul 02841,

Republic of Korea.

Email: namkkim1@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(2-3) 534-562

ªThe Author(s) 2020

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sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720957064

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is a permanent part of the state apparatus and is equipped with privileged access to

coercive resources (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Stepan

1988). Establishing civilian control is thus deemed to be a necessary condition for

successful democratic consolidation. However, this task is particularly challenging

for new democracies transitioning from military rule (Barany 2012; O’Donnell and

Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 2016). Empirical

studies demonstrate that democracies established after military dictatorships are less

likely to survive than those emerging from civilian dictatorships (e.g., Cheibub

2007; Poast and Urpelainen 2015; Svolik 2008, 2015). For example, Svolik

(2015) finds that a democracy preceded by a military dictat orship is about fifty

percent more likely to collapse than a democracy preceded by a civilian dictatorship

or a monarchy.

One shortcoming of the existing literature is that it pays relatively little attention

to variations within military-l ed dictatorships. It tends to ove rlook the fact that

military rule can take two distinct forms : collegial and personalist military rul e

(Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014). The former are characterized by rule by the

military institution, as in the fifty two-year military rule in Myanmar or the Brazilian

dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. Personalist military rule, on the other hand, is

characterized by one-man rule, as in Idi Amin’s dictatorship in Uganda or the

Gaddafi regime in Libya. Most scholars tend to treat collegial and personalist mil-

itary rule alike. They posit that any military rule or coup-born regimes negatively

influence the survival and consolidation of the following democracies by focusing

on whether the dictatorship that preceded a democratic regime was headed by a

military leader (e.g., Cheibub 2007; Londregan and Poole 1990; Poast and Urpelai-

nen 2015; Svolik 2008, 2015). For example, according to the well-known coup trap

argument, both types of military rule would jeopardize the prospects for democratic

survival since the previous history of praetorianism increases the risk of military

coups in the subsequent democratic regimes.

I argue that distinguishing between them has important implications for under-

standing the legacy of military rule, as each military rule relies on different types of

military and offers different types of influence on the rest of the leadership group.

While in both types of military rule, the military tends to seize power by coup and

depends on the armed forces in esta blishing the new dictatorshi p, collegial and

personalist military dictatorships provide different structural conditions for

post-authoritarian contexts. Militaries that establish collegial military rule tend to

maintain organizational cohesion and hierarchical command structure. This allows

credible power-sharing arrangements between military rulers and other high-ranking

officers since such militaries can allow high-ranking officers to make credible

threats and promises by controlling the behavior of junior officers. For the same

reason, these militaries often remain organized and powerful enough to threaten the

survival of new democratic regime even after their extrications. Given the military’s

capacity to stage coups, political and socioeconomic instability plaguing newly

democratized regimes often provide impetus for military coups. Furthermore,

Kim 535