A presumption of guilt: the unlawful enemy combatant and the U.S. war on terror.

• Author: Sadat, Leila Nadya

1. INTRODUCTION

   Since the advent of the so-called "Global War on Terror," the United States of America has responded to the crimes carried out on American soil that day by using or threatening to use military force against Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan. The resulting projection of American military power resulted in the overthrow of two governments--the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the fate of which remains uncertain, and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq--and "war talk" ebbs and flows with respect to the other countries on the U.S. government's "most wanted" list. As I have written elsewhere, the Bush administration employed a legal framework to conduct these military operations that was highly dubious--and hypocritical--arguing, on the one hand, that the United States was on a war footing with terrorists but that, on the other hand, because terrorists are so-called "unlawful enemy combatants," they were not entitled to the protections of the laws of war as regards their detention and treatment. (1) The creation of this euphemistic and novel term--the "unlawful enemy combatant"--has bewitched the media and even distinguished justices of the United States Supreme Court. It has been employed to suggest that the prisoners captured in this "war" are not entitled to "normal" legal protections, but should instead be subjected to a regime d'exception--an extraordinary regime--created de novo by the Executive branch (until it was blessed by Congress in the Military Commissions Act of 2006) (2)--in which any protections afforded the suspects become simply a matter of grace.

   One cannot find the term "unlawful enemy combatant" in the Geneva Conventions or other treatises on the law of war. The administration traces its use to the case of Ex parte Quirin, a World War II opinion addressing the question whether Nazi "spies and saboteurs," who had entered the United States during the war, could be tried before a U.S. military commission. (3) Like many other Bush administration "legal opinions," the use of Quirin as the legal foundation not only for the invention of this new legal category, but to justify indefinite detention, coercive interrogation and other mistreatment, is deeply problematic. What the Court held in Quirin was that because the defendants (mostly German saboteurs) had entered the United States to engage in acts of spying and sabotage, they were not only liable to be captured and detained (like all POWs), but could, in addition, be tried before a military commission for acts violating the laws of war. (4) The Quirin opinion makes reference to "acts which render their belligerency unlawful," and from this language, which meant nothing more than that enemy prisoners who are accused of violating the laws of war may be tried as such, the Executive Branch developed a doctrine of "unlawful enemy combatant (UEC)," as subsequently defined in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. (5) Yet the United States Supreme Court, while admitting the uncertain contours and origin of the term, accepted the President's invocation of it in the Hamdi case. Indeed, the Court held only that Hamdi, a "citizen-detainee" seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant could receive notice of the basis for his classification, and an opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions. (6) Only Scalia and Stevens squarely addressed the question of Hamdi's status, finding that "absent suspension [of the writ of habeas corpus] the Executive's assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge." (7) The same is true of the Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene, which although striking down the suspension of habeas corpus in the Military Commission's Act of 2006, did not question the legitimacy of the classification scheme in the first place. (8) Indeed, like the plurality's view in Hamdi, Justice Kennedy's opinion only permits the detainee to have a meaningful right to rebut the Pentagon's evidence. (9)

   This dehumanization of a whole category of human beings--the "suspected terrorist" or "unlawful enemy combatant"--has had pernicious effects upon the American legal system and severely harmed America's international standing. These doctrines and the propaganda supporting them have led to the systematic use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment used on prisoners detained in the legal limbo known as Guantanamo Bay, Kandahar prison in Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, as well as the rendition of terror suspects to third countries and to "black sites" scattered around the world for detention, interrogation, mistreatment, and sometimes death. (10) Although most (but not all) of the individuals subjected to this regime have been foreigners, the impact of this Executive Activism has been on the American legal regime and the American psyche, for it has been U.S. investigators, U.S. courts, and U.S. lawyers, that carried out the government's plan. To this extent, all Americans are responsible for and affected by these policies, which have been carried out in our names, even if those targeted are, for the most part, aliens. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times recently reported that the officers in charge of the detention of Jose Padilla and Yasser Hamdi, both U.S. citizens detained as "unlawful enemy combatants," in military jails inside the United States, became increasingly uncomfortable and even alarmed that they were being directed to handle their prisoners under "Guantanamo Rules"--depriving them of all natural light for months, repeatedly interrogating them, denying them access to attorneys and mail from home, allowing them no contact with anyone other than guards, and depriving them, for years, even of minor distractions such as a soccer ball or a dictionary. (11)

   This is a serious problem, both quantitatively and qualitatively, because the notion of creating a legal classification whereby all rights granted by law--domestic and international--become simply a matter of executive grace violates not only separation of powers principles but several other foundational principles of the American legal system, including equality before the law and the right to be presumed innocent before being subjected to criminal proceedings (whether civil or military). Indeed, these policies have turned U.S. legal principles upside down, resulting in a presumption of guilt applicable to anyone accused of acts of terrorism by the government--that the terror suspect, or "UEC" must rebut in order to defeat his or her imprisonment--under circumstances that hardly result in the kind of equality of treatment required by international law and U. S. Constitutional principles.

   I will briefly survey the application of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the U.S. enemy combatant cases litigated thus far, before venturing some thoughts on the continuing dangers of these policies, and what might be done to reverse them. I conclude on a cautionary note. Although the new administration may wish to break with the Bush legacy, it may be difficult to do so. "Guantanamo rules" penetrated quickly and deeply into the American legal system, and many of the individuals who wrote them continue to exercise influence and to assert their applicability, extension or incorporation into new legal doctrines and institutions, such as the establishment of so called "national security courts." This essay concludes with seven recommendations to President Obama to strengthen America's human rights infrastructure, and help prevent future human rights violations by the United States of America.

2. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

   1. International Human Rights Law

      The presumption of innocence is found in all modern day human rights instruments. The presumption has a long pedigree, and is codified in the famous French Declarations des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (12) and enshrined in many, if not most, of the world's constitutions in some form or another, or is incorporated by judicial interpretation, as is the case in the United States. (13)

      It was included in article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequently codified in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law." (14) A government could argue that the kind of preventive (indefinite) detention provided for in Guantanamo Bay is not covered by this prohibition because the individuals held there have never actually been accused of a crime; instead, they have been incarcerated as "unlawful enemy combatants" who will, for the most part, never face charges brought before a court of law or a military commission. Yet, earlier drafts of the Universal Declaration referred not to persons charged with crimes but to "any person" or "everyone," and the view of Eleanor Roosevelt and Rene Cassin, two principal drafters of the UDHR, was that the guarantee should benefit "everyone," regardless of whether they were involved in criminal proceedings or not. (15) Accordingly, the presumption is particularly important for those charged in criminal proceedings, but still applicable to those who are not. Moreover, article 9 of the Covenant also prohibits arbitrary detention and provides that "no one" shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, or deprived of liberty except on "grounds and in accordance with [legal procedures]." (16) The classification of an individual by the Executive Branch as an "unlawful enemy combatant" subject to indefinite detention violates this provision, as well.

      The United States could have derogated from articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant, for the Covenant specifically permits derogation from certain of its provisions "in times of public emergency which threatens...