Press Access to Combatant Operations in the Post-Peacekeeping Era

• Author: Colonel James P Terry (Retired)
• Pages: 01

I. Introduction

In the fifteen years since the United States intervened in Grenada in 1983, the Department of Defense (DOD)has engaged in a careful process to balance the requirement that the Government conduct effective military operations, with the requirement that the public, via a free press, be independently informed about the actions of its Government. This process, initiated largely because of adverse press reaction to tighter restrictions on media coverage resulting from military frustrations with the press in Vietnam, has eulminat. ed in a series of negotiations following United States interventions in Grenada, Panama, and Ln the Persian Gulf. During the last five years, however, this process has been in abeyance, because the advent of multi-national peacekeeping often left United States leaders and forces assigned to these initiatives without independent control over either information or operational decision-making.' Somalia and Rwanda are examples of this phenomenon.2

As the decade closes, and a8 the United States and other Western nations revise their view of the utility of United Nations'

Coiansl James P Terry served 8s Legal Cauniei b the Chairman ofthe Jomt Chiefs of Staff from 1 July 1992 until 30 June 1995, when ha retired fmm the United States Marine Corps. He p~esently nerve6 ae a senior offleial in the Dep&ment of the Interim Colonel Pm, received his undergradvste degree from the University of Virglnia I" 1968. his law degree from Mercer University in 1973, and his LLM and SJD degrees from The Oeorge WkshingLon Unwermfy m 1980 and 1982. respectwely He IS widely published m the areas ai caereian cmtml and national s-ty law

See James P. Terry, A Legal Review of LIS Milifcry Invaiumeni 'n Peocakeqping and Peace Enfuimment Opemhms, 42 NAWL L. REV 79 (1995)

It 18 hard to forget the international array of newsmen, complste xlth hghts and esmers equipment. awaiting the ariival of United States Marine by sea sf.Mogadishu, Somalia. during Operation Reatore Hope

JAMES

P. TERRY (RETIRED)'

peace operatians3 in favor of coalition initiatives wnh carefully selected national participants in which operational security 1s stnctly maintained, it may be pmdent to review once agam the role of the press in combatant theaters of operation. If the current crises ~nSierra Leone and the Congo (formerly Zaire), and the continuing unrest in Algeria, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda are representative of the concerns facing us m the next decade, we will likely once again have to address the limits of media access.

This article establishes the framework for debate, reviews the historical currents underlying our present policy regarding press access, examines several conflicts (Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, and Haiti) that have shaped that policy, reviews the litigation arm ing from these operations, and comments on the hlay 1992 "agree-ment on war coverage guidelines" negotiated over B period of eight months between the press and the Department of Defense. Finally, this article explains the shortcomings of the latest polmy guidance, as reflected in the 1996 DOD Directives resulting Cram the post-Desert Storm negotiations, and offere suggestions an areas not addressed, to include numerical Imitations on correspondents assigned to specific military operations, and U.S media access to multinational operations.

11. Framework far Debate

The United States intervention in Grenada in 1983 marked a turning paint in the relations between the working press and US. military officials The exclusion of media from Grenada during the first two days of that operation resulted in a ten-year battle between the media and the Government to establish reasonable limits on press acce~b to U.S. military operations. Following the 1983 inter. vention, immediate demands were leveled by the national media organizations to accommodate the Fourth Estate in combat operations. Two arguments, one historical and one constitutional, were advanced to justify the presence of reporters on the battlefield. These arguments, found within the 1984 Statement of Pnnmples on Press Access to Militaly Operations? urged that, historically, United States reporters "have always been allowed to COWT U.S. troops in

lmited to Chapter VI peacekeepmg ~n contrast to peace enforcement operatms

4 The statement was ~ssued on 10 Janusrv 1964 The ivll text 1s reoorted ~n N Y TIMES, Jan 11, 1984. atAiQ. COI 1

action"5 The journalists also argued that the presence of the press in combat serves the citizens'right to know. The thrust of this claim is tied to the democratic values attributed to a free press as a pillar of American Strength.6 The Sidle Panel, commissioned by the Secretary of Defense to address the press' concerns related to Grenada, assuaged the press initially, but the pool concept it approved was later found by journalists to be inadequate.'

The attempt to find compromise after Grenada, and the press frustrations during the Panama intervention and the Desert Storm operation with the limitations imposed on pool reporters' access to combat operations and military personnel, ultimately led to the 1992 negotiations which resulted in new Department of Defense combat coverage pnnciples. The negotiators from the press finally agreed "that the guidelines offer the kind of coverage the citizens of e democracy are entitled to have."s The implementation of the negotiated agreement evolved into a lengthy process concluding with the publication of two DOD Directives in 1996, and the issuance of a statement entitled Principles of Infomatron by Secretary Cohen on1 April 1997.9

The agreed-upon principles at the heart of these documents include: 11) open and independent coverage ab the principal means of covering USmiiitary operations; (2) use of a pool when it pra-vides the only feasible means of access to a military operation, when space is limited, or for a specific event; 13) the credentialing ofjaurnalists and the requirement to abide by security ground d e s , with nan-observance leading to loss of accreditation; (4) accem for journalists to all major units, although special operations units may

nene media may as& and understand the fads about natidnsl reeurily and defense atraleB"

have some restrictions; (5) the noninterference with reporting by public affairs officers; (6) the responsibility of the militaly to provide transport and communication facilities for pool journalists; (7) the application of these principles to the national media pool; and (8) the agreement by both parties to disagree an the issue of security review.10

Although agreement an them principles provides an important first step in resolving long-standing differences between the military and the media, it leaves as many unanswered questions 86 It resolves. .4n important unresolved ISSUB is the meaning and extent of "open and independent coverage" in the first principle above While reporters would like to believe It means that reporters can go when they want, where they want and report on what they want, operational security IOPSECI and the security of the force will likely dictate otherwise. Nevertheless, the new DOD Directive requires that commanders grant reporters the maximum B C C ~ S S possible to

the battlefield I1

Another major ~ S S U ~

left unresolved in the latest round of negotiations is the question of security review The Department of Defense has remained adamant that It must retain authority to impose security review where operationally required, while the press finds no circumstances which would warrant such extreme measures. All find agreement, however, that certain ground rules to ensure the security of the operation and the safety of the force are warranted.12

engagement details, information an intelligence collectron activities, mdudmg targets, methods and risulfe specific miarmation m fnendlg force traap movements. tactical deplagmenta. and dispositions that would jeopardize ~peraiianal %murny or Ihvei: Identification of mixmon amraft points d o n g x other thin 8s land or carner-baaed. ~nlormalian on the effeefivenehe or the ineffectiveness af enemy camauflage, cover, deception. targering. fire, mtslligence and security meaburea. ~pec~Rc Identlfymg informatian m missing OT downed amraft or ships while search and reaeue misbions are planned or underway. Special

A third area of continuing debate relates to how the Pentagon will determine when the circumstances me such that a pool can be disbanded and "open and independent coverage" permitted. A final issue relates to the question of press access to multinational opera. tions. Except for Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), nearly all our large militaq operations in the last ten years have had multilateral or United Nations' participa. tion. Nevertheless, we have developed no process and no guidelines far accrediting foreign reporters to cover U.S. forces and acti\.ities.13

Each of the concerns addressed is presented in the context of the development of a body of applicable caselaw affecting DOD decismnmaking.

111. Historical Currents

Until the American Civil War, the United States military had neither cause nor capability to censor reports of the working press. There was neither a corps of American war correspondents nor a means to transmit information in a sufficiently timely manner that its dissemination could affect either actions an the battlefield or public opinion. What news that was transmitted came in the form of long-delayed personal letters from soldiers to their loved one8.14 With the advent of the telegraph in the early 18OO's, however, everything changd'j

Although the MexicanAmerican War of 1846-47 saw the emer-gence of the modern war correspandent,16 the Civil War was the first

Except in the esse oioperstmn Dnlfed Shdd m Somalls ~n March, 1995, the

United Sea Jack A Gattachslk. Consistent urth Security. A History ofAmerican

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