Presidents and Generals: Systems of Government and the Selection of Defense Ministers

DOI10.1177/0095327X19900368
Date01 January 2022
Published date01 January 2022
Subject MatterArticles
2022, Vol. 48(1) 136 –163
Presidents and Generals:
Systems of Government
and the Selection of
Defense Ministers
Octavio Amorim Neto
1
and Pedro Accorsi
2
Abstract
Defense ministers are among the most central players in democracies’ civil–military
relations. This article aims to identify the determinants of the selection criteria of
defense ministersin democracies and semi-democracies. More specifically, it attempts
to measure the effects of systems of government on decisions to appoint civilians or
military officers to head the defense ministry. We argue that some characteristics of
presidentialized regimes lead to the appointment of military defenseministers. This is a
novel contribution, one that connects the literatureon civil–military relations andthat
on systems of government. To assess our hypothesis and its mechanisms, we use
comprehensive cross-national data in 1975–2015. Our tests indicate a robust asso-
ciation between presidentialized systems of government and the appointment of
military ministers. We also show that military defense ministers are associated with
some relevant outcomes. These findings have important implications for the study of
civil–military relations, defense policy, and democracy.
Keywords
civil-military relations, democracy, political science, militarism, defense policy,
governmental organization
1
Brazilian School of Public and Business Administr ation (EBAPE), Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV),
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
2
Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
Corresponding Author:
Octavio Amorim Neto, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE), Getulio Vargas
Foundation (FGV), Rua Prof. Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30, Rio de Janeiro 22231-010, Brazil.
Email: oamorim@fgv.br
Armed Forces & Society
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19900368
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Article
Amorim Neto and Accorsi 137
The importance of the ministry of defense is well-established in the scholarly liter-
ature. This ministry is key to the essential problem of civil–military relations in a
democratic setting. Feaver (2003, p. 57) goes to the heart of the question:
In the civil-military context, the civilian contracts with the military agent to develop the
ability to use force in defense of the civilian’s interests. Once the contract is estab-
lished, the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the military agent does what the
civilians want while minimizing the dangers associated with a delegation of power.
In this sense, a civilian-led defense ministry and its civilian advisors constitute a
“police patrol” mechanism to mo nitor delegation to the military ( Feaver, 2003,
p. 86). Bruneau and Goetze (2006, p. 71) conver ge with Feaver: A civilian-led
defense ministry is the best solution to the classic paradox regarding “who guards
the guardians.” That is, it behooves the civilian-led defense ministry to ensure that
civilian principals do not see their authority usurped by military agents.
This idea is consistent with the findings of Cheibub (2007), who argues that
countries where militarism—that is, where armed forces’ interventions in politics
are frequent—remained strong go through democratic breakdowns more frequently.
Likewise, Stepan (1988) sees active-duty military participation in the cabinet as one
of the prerogatives of the armed forces as an institution in democratic regimes. This
prerogative is lower, in Stepan’s (1988, p. 95) view, when there is usually no active-
duty military participation in the cabinet.
Additionally, the frequent presence of military officers at the top of defense
ministries can lead to higher levels of military political influence and lesser dem-
ocratic accountability as far as national security issues are concerned (Croissant
et al., 2017).
Therefore, defense ministers are an essential factor for the quality of democracy.
Along with chief executives, they are often the most central player in any democ-
racy’s civil–military relations. It is precisely their job, among other issues, to man-
age this relationship. Military ministers are more likely to shield the military from
oversight and empower them because they are more likely than civilians to have
incentives to defend the interests of military organizations (Betts, 1991; Bland,
1999; Feaver, 2003). Hence, it is crucial to understand why and under what condi-
tions military (civilian) ministers are selected.
With this in mind, this article investigates the determinants of the selection
criteria of defense ministers in democratic and semi-democratic regimes. Our main
hypothesis is that pure presidentialism should feature a higher frequency of military
officers heading the ministry of defense than presidential-parliamentarism, premier-
presidentialism, and pure parliamentarism, in this order.
As for the definition of each system of government, pure presidentialism is
characterized by five elements: the popular election of the chief executive, the
popular election of an assembly of representatives, the terms of office of the chief
executive and the assembly are fixed and mutually independent, the chief executive
2Armed Forces & Society XX(X)

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