Presidential Leadership Change and Foreign Policy Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate

Date01 December 1972
DOI10.1177/106591297202500403
AuthorCharles M. Sabatt,Charles M. Tidmarch
Published date01 December 1972
Subject MatterArticles
613
PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP
CHANGE
AND
FOREIGN
POLICY
ROLL-CALL
VOTING
IN
THE
U.S.
SENATE
CHARLES
M.
TIDMARCH
and
CHARLES
M.
SABATT
Union
College
EW
OBSERVERS
of
American
foreign
policy
making
since
1940
would
dis-
pute
the
assertion
that
most
of the
major
decisions
in
this
area
of
policy
have
-t-
been
executive
decisions.
Yet,
although
the
President
and
the
foreign
affairs
bureaucracy
have
assumed
preeminent
leadership
in
managing
the
relations
of
the
United
States
with
the
rest
of
the
world,
formal
control
over
foreign
policy
remains
fragmented
and
congressional
participation
in
a
variety
of
activities
has
continued.1
Control
over
appropriations
in
particular
remains
a
major
instrument
of
congres-
sional
influence
upon
the
executive.2
2
If
a
President
is
to
be
an
effective
foreign
policy
leader
vis-a-vis
Congress,
he
must
depend
heavily
upon
the
members
of
his
own
party
for
core
support.
Should
the
President’s
party
be
in
the
minority
in
one
or
both
houses,
a
strictly
partisan
leadership
strategy
would
of
course
be
tantamount
to
inviting
failure.
Furthermore,
even
if
his
party
is
in
the
majority,
he
will
find
it
advantageous
to
cultivate
bipartisan
support,
if
for
no
other
reason
than
to
present
the
face
of
consensus
to
allies
and
enemies
alike
in
the
community
of
nations.
It
is
a
fact
that
members
of
the
President’s
party
in
Congress
tend
to
give
him
somewhat
more
support
than
members
of
the
opposition
party
in
roll-call
voting
on
foreign
policy
issues.
For
example,
in
the
Senate
in
1969
(91st
Congress,
1st
Session),
the
average
Presidential
Foreign
Policy
Support
Score
(a
Congressional
Quarterly
measure)
of
the
Republicans
was
71.3
percent,
while
the
average
Demo-
cratic
score
was
65.1
percent.3
Although
this
is
not
a
strikingly
large
difference,
it
is
significant
(not
in
a
statistical
sense)
if
one
considers
that
the
roll
calls
upon
which
the
scores
are
based
were
among
the
most
important
in
the
session.
Under
such
conditions
various
other
strong
pressures
(e.g.,
constituency,
interest
groups,
com-
mittees)
are
more
likely
to
be
exerted
on
senatorial
voting.
In
other
words,
it
is
NOTE:
The
authors
wish
to
thank
James
E.
Underwood
and
Norman
V.
Walbek,
both
of
Union
College,
for
their
comments
on
an
earlier
draft
of
this
paper.
1
Sheldon
Appelton,
United
States
Foreign
Policy
(Boston:
Little,
Brown,
1968),
pp.
85-109.
Other
important
works
dealing
with
congressional
participation
in
foreign
policy
making
include
Malcolm
Jewell,
Senatorial
Politics
and
Foreign
Policy
(Lexington:
University
of
Kentucky
Press,
1962) ;
David
N.
Farnsworth,
The
Senate
Committee
on
Foreign
Rela-
tions :
A
Study
of
the
Decision-Making
Process
(Urbana:
University
of
Illinois
Press,
1961);
James
A.
Robinson,
Congress
and
Foreign
Policy
Making
(rev.
ed.:
Homewood:
Dorsey
Press,
1967) ;
Roger
Hilsman,
The
Politics
of
Policy
Making
in
Defense
and
For-
eign
Affairs
( New
York :
Harper
and
Row,
1970),
chap. 4 ;
Robert
A.
Dahl,
Congress
and
Foreign
Policy
(New
York:
Harcourt,
Brace
and
World,
1950) ;
Leroy
Rieselbach,
The
Roots
of
Isolationism:
Congressional
Voting
and
Presidential
Leadership
in
Foreign
Policy
(Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill,
1966).
2
David
Howard
Davis,
"The
Price
of
Power:
The
Appropriations
Process
for
Seventeen
For-
eign
Affairs
Agencies,"
Public
Policy,
18
(Spring
1970),
355-81.
3
The
scores
were
taken
from
the
Congressional
Quarterly
Almanac,
1969
(Washington:
Con-
gressional
Quarterly,
Inc.,
1970),
p.
1045.
The
CQ
staff
selected
nineteen
roll-call
votes
as
the
base
for
calculating
the
senators’
scores.

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