Presidential Campaigning in the 2002 Congressional Elections

• Published date: 01 November 2007
• Author: PAUL S. HERRNSON,IRWIN L. MORRIS
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.3162/036298007782398468
• Date: 01 November 2007

629Presidential Campaigning

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXXII, 4, November 2007 629

PAUL S. HERRNSON

IRWIN L. MORRIS

University of Maryland

Presidential Campaigning in the

2002 Congressional Elections

Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and

the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congres-

sional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president

campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush’s decisions

to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his

visits on Republicans’ electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the

president’s electoral self-interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a

candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect.

We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates’

electoral prospects.

In 2002, President George W. Bush mounted an extensive

campaign effort in support of Republican candidates nationwide. From

January to November, Bush made campaign stops—at least one in

every region—for 72 House, Senate, and gubernatorial candidates. He

also made several visits to assist Republican Party committees and a

conservative-leaning political action committee. The vast majority of

the president’s visits were made to assist candidates in competitive

races, although a few, such as visits to House Speaker Dennis Hastert

and Florida representative Bill Young, appear to have been intended

to foster goodwill among safe but powerful incumbents. Scholars, jour-

nalists, and political practitioners have commented on presidential

campaign visits, but little systematic research has been conducted on

the president’s role as congressional campaigner.

For this study, we moved beyond structural and contextual

theories that depict presidents as bystanders in the political milieu of

congressional elections. Using new data, we considered what happens

when a president chooses to play an active role in congressional elec-

tions and asked, When is a president likely to visit a congressional

district to campaign for a candidate, and do these visits matter?

630 Paul S. Herrnson and Irwin L. Morris

Presidential Campaign Effects Revisited

Until recently, midterm losses by the president’s party were the

surest bets in American electoral politics. With the exception of the

1934, 1998, and 2002 elections, presidential parties lost seats in the

House of Representatives relative to the opposition during every mid-

term election in the twentieth century. Although some losses were small

(4 seats in 1962), others were considerable (45 in 1946 and 53 in 1994)

and shifted the balance of power in the chamber. Political scientists

have developed a sizable literature attempting to explain these losses.1

Structural theories involving coattail effects and the surge and decline

of the electorate (A. Campbell 1966), contextual theories focusing on presi-

dential popularity (Kernell 1977; Tufte 1975, 1978) and the state of the

economy (Hibbs 1986, 1987; Tufte 1975, 1978), and theories positing

linkages between structural and conditional factors (J. Campbell 1985;

Jacobson and Kernell 1983) have been used to try to explain midterm

election outcomes. Yet these theories ignore a potentially important as-

pect of recent midterm elections: the president as congressional campaigner.

Current political conditions provide major incentives for a presi-

dent to try to influence congressional elections. The relatively even

partisan balance in Congress ensures that control of either house

depends on the results of a very small number of contests. The prospect

of a change in partisan majorities increases the marginal value of each

additional seat and gives the president strong motivation to campaign

actively for party members who are involved in hotly contested

elections. The ideological polarization and internal cohesiveness of

the congressional parties (e.g., Jacobson 2003) provide policy-related

incentives for presidential campaigning.

Moreover, current conditions make it easier for the president to

influence congressional elections. The decline in the number of

competitive House races has made it simpler for the president and

party organizations to effectively target and coordinate their campaign

efforts (Hoddie and Routh 2004). The emergence of a nationalized

system of campaign finance has facilitated leadership control over the

flow of campaign contributions to congressional candidates (Francia

et al. 2003; Herrnson 2004). Popular presidents, such as Bush in 2002,

are in a particularly good position to capitalize on these resources.

Finally, advances in high-speed travel, namely, those offered by the

modern Air Force One, make it possible for a president to crisscross

the country efficiently and with relative ease.

Which specific candidates presidents choose to help requires

further explanation. Do presidents campaign for party stalwarts,