Preparing now for a peaceful 21st century.

• Author: Kegley, Charles W., Jr.
• Position: International relations

DESPITE the disruptions evident since the end of the Cold War, the great powers have yet to forge a clear, coherent strategy for promoting global security. Instead, confusion and conflicting impulses abound. From efforts to deal with the civil war in what was once Yugoslavia to coping with domestic turmoil in Somalia, their policies have been characterized by hesitation and false starts. The failure to prevent aggression stemming from long-suppressed ethnic hatreds, alongside percolating rivalries among themselves over trade issues, have heightened apprehensions about whether the great powers will be able to maintain peaceful relations in the long term.

To some extent, their struggles are understandable. Creating a global security policy for a chaotic and confusing post-Cold War world is a formidable challenge. The simple bipolar system of the recent past rapidly is giving way to a more complex configuration of strength, and the prevailing uncertainty surrounding the great powers' future intentions makes construction of a new security system difficult.

In today's cloudy global atmosphere, military and economic might are becoming increasingly diffused. In contrast to bipolarity, where two superstates held a preponderance of strength compared to all other countries, the multipolar system of the future appears destined to contain as many as five roughly equal great powers: the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and either Germany or a European Union with a common defense policy. A "power transition" is well under way, and the changes provoked by this redistribution promise to be fundamental. The relative capabilities of the great powers are moving in the direction of approximate parity.

The diffusion of strength among the world's leading states demands attention because some previous forms of multipolarity have been more war-prone than others. For example, the multipolar system of antagonistic blocs that developed on the eve of World War I proved particularly dangerous. When a world of many great powers splits into rival camps, there is little chance that competitors in one policy arena will emerge as partners somewhere else, so as to mitigate the competition. Rather, the gains made by one side will be seen as losses by the other, ultimately causing minor disagreements to grow into larger faceoffs from which neither coalition is willing to retreat.

Since the international system of the early 21st century probably will include three or more extremely powerful states whose security interests are global, it is important that they do not become segregated into rival blocs. While the world can rejoice in the end of Cold War hostility, differences in the interests of the great powers have not disappeared, and there is no assurance that future disagreements will not culminate in intense conflict.

As former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger warns, we are "returning to a more traditional and complicated time of multipolarity, with a growing number of countries increasingly able to affect the course of events." The primary issues are how well the U.S. and Russia can adjust to their unequal decline from overwhelming preponderance, and how well China, Japan, and the European Union will adapt to their newfound importance. "The change will not be easy for any of the players, as such shifts in power relationships have never been easy."

Can great-power cooperation, not renewed conflict, prevail? At issue is whether the security threats that collectively will face the world will be managed through multilateral great-power action instead of the unilateral pursuit of national advantage.

Great-power options in a multipolar future

As power in the international system becomes more diffused, what can be done to prevent the re-emergence of an unstable form of multipolarity? How can the great powers avoid the rivalries that historically have provoked the formation of polarized, antagonistic blocs? Three general courses of action exist: they can act unilaterally; develop specialized bilateral alliances with others; or engage in some form of broad collaboration with many nations. What matters...