Preface.

• Author: Porter, Robert R.

Originalist arguments are present in an increasing number of law school classrooms, in the briefs of many practicing attorneys, and in the written decisions of more than a few judges and Justices. In introducing the theme of this Issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Justice Antonin Scalia--widely considered the leading exponent and practitioner of contemporary originalism--notes that this approach to constitutional interpretation at one time prevailed in the courts. The recent emergence of originalist influence is not itself original but rather represents a return to the original interpretive method of American constitutional law.

The present revival of originalist thinking, however, has yet to achieve ascendancy in the contemporary legal profession. Indeed, even among its proponents, originalism means different things to different people. The wide variety of doctrines that march under the originalist banner--including theories of "original intent," "original understanding," and "original public meaning"--are sometimes at odds with each other. Neither is the politics of (and behind) originalism as straightforward as many critics suggest. Although long associated with the conservative legal movement, there are prominent left-leaning originalists as well as scholars who propound a "conservative" case against originalism.

The symposium essays that follow, ably introduced by Professor Steven Calabresi and including contributions from some of the most eminent proponents and critics of originalism, discuss this mode of constitutional interpretation from a variety of perspectives. These essays originated as panel presentations at the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention held in Washington, D.C., on November 10, 2005. A transcript of the panel proceedings was published in book form as Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007). We are grateful to Gene Meyer and the Federalist Society for sponsoring a conference on this important topic and to Professor Calabresi for helping to organize its proceedings and subsequent publication. We are especially thankful to the distinguished symposium participants for revising, and in some cases greatly expanding, their remarks in order to share their ideas with our readers.

Critics of originalism frequently cite the Coinage Clause as evidence that this interpretive method is unwise and often unworkable. Presuming the phrase "To coin Money" originally to...