Preemptive Action: Measuring Presidential Assertiveness in Foreign Policy Lawmaking
| Published date | 01 November 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221135550 |
| Author | Jakob Wiedekind |
| Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
American Politics Research
2023, Vol. 51(6) 763–780
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221135550
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Preemptive Action: Measuring Presidential
Assertiveness in Foreign Policy Lawmaking
Jakob Wiedekind
1
Abstract
To what extent and under which conditions do presidents challenge foreign policy legislation through Statements of Ad-
ministration Policy (SAPs)? While the presidents’use of executive orders and signing statements has been studied extensively,
this paper argues that SAPs are a subtler and less politically costly tool that is more important than scholars realized. Delivered
at a crucial intervention point along the legislative process, these communications provide a key gatew ay for assertive
presidential challenges. Relying on a novel assertiveness-score, this paper finds that SAPs target legislative content more
aggressively over time and that the composition of government predicts executive assertiveness particularly well. Next to that, I
show that presidents are more assertive when their term comes to an end. These insights contribute to our understanding of
spiking interbranch tensions in American Politics.
Keywords
executive-legislative relations, presidents, foreign policy, lawmaking, statements of administration policy
Introduction
The specter of unchecked presidential discretion in foreign
and defense policy looms large in scholarship on the sepa-
ration of powers in American government (Mayer, 1999;
Howell, 2003;Rudalevidge, 2005;Young, 2013;Bolton &
Thrower, 2016). Interbranch competition in lawmaking often
centers on extensions of presidential power that are at the
forefront of the public and academic discourse on legislative
bargaining –especially so in settings of divided government
(Key, 1964;Krehbiel, 1998;Lindsay, 2017;Bolton &
Thrower, 2022). In foreign and defense policy, presidents
usually exercise their power by means of unilateral executive
action (Marshall & Pacelle, 2005;Canes-Wrone et al., 2008)
–especially so under the impression of international crises
(Young, 2013). Yet, presidents also regularly and assertively
intervene preemptively in lawmaking, which is often over-
looked under the impression of more overt and direct ex-
ecutive action in foreign policy. Therefore, this paper seeks to
contribute to understanding the ways in which presidents
engage lawmakers preemptively as they draft legislation in
this policy area. I calculate a novel assertiveness-score based
on executive communications that captures the extent of early
presidential opposition and I apply it to pivotal legislation.
While presidential intervention can take multiple forms, I
focus on Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) to
pinpoint preemptive signals, because they mark direct ex-
ecutive interventions that convey positions on pending
legislation, which are often section-specific. Presidents re-
lease them through the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Executive Office of the president (EOP)
letterhead and provide Congress with a straightforward de-
scription of the president’s position on pending legislation
usually after the corresponding full committee reports the bill.
Yet, extant literature tends to underestimate the true extent of
presidential challenges voiced in SAPs. We also know little
about how their use might have changed over time and to
what extent contextual factors help to explain variance in the
degrees of opposition voiced therein. Hence, I posit the
following research question: To what extent and under which
conditions do presidents challenge foreign policy and defense
legislation through SAPs?
I assess three central propositions: First, I argue that
presidential assertiveness in SAPs gradually grew more de-
cisive over time. The gradual expansion of presidential as-
sertiveness aims to heighten executive prerogatives in the
early stages of lawmaking over the long term as presidents
leverage their veto threat power to define the substance of
legislative bargaining. It is an incremental dynamic because
1
Leibniz Universit¨
at Hannove, Hannover, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Jakob Wiedekind, Leibniz Universit¨
at Hannover, Schneiderberg 50, Office
118, Hannover 30167, Germany.
Email: j.wiedekind@ipw.uni-hannover.de
presidents gradually adjust their negotiating strategies to
long-term shifts in the contextual factors that impact inter-
branch relations (i.e. more frequent divided government).
Second, I expect a marked rise in assertiveness after the
September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United
States because the prevalence of presidential preferences that
was characteristic of lawmaking in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 meets tougher scrutiny as the rally-‘round-the-flag
effect fades. Presidents respond with more assertive messages
to ward off undesirable legislation early that might reestablish
constraints loosened by the crisis. Third, I posit that three
contextual factors correlate with changes in the extent of
presidential challenges in SAPs. More specifically, I expect
divided government, strong approval ratings and high levels
of polarization to each be associated with rising presidential
assertiveness. I explain the rationales behind these assump-
tions in detail below. I measure the extent of presidential
opposition by categorizing each section of SAPs individually
and without limiting the analysis to veto threats. I also an-
alyze the conditions under which presidents challenge
Congress on foreign policy legislation by means of SAPs
more or less aggressively.
My empirical strategy leverages a multi-method research
design that incorporates content analysis techniques, linear
regression modelling and descriptive statistics to assess these
propositions. First, content analysis classifies SAPs according
to the degree of assertiveness voiced therein in order to
measure the dependent variable. Second, descriptive statistics
and regression analysis assess the relationship between se-
lected predictors and the degree of opposition voiced in
SAPs. Empirically, the analysis focuses on SAPs addressing
the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) between
1985 and 2020.
My findings contribute to a more comprehensive under-
standing of presidential intervention in lawmaking in multiple
respects. First, they show that the lion’s share of SAPs that
address NDAAs present Congress with strong presidential
opposition. Second, controlling for approval ratings and
different polarization measures, the composition of govern-
ment seems to be the most reliable predictor for more as-
sertive presidential challenges. Third, evidence for a critical
juncture in connection to 9/11 is scarce while a clear gradual
shift towards a bolder presidency emerges that appears to be
largely detached from rising polarization. The paper proceeds
as follows: Next, I connect my research to previous studies
before I illuminate the rationales behind my propositions.
Then, I outline my empirical strategy, which I leverage to
assess my original data-set. I conclude with the discussion of
my results.
Literature Review
I organize the connected literature in two strands. The uni-
lateralism-strand investigates congressional-executive rela-
tions focusing on presidential unilateral actions that are
understood as instruments to circumvent or to evade con-
frontations with Congress (Howell, 2003,2005;Lowande,
2014;Bolton & Thrower, 2016;Belco & Rottinghaus, 2017;
Warber et al., 2018). In this strand, scholars often give special
attention to executive orders and aim to uncover to what
extent contextual factors matter for the issuance of these
directives (Mayer, 2002;Warber,2006;Fine & Warber, 2012;
Rottinghaus, 2019;Barber et al., 2019). They also highlight
that presidents act strategically and with a certain degree of
assertive autonomy when they employ unilateral means
(Waber et al., 2018, p. 112; Bolton & Thrower, 2016). I argue
that much of executive assertions of power predate executive
orders, which also feeds into presidents’assertive autonomy.
Next to executive orders, signing statements rose to
prominence in this discourse because they allow presidents to
shape how federal agencies implement legislation (Kelley &
Marshall, 2009;Rice, 2010;Ainsworth et al., 2012;
Moraguez, 2019). However, by 2017, the number of signing
statements had dropped considerably. One prevalent expla-
nation suggests that legislators ramping up their oversight
efforts on the implementation of laws that received a signing
statement increased the political costs of using them in the
first place (Sievert & Ostrander, 2017, p. 773). I propose an
extension to this explanation: assertive SAPs signal presi-
dential opposition earlier and therefore might foreshadow
what presidents seek to correct or to accentuate in signing
statements. In support of this notion, Bolton & Thrower
(2016, p. 661) conclude that “[…] the future of unilateral
work may well focus on the complementarities of unilateral
tools and the ways they combine with other presidential
strategies for interacting with Congress and directing
agencies.”My work on SAPs can provide helpful insights on
an important piece of this puzzle, because I illuminate pre-
emptive assertiveness, while most of the unilateralism-strand
hitherto centers on the implementation of laws. SAPs rise in
scholarly attention because they are influential envoys of
presidential preferences within the lawmaking process (Rice,
2010;Ainsworth et al., 2014). Looking at particularly con-
troversial lawmaking-processes during the Bush- and the
Clinton-Administration, Rice (2010, p. 704) identifies mul-
tiple cases that point to SAPs rather than signing statements
for the last word on the targeted provisions’implementation.
Therefore, I argue that SAPs are a rather subtle and less
politically costly tool for presidents to intervene in the
process of lawmaking.
In the veto-bargaining strand, scholars predominantly
investigate the arena in which interbranch contestation comes
to the forefront most frequently (Cameron, 2000;Cameron &
McCarty, 2004). In the process of lawmaking, the veto is a
potent tool for legislative influence and it rarely comes as a
surprise to Congress. “Rather, these vetoes usually have been
signaled well in advance with the hope that knowledge of an
impending veto will shape the legislation as it moves through
the process.”(Deen & Arnold, 2002, p. 31). Vetoes also do
not have to be exercised to be important. Veto threats are lines
764 American Politics Research 51(6)
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