Predicting Political Influence on State Ethics Commissions: Of Course We Are Ethical—Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink

• Date: 01 January 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12290
• Published date: 01 January 2015

Jonathan Rauh is a doctoral candidate

at the University of South Carolina. His

interests include ethics and accountability,

education policy, and health policy. His work

has appeared in Public Organization

Review, Administration & Society, and

Education Policy Analysis Archives. In

his current position, he works in regulatory

affairs for the health insurance industry.

E-mail: wjrauh@gmail.com

98 Public Administration Review • January | February 2015

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 75, Iss. 1, pp. 98–110. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12290.

Jonathan Rauh

University of South Carolina

Abstract:  is article explores the ability of elected of‌f‌i cials to af‌f ect the autonomy of state ethics commissions.  e

author examines autonomy as a function of the capacity of ethics commissions to control their f‌i nances and personnel

decisions and how the presence or absence of that capacity af‌f ects whether bureaucratic structures can function inde-

pendently of politics. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, the analysis extends previous arguments

concerning political actors’ desire to af‌f ect ethics commissions. Findings suggest that elected of‌f‌i cials use their positions to

control the makeup of commission leadership and f‌i nancial resources, with the goal of decreasing commissions’ ability

to act autonomously.

Practitioner Points

• Ensuring that those who are monitored do not control appointments is essential for reducing political

interference on ethics commissions.

• It is necessary to set positive standards of required experience for serving as a commissioner rather than just

relying on negative standards for who may not serve.

• A commission with a higher budget relative to its required tasks will likely be more autonomous.

Constituencies expect ethics commissions to provide

oversight of their public and elected of‌f‌i cials. In a

white paper for the National Conference of State

Legislatures, Comlossy states that ethics commis-

sions “work to ensure voters’ trust in policymakers

and political institutions by monitoring compliance

with ethics laws and ensuring

ethical conduct by those under

their jurisdiction” (2011, 1).

Commissions serve as watch-

dogs for the public; they ensure

that conf‌l icts of interest are

exposed, f‌i nancial dealings are

done “in the daylight,” and

the decision-making process is

transparent. In practice, however, ethics commissions

are primarily compliance organizations that set mini-

mum standards for what is acceptable (Smith 2003b).

Most commissions lack strong mandates but also

can only interpret what is ethical according to set

rules and guidelines. Ethics commissions and most

ethics policies have been born of scandals (Rosenson

2003)—the trend of creating state ethics commis-

sions can be traced to Watergate. Ethics policies,

therefore, tend to be responsive and do not ref‌l ect the

true preferences of elected of‌f‌i cials (see Anechiarico

Predicting Political Inf‌l uence on State Ethics Commissions:

Of Course We Are Ethical—Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink

Political inf‌l uence over ethics commissions is an

important topic in thinking about the legiti-

macy of these commissions. However, politi-

cal inf‌l uence over ethics commissions presents some

sticky problems for the current literature on bureau-

cratic autonomy. No bureaucracy has the authority

to make its own mandate, but

it is important that some have

greater autonomy than oth-

ers. Ethics commissions do not

usually regulate the providers

of public goods or other private

entities; instead, they target

elected and public of‌f‌i cials,

that is, those who make public

policy.  erefore, it is desirable that ethics commis-

sions have broad mandates; have the authority, fund-

ing, and capacity to accomplish those mandates; and

be able to do so without ex ante or ex post pressure

from elected of‌f‌i cials.

Commissions are politically empowered institu-

tions that have a responsibility to monitor those who

empower them.  is power and the ability of commis-

sions to harm elected of‌f‌i cials both economically and

politically may give elected of‌f‌i cials an incentive to

exert control over ethics commissions.

No bureaucracy has the author-

ity to make its own mandate,

but it is important that some

have greater autonomy than

others.