The United Nations Post-Brahimi: an interview with the UN under secretary-general for peace operations.

• Author: Khan, Shireen
• Position: The Future of the United Nations

Interviewed on 20 December 2001 by Shireen Khan

Journal: It has been more than a year since the Brahimi Panel report was published. Which recommendations from the report have been implemented? What is your view on the implementation of those recommendations?

Guehenno: Well, in the Brahimi Panel report, there are recommendations that really call for action in the Secretariat and recommendations that call for action by the member states. I think the whole philosophy of the Brahimi report is to say, there are some fundamental issues that are really the responsibility of the Security Council and of the member states.

The Security Council has to give mandates that are achievable. The Security Council has to make sensible decisions and not just push the problem to the UN because it's more convenient, while knowing that it won't be solved by the UN. So, there is the responsibility of the Security Council to be responsible in its actions.

There is the responsibility of the member states to provide the means for implementation because the UN has no standing army. The troops, the police, the people we deploy in the field--they are provided by member states. So, with the best of intentions, if there is not a political will to deploy troops, if there is no troop contributor in a situation where it's required, what can we do?

Then there is a third responsibility, which is the responsibility of the Secretariat, and that's what we'll be focusing on. The Secretariat has to give good advice to the Security Council. It has to make intelligent and efficient use of the resources provided to it by the member states. And that's important, also, to create the kind of trust that has to exist between the member states so that they do not have the excuse, so to speak, to say, "Well, the Secretariat is not going to handle what we give the Secretariat in an efficient way."

That's what we've been focusing on in the past 15 months. The Brahimi Panel report really set a sort of broad strategic direction. It helped build a consensus that there were a number of practical issues that had to be addressed, that had to be fixed. Without the political momentum given by the Brahimi Panel report, we would never have had the clout to really move things forward.

On the basis of that report we then developed the fine print. The first place to address the most immediate need in the department was to have an emergency budgetary package, because the quantitative and the qualitative are linked.

We had a massive shortage of staff because we are a department that has about 60,000 people in the field, of which 40,000 are troops, 8,000 are police, and the balance, civilian personnel. To manage those 60,000 people with a little more than 400 people, the ratio of support to field-deployed people is insane. The first step, in fall of 2000, was addressing that immediate emergency need.

The second step was to look at what would be the right department. We hired consultants. On the basis of their findings, we brought in people who had run operations or had direct experience in peacekeeping, such as former special representatives of the secretary-general, from a range of nationalities so that the consultants' report could not be biased, by say, one particular type of geographic bias.

It was important because it was a reality check on sound recommendations. And, we did not buy the recommendations of the consultants right away. On the basis of that, we did our own homework and then produced recommendations on what the structure of the department would be and what the right size, the right staffing level, would be for the department. We found that about 630 something would be right.

We had 93 posts in the first batch. We have 92 posts in the balance. In essence, I think we'll have a reasonable structure; I mean a lean one, but a reasonable one.

Journal: How close are we to seeing a standing UN military force that can respond rapidly to crisis situations? How should it be proposed if there is one? What are the obstacles?

Guehenno: Well, I do believe that being able to deploy quickly is important for the success of any operation. I think everybody who looks at the political situation in the world today would reach the conclusion that there is no consensus on such an idea today. And that was the recommendation of the Brahimi Panel report.

There is a lot of room for improvement in that system, but the improvement depends very much on the political will of the member states. It needs to have up-to-date information in our database to have very precise commitments. All that requires, I think, the strengthening of the relationship between the UN Secretariat and the potential true contributors.

To improve our rapid deployment capacity we really have to work on three problems. First, the relations with the member states and a greater commitment of the member states to provide troops. Second, more effective planning and more resources for a strategic reserve for peacekeeping, for the equipment needed in peacekeeping operations. That means strengthening our base in Brindisi. And third, probably improvement in our financial rules so that we can spend money in a timely fashion...