Pork‐Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress

• Published date: 01 February 2015
• Author: Yann P. Kerevel
• Date: 01 February 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12068

YANN P. KEREVEL

Lewis University

Pork-Barreling without Reelection?

Evidence from the Mexican Congress

Previous research on term-limited legislators suggests they have fewincentives to

engage in pork-barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term-

limited, I f‌ind legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a

reelection incentive. I argue term-limited legislators are progressivelyambitious and use

interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I f‌ind legislators elected in

single-member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through

proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future off‌ice. I

also f‌ind governors and gubernatorial elections inf‌luence the submission of budget

amendments, which is related to gubernatorial inf‌luence over political careers.

Prior research on pork-barreling and constituency service largely

explains this behavior through the reelection incentive (Alvarez and

Saving 1997; Arnold 1990; Bickers and Stein 1996; Mayhew 1974; Stein

and Bickers 1994). According to this logic, incumbent legislators can

distribute federal resources to their districts to claim credit for serving

constituent interests in order to increase their chances of reelection.

Studies of the effects of term limits and “shirking” among legislators in

their f‌inal term support this logic as these studies f‌ind legislators are less

attentive to their constituency, participate less, and are less likely to direct

government resources to their districts (Carey et al. 2006; Herrick,

Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). These

US-based studies provide a strong theoretical argument for why legisla-

tors who cannot seek reelection would not provide constituency service

or particularistic benef‌its.

In cases where legislators are unlikely to seek reelection, either

because of low reelection rates, strong party control over ballot access, or

reelection is prohibited by law, one might expect these legislators not to

engage in pork-barreling or constituency service due to the lack of a

reelection incentive. In the case of Mexico, where legislators are consti-

tutionally prohibited from seeking immediate reelection to the same

off‌ice, one would expect very little provision of particularistic benef‌its.

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LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 40, 1, February 2015 137

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12068

© 2015 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa

Indeed, research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested legisla-

tors have few incentives to engage in constituency service or pork-

barreling activities due to the lack of reelection, party voting in the

electorate, and strong party control over the candidate-selection process

(Casar 2002; Freidenberg 2010; Nacif 2002; Ugues Jr., Medina Vidal,

and Bowler 2012; Weldon 2002; Wuhs 2006).

However, most Mexican legislators are career politicians, even if

they are not career legislators. If one assumes that Mexican legislators are

progressively ambitious, as is common in studies of legislatures where

reelection is less frequent than in the US Congress (e.g., Samuels 2003;

Micozzi 2009; Taylor 1992), then one should expect them to engage in

activities while in off‌ice to further their careers after leaving Congress.

For example, federal legislators seeking to run for mayor, state legislator,

or governor after serving in the legislature may engage in activities that

target their future constituency. Legislators seeking a future subnational

off‌ice should be more likely to engage in “pork-barreling” behavior in

order to claim credit with their “selectorate” (Micozzi 2009; Samuels

2003). However, not all legislators in federal systems seek a subnational

off‌ice for which pork-barreling would serve one’s career interests, and

thus variation in ambition should lead to variation in providing particu-

laristic benef‌its.

Moreover,some recent research has suggested the increased impor-

tance of federalism has led to greater pressures on Mexican federal

deputies from governors to represent local and state interests due to the

inf‌luence governors have over the careers of copartisans from their state

(Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011). Gubernatorial inf‌luence

over federal deputies may pressure deputies to represent constituent

interests despite the lack of a reelection incentive and is another indicator

that legislators are engaging in strategic behavior to further their political

careers after leaving a three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies.

In addition to the personal motivations of legislators to further their

careers, electoral rules may also inf‌luence whether or not legislators

engage in constituency service (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006;

Lancaster 1986; Stratmann and Baur 2002). Although all legislators

come from some geographic region, individuals elected in single-

member districts (SMD) are likely to have greater ties to specif‌ic con-

stituencies and also feel greater pressure from district interests or

“attentive publics” (Arnold 1990; Bickers and Stein 1996) to deliver

compared to individuals elected through closed-list proportional repre-

sentation (PR). Moreover, due to variation in the candidate-selection

methods for SMD and PR deputies in Mexico, competing principals may

exert different pressures on SMD and PR deputies (Freidenberg 2010;

138 Yann P. Kerevel