Polluting ‘til the Cows Come Home: How Agricultural Exceptionalism Allows Cafos Free Range For Climate Harm
Polluting ‘til the Cows Come Home:
How Agricultural Exceptionalism Allows
CAFOs Free Range for Climate Harm
RYAN LEVANDOWSKI*
ABSTRACT
Despite strong opposition under the Trump administration, recent U.S. cli-
mate policy proposals continue to focus on reducing the amount of greenhouse
gases emitted by some of the most polluting sectors—from transportation to
electricity generation—but one high-polluting industry has been overlooked for
decades: animal agriculture. Although animal agriculture, especially beef pro-
duction, accounts for a significant amount of highly potent greenhouse gases,
including methane (“CH
4
”) and nitrous oxide (“N
2
O”), regulators have not
sought to curb emissions from livestock and their waste. Instead, the sector
enjoys numerous and longstanding freedoms from environmental regulation—
part of a system that agricultural law scholars have deemed “agricultural
exceptionalism”—perpetuated by virtue of our reliance on, and traditional
notions of, agricultural production. However, agricultural trends over the past
few decades have led to a model of highly concentrated and industrialized ani-
mal agriculture that bears little resemblance to the family farm. With the rise of
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), facilities collocating
hundreds to thousands of animals and their waste on small areas of land, the
animal agriculture industry, more than ever, resembles the conventional model
of a greenhouse gas-emitting source.
This Note expands upon the pervasive regime of agricultural exceptionalism and
analyzes some of its ramifications in the climate context. In particular, this Note
examines the scope of climate impacts from CAFOs, the failure of federal regula-
tion to address those impacts, and the potential of alternative methods—namely,
common law climate litigation—as a substitute for regulatory intervention.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
I. Animal Agriculture is a Significant Contributor to Climate Change. . . . . 153
* Georgetown Law, J.D. 2020; The George Washington University, B.A. 2016. © 2020, Ryan
Levandowski. The author thanks Professor Lisa Heinzerling and the editors of the Georgetown
Environmental Law Review.
151
A. Animal Agriculture is a Leading Emitter of Greenhouse Gases. . . . 154
B. Animal Agriculture Can Play a Role in Climate Change Mitigation . . 155
1. Opportunities for Reducing Emissions from Animal
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2. Obstacles to Reducing Emissions from Animal Agriculture . . . 157
II. Agricultural Exceptionalism has led to a Failure of Federal Oversight. . . 158
A. Federal Regulators Lack Sufficient Information to Regulate CAFO
Air Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
1. EPA Lacks Adequate Information on CAFO Greenhouse Gas
Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
2. Federal Deregulation Further Limits Access to CAFO Emission
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B. EPA Refuses to Use its CAA Authority to Regulate CAFOs. . . . . . 163
1. EPA has Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gases under the
CAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
2. EPA has Avoided Applying Stationary Source Regulations to
CAFOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
III. Climate Litigation is an Unproven Substitute for Federal Regulation. . . . 166
A. CAFOs Face the Same Barriers to Federal Public Nuisance Litigation
as Other Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
B. State Law Presents Unique Barriers to Nuisance Liability for
CAFOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
INTRODUCTION
The world is facing an existential climate emergency.
1
Recent climate reports
warn of food shortages, wildfires, and inundated coastlines, among other dire
consequences that may be unavoidable—absent an unprecedented transformation
of the global economy.
2
Yet policy responses have been slow and may fail to pre-
vent some of these most serious effects of climate change.
3
Recently, climate pol-
icy in the United States has been particularly troublesome, as the Trump
Administration has reversed some of the most significant Obama-era climate reg-
ulations.
4
However, one major emitter of greenhouse gases has avoided the atten-
tion of policymakers for decades: the animal agriculture industry.
1. WILLIAM J. RIPPLE, CHRISTOPHER WOLF, THOMAS M. NEWSOME, PHOEBE BARNARD, & WILLIAM
R. MOOMAW, World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency, BIOSCIENCE, https://perma.cc/
JZ32-UK6Z
2. See CORAL DAVENPORT, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/X3XK-TGXS (reporting on a landmark special report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
3. See U.N. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5 ˚C, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4–10 (2018).
4. See Daniel Farber, U.S. Climate Policy: Obama, Trump, and Beyond, 10(2) REVISTA DE ESTUDOS
CONSTITUCIONAIS, HERMENE
ˆUTICA E TEORIA DO DIREITO 95 (2018).
152 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:151
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