Politics of Disclosure: Organizational Transparency as Multiactor Negotiation

• Date: 01 September 2018
• Author: Leonhard Dobusch,Maximilian Heimstädt
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12895
• Published date: 01 September 2018

Politics of Disclosure: Organizational Transparency as Multiactor Negotiation 727

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 78, Iss. 5, pp. 727–738. © 2017 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12895.

Leonhard Dobusch is professor of

business administration with a focus on

organization at the University of Innsbruck.

He holds degrees in law and in business

studies, and his main research interests

include the management of digital

communities and private regulation via

standards.

E-mail: leonhard.dobusch@uibk.ac.at

Maximilian Heimstädt is

postdoctoral researcher at the Reinhard

Mohn Institute of Management at Witten/

Herdecke University. In his research,

he explores the genesis and effects of

openness as an organizing principle. He

lives in Witten, Germany.

E-mail: maximilian.heimstaedt@uni-wh.de

Abstract: Transparency is in vogue, yet it is often used as an umbrella concept for a wide array of phenomena. More

focused concepts are needed to understand the form and function of different phenomena of visibility. In this article,

the authors define organizational transparency as systematic disclosure programs that meet the information needs of

other actors. Organizational transparency, they argue, is best studied as an interorganizational negotiation process on

the field level. To evaluate its merit, the authors apply this framework to a case study on the introduction of open data

in the Berlin city administration. Analyzing the politics of disclosure, they consider the similarities and differences

between phenomena of visibility (e.g., open data, freedom of information), explore the transformative power of

negotiating transparency, and deduce recommendations for managing transparency.

Evidence for Practice

• The creation of organizational transparency, the systematic and rule-bound disclosure of relevant

information, can be understood as a negotiation process between a focal organization and its stakeholders.

• In this process, information providers (e.g., city agencies) can contribute to the realization of mutual benefit

through tactful timing, structural coupling, and the creation of new role expectations.

• Information seekers (e.g., advocacy organizations) can shape the process toward mutually beneficial outcomes

through means of formalization and by using hybrid strategies (e.g., by simultaneously campaigning with

very broad and very specific demands).

Maximilian Heimstädt

Witten/Herdecke University

Leonhard Dobusch

University of Innsbruck

Politics of Disclosure:

Organizational Transparency as Multiactor Negotiation

Far-reaching disclosure scandals and a growing

distrust in institutions have fueled the theoretical

debate on the form and function of transparency.

While some authors argue provocatively that theories

of transparency have failed (Fenster 2015), others

ask for theoretical and empirical efforts that allow for

greater complexity when studying transparency (Meijer

2013). So far, transparency has often been used as an

“umbrella construct” (Hirsch and Levin 1999) that

accounts for a wide variety of phenomena. While this

approach is helpful in establishing a new research field,

in this article, we show how more specific concepts

of transparency allow for a deeper understanding and

help make practical recommendations regarding how

to manage transparency.

At the beginning of this article, we develop a

definition of what we consider one of the most

interesting phenomena of visibility: organizational

transparency (Albu and Flyverbom 2016; Cucciniello,

Porumbescu, and Grimmelikhuijsen 2017; Garsten

and Montoya 2008). In contrast to individual acts

of transparency and other forms of information

disclosure, organizational transparency, we argue, is

characterized by systematic programs for information

disclosure that meet information needs external

to the organization (cf. Bernstein 2017). In recent

years, a large proportion of studies on the creation

of organizational transparency in the public sector

have explored the adoption of open data. While early

studies explored mainly barriers to open data adoption

(Janssen, Charalabidis, and Zuiderwijk 2012), recent

accounts have looked at antecedent and enabling

conditions of open data as a form of organizational

transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen and Feeney

2017). Overall, many of these studies call for more

processual and contextual research into the creation

of organizational transparency between public

organizations and their stakeholders (Cucciniello,

Porumbescu, and Grimmelikhuijsen 2017; Meijer

2013). Responding to these calls, we complement

our definition of organizational transparency with

a process framework that allows us to study the

interorganizational negotiation of disclosure programs

between “challengers” (information seekers) and

“incumbents” (information providers), who “vie for

advantage” (Fligstein 2013, 41) on the field level

(Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Zietsma and Lawrence

2010). We call this new framework the politics of

disclosure (cf. Hansen and Flyverbom 2015).

Research Article