Political Theory and the Theory of Action
| Published date | 01 September 1981 |
| Date | 01 September 1981 |
| Author | John G. Gunnell |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591298103400303 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
POLITICAL
THEORY
AND
THE
THEORY
OF
ACTION
JOHN
G.
GUNNELL
State
University
of
New
York
at
Albany
HE
PURPOSE
of
this
essay
is
to
present
the
basic
elements
of
a
t
theory
of
human
action
and
to
suggest
their
relevance
for
claims
about
political
phenomena.
Although
it
would
be
desirable
to
offer
the
analysis
of
action
without
an
introduction
and
justification,
there
are
at
least
two
reasons
why
such
a
move
might
be
problematical.
First,
this
type
of
analysis,
and
even
the
idea
of
what
is
referred
to
here
as
&dquo;theory,&dquo;
does
not
have
an
accepted
place
within
the
disciplinary
matrix
of
contemporary
political
science.
Although
my
principal
concern
in
this
essay
is
neither
to
demonstrate
the
need
for
such
a
theory
in
political
science
nor
to
explore
its
possible
implications
for
prevailing
forms
of
research,’
a
summary
statement
of
the
arguments
and
assumptions
relating
to
such
matters
is
required.
Sec-
ond,
although
the
theory
is
in
certain
respects
related
to
accounts
of
social
scientific
explanation
that
advocate
what
has
been
variously
described
as
an
interpretative,
hermeneutical,
or
phenomenological
mode
of
inquiry,
there
is
a
fundamental
logical
difference.
It
is
a
claim
about
action
as
a
kind
of
-
phenomenon
rather
than
about
the
explanation
of
action.
This
is
a
crucial
distinction
which,
along
with
several
other
issues
raised
by
this
analysis,
will
be
discussed
briefly
in
Sections
I
and
III.
Section
II
presents
the
substance
of
the
theory,
but
the
argument
is
necessarily
very
compressed
in
this
context.2
SOCIAL
SCIENTIFIC
THEORY
AND
THE
THEORY
OF
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
Theorizing
in
political
science
and
social
science
in
general
(in
the
sense
of
making
substantive
claims
about
the
character
of
political
phenomena)
has
been
severely
inhibited
by
the influence
of
certain
aspects
of
academic
phi-
losophy.
This
problem
became
acute
during
the
behavioral
era
when
the
_
discipline
turned
to
the
philosophy
of
science
(that
is,
theories
about
sci-
ence),
and
particularly
the
logical
positivist
and
logical
empiricist
reconstruc-
tion
of
the
logic
and
epistemology
of
scientific
explanation,
as
a
rationale
for,
and
guide
to,
the
practice
of
empirical
inquiry,
but
it
did
not
end
there.
Neither
the
advocates
of
behavioralism
nor
their
critics
avoided
the
dilem-
mas
arising
from
the
relationship
between
social
science
and
philosophy.
During
the
past
decade,
the
assumptions
about
science
which
charac-
terized
behavioralism
as
a
philosophy
of
inquiry
and
which
continue
to
in-
form
the
conception
of
science
held
by
many,
and
maybe
most,
political
scientists
were
subjected
to
an
intensive
critique
from
the
perspective
of
alternative
views
in
the
philosophy
of
science.3
It
is
not
surprising
that
politi-
cal
science,
in
attempting
to
establish
itself,
practically
and
reputationally,
as
1
For
a
more
detailed
discussion
of
these
matters,
see
John
G.
Gunnell,
"Political
Science
and
the
Theory
of
Action:
Prolegomena,"
Political
Theory
7
(February
1979):
75-100;
"Philosophy
and
Political
Theory,"
Government
and
Opposition
14
(Spring
1979):
198-216;
"Encounters
of
a
Third
Kind:
The
Alienation
of
Theory
in
American
Political
Science,"
American
Journal
of
Political
Science,
forthcoming.
2
Earlier
versions
of
portions
of
this
argument
may
be
found
in
John
G.
Gunnell,
"Political
Inquiry
and
the
Concept
of
Action:
A
Phenomenological
Analysis,"
in
Maurice
Natanson,
ed.,
Phenomenology
and
the
Social Sciences
(Evanston:
Northwestern
University
Press,
1973);
"Political
Science
and
the
Poverty
of
Theory,"
in
Maria
Falco,
ed.,
Through
the
Looking-
Glass :
Epistemology
and
the
Conduct
of
Inquiry
(Washington,
D.C.:
University
Press
of
America,
1979).
3
See,
for
example,
John
G.
Gunnell,
Philosophy,
Science,
and
Political
Inquiry
(Morristown,
N.J.:
General
Learning
Press,
1975).
342
a
form
of
science
came
into
contact
with
a
body
of
literature
that
made
what
seemed
to
be
authoritative
claims
about
scientific
theory
and
explanation.
And
it
is
not
surprising
that
the
revolt
within
the
philosophy
of
science,
associated
with
the
work
of
individuals
such
as
Kuhn,
against
the
arguments
of
logical
positivism
and
logical
empiricism
provided
a
basis
for
the
critique
of
behavioralism
in
political
science.
This
mode
of
criticism
was
necessary,
and
maybe
inevitable,
since
the
behavioral
image
of
science
had
been
predi-
cated
on
assumptions
derived
from
the
philosophy
of
science.
But
this
de-
velopment
had
certain
unfortunate
results.
Although
it
may
be
difficult
to
assess
precisely
what
effect
behavioral
doctrines
about
science
had
on
the
actual
conduct
of
inquiry,
one
thing
is
quite
clear:
the
philosophical
origin
of
these
doctrines
propelled
discussion
in
a
metatheoretical
direction.
The
critique
and
defense
of
behavioralism
became
largely
a
philosophical
debate
about
the
nature
of
scientific
explana-
tion
rather
than
a
confrontation
between
substantive
claims
about
politics
or
the
character
of
political
phenomena.
Methodological
issues
in
political
sci-
ence
became
largely
the
residue
of
controversies
in
the
philosophy
of
sci-
ence,
and
political
theory
gave
way
to
epistemology.4
Political
scientists
began
to
pose
for
themselves
such
questions
as
&dquo;What
is
the
logic
of
scientific
explanation?&dquo;;
&dquo;What
is
the
relationship
between
theory
and
fact?&dquo;;
&dquo;How
is
objectivity
possible?&dquo;
But
these
are
philosophical
or
metatheoretical
ques-
tions
to
which
there
are
only
philosophical
and
metatheoretical
answers.
They
are
questions
about
the
character
of
social
science
stated
in
the
lan-
guage
of
philosophy
and
not,
strictly
speaking, questions
that
arise
in
the
practice
of
social
science.
When
social
scientists
treat
these
questions
as
theoretical
questions
and
assume
that
the
answers
provide
some
sort
of
methodological
guide,
the
difficulties
begin.
But
this
fascination
with
the
philosophy
of
science
was
only
one
aspect
of
the
&dquo;philosophization&dquo;
of
politi-
cal theory.
The
critique
of behavioralism
from
the
standpoint
of
issues
in
the
phi-
losophy
of
science
was
paralleled,
and
complemented,
by
the
introduction
of
a
number
of
anti-positivist
arguments
about
social
scientific
explanation
which
were
derived
from
the
philosophy
of
social
science
and
which
addres-
sed
themselves
to
the
question
of
the
logic
of
inquiry
demanded
by
the
character
of
social
phenomena.
Often
these
philosophical
accounts
largely
accepted
the
positivist
representation
of
the
character
of
explanation
in
natural
science
and,
building
upon
the
methodological
work
of
individuals
such
as
Weber
and
upon
more
recent
but
related
philosophical
arguments
associated
with
phenomenology
and
linguistic
analysis,
they
set
out
to
dem-
onstrate
that
social
scientific
inquiry
was
logically
distinct.
These
accounts,
advanced
by
individuals
such
as
Alfred
Schutz,
Charles
Taylor,
and
Peter
Winch,
generally
objected
to
what
was
understood
as
the
&dquo;naturalistic&dquo;
or
behavioristic
implications
of
the
positivist
view
of
science
and
its
demand
for
logical
symmetry
between
explanation
in
the natural
and
social
sciences,
and
they
attempted
to
describe
and
prescribe
the
basic
features
of
the
explana-
tion
of
social
action.
Opponents
of
behavioralism
in
political
science
soon
discovered
this
literature
and
found
that
it
provided
a
more
sophisticated
basis
for
a
critique
than
some
of
the
earlier
attacks
on
scientism.~
This
literature
also
seemed
to
suggest
a
somewhat
more
positive
alternative
to
4
See
Paul
Kress,
"Against
Epistemology:
Apostate
Musings,"
Journal
of
Politics
41
(May
1979):
526-42.
5
For
an
early
argument
from
this
standpoint,
see
John
G.
Gunnell,
"Social
Science
and
Political
Reality:
The
Problem
of
Explanation,"
Social
Research
35
(Spring
1968):
159-201.
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