Political Legitimacy and the Institutionalization of Crisis in Latin America

• Author: Irving Louis Horowitz
• Published date: 01 April 1968
• Date: 01 April 1968
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/001041406800100102
• Subject Matter: Articles

45

POLITICAL

LEGITIMACY

AND

THE

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

OF

CRISIS

IN

LATIN

AMERICA

IRVING

LOUIS

HOROWITZ

IRVING

LOUIS

HOROWITZ

is

Professor

of

sociology

at

W&dquo;a,~sngtor~

University

in

St.

Louis.

He

is

Director

of

Studies in

Comparative

International

Development,

and

Senior Editor

of

Trans-Action.

He is

presently

Visiting

Professor

of

Sociology

at

Stanford

University.

His

most

recent

books

are

The

Rise

and

Fall

of

Project

Camelot

(M.I.T.

Pr688.

1967)

and

Three

Worlds

of

Development:

The

Theory

and

Practice

caf

International

Stra~ca~i~n

(N.Y.:

Oxford

Univ.

Press,

1966).

T HIS

IS

~1.N

ATTEMPT

TO

EXPLAIN

the

permanent

political

crisis

JL

which

has

gripped

Latin

America

during

the

twentieth

century.

The

primary

reason

is

considered

to

be

the

absence

of

political

legitimation

through

either

popular

sovereignty

or

constitutional

legality.

This

paper

deals

first

with

the

rise

of

a

normative

pattern

based

on

violence.

A

second

related

factor is

the

inability

of

any

one

social

to

emerge

in

a

leadership

capacity

for

any

length

of

time,

which

makes

the

estab-

lishment

of

regimes

with

staying

power

impossible.

Given

such

a

situ-

ation,

elites

(often

of a

military

variety)

control

the

political

system

.~1.~~’s

NOTE:

This

article is a

remed

version

of

a

paper

originally

pr’~‘ec~

for

delivery

at

the

1967

Annual

Meeting

of

the

American.

Polit-

i6al

~~ie~~ ~~~t~,

Pick-Congress

Hotel,

Chicago,

Sept.

5-9.

I

want

to

express

my

appreciation

to

Kay

Doherty

of

the

Princeton

Uni-

~r,~ty

Department at

Political

Science,

who

was

~~S~e~tt~

disturbed

by

the

first

~’r~t

version

to

render

the

highest

possible

pru~-,str~r.g

and

weful

eritkism.

46

through

arbitrary,

non-legitimated

channels.

It

is

hypothesized

that

Latin

America

reveals

the

institutionalization

of

illegitimacy

rather

than

of

widely

recognized

authority.

In

an

effort

to

verify

this

hypothesis,

four

crucial

Latin

American

nations

are

examined

for

structural

similarities:

Argentina,

Brazil,

Mexico,

and

Cuba.

Two

main

conclusions

are

drawn

from

the

analysis:

first,

that

military

or

pseudo-military

rule

in

Latin

America,

whatever

achievements

it

may

register

in

stimulating

economic

development,

is

primarily

a

conflict-model

substitute

for

consensual

politics.

It

may,

through

the

evolution

of

governmental

violence,

prevent

legitimacy

from

evolving.

The

second

major

conclusion

is

that

illegitimate

political

re-

gimes

in

Latin

America

operate

less

efficiently

than

legitimate

regimes,

since

they

are

geared

toward

crisis

rather

than

stability.

I.

THE

CRISIS

To

avoid

confusion

at

the

outset,

the

term

legithnacy

must

be

stripped

of

the

value

connotations

it

often

carries,

and

its

objective

meaning

speci-

fied

in

as

simple

and

pragmatic

a

way

as

the

current

state

of

theory

will

permit.

Above

all,

legitimacy

is

a

set

of

publicly

stated

guidelines

(laws

and

norms)

defined

by

elites

and

believed

in

by

masses.

Another

way

of

expressing

the

same

concept

is

that

legitimacy

is

power

which

is

authorized

at

the

top

and

recognized

at

the

bottom.

Legitimacy,

whether

it

is

sanctioned

in

law

or

in

custom,

is

operationalized

through

participa-

tion

and

conviction.

It is

consecrated

power

which

is

often

believed

to

be

an

accurate

estimate

of

general

societal

needs.

Legitimacy

exhibits

a

relational

quality:

a

phenomenon

which

elites

define,

and

which

masses

loyally

participate

in.

When

either

&dquo;mass&dquo;

or

elite&dquo;

elements

are

absent

for

any

length

of

time,

legitimacy

crumbles.

Turning

specifically

to

Latin

America,

traditionally

there

have

been

two

styles

of

political

legitimation:

constitutionalism

and

presidentital3is~n.~

The

constitutional

framework

tends

to

be

narrowly

constructed,

manip-

ulated

by

the

feudalistic

sectors

which

see

in

law

the

preservation

of

traditional

class

privileges.

Because

of

this,

constitutional

regimes

display

a

limited

electorate,

often

with

strong

rural

support.

The

presidential

framework,

for

its

part,

tends

to

institutionalize

a

broad

charismatic

style;

and

largely

because

of

its

urban

base,

requires

a.

broad

electorats

and

adaptation

to

the

principles

of

popular

sovereignty.

The,

~udifi~-