Political Knowledge and Policy Representation in the States

AuthorJeffrey Lyons,William P. Jaeger,Jennifer Wolak
DOI10.1177/1532673X16657806
Published date01 November 2017
Date01 November 2017
Subject MatterArticles
American Politics Research
2017, Vol. 45(6) 907 –938
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X16657806
journals.sagepub.com/home/apr
Article
Political Knowledge and
Policy Representation in
the States
William P. Jaeger1, Jeffrey Lyons2,
and Jennifer Wolak3
Abstract
Political knowledge is central to the success of representative democracy.
However, public policy has been shown to follow public opinion even
despite low levels of political information in the electorate. Does this mean
that political knowledge is irrelevant to policy representation? We consider
whether knowledgeable electorates are better able to achieve representative
policy outcomes. Using the heterogeneity in the responsiveness of
government across the states, we consider how state political knowledge
moderates the connection between citizen ideology and the policy outcomes
of state government. Using national surveys and multilevel logit with post-
stratification, we develop measures of collective political knowledge in
the states. We test whether knowledgeable electorates are more likely
to secure representative political outcomes than less politically informed
constituencies. We find that as state political knowledge increases, so
does the correspondence between the preferences of the public and the
ideological tenor of state policy outcomes.
Keywords
political knowledge, representation, state politics
1Colorado Children’s Campaign, Denver, Colorado, CO, USA
2Boise State University, Boise, Idaho, ID, USA
3University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer Wolak, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder, 333 UCB,
Boulder, CO 80309-0333, USA.
Email: wolakj@colorado.edu
657806APRXXX10.1177/1532673X16657806American Politics ResearchJaeger et al.
research-article2016
908 American Politics Research 45(6)
Political knowledge is at the heart of representative democracy. If elected
officials are to vote in line with the preferences of their constituents, they
need some knowledge of what the people in their district want. If citizens
are to hold politicians accountable for their choices, they need information
to evaluate how well that representative performs his or her job. Indeed,
debates about the degree to which the U.S. system of government fits a
model of representative democracy often hinge on questions of political
knowledge and information. Citizens delegate political decision-making
power to elected representatives—who may choose to follow the wishes of
their constituents or not. For citizens who want to insure against the risk of
an unresponsive representative, knowledge is a source of political power.
Citizens who hold greater stocks of information and political knowledge
are better equipped to hold representatives accountable as well as generally
take on the challenges of good citizenship. Political information helps citi-
zens form opinions on what they believe in politics and what they think
politicians should do (Krosnick & Milburn, 1990). Political knowledge
helps people communicate their wishes to elected officials and identify
unresponsive politicians (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Political knowl-
edge is not only central to definitions of good citizenship (Berelson, 1952)
but also has been demonstrated to promote civic competence in practice.
When people are knowledgeable about politics, they make choices at the
ballot box that better reflect their interests (Gelman & King, 1993; Lau,
Andersen, & Redlawsk, 2008). Because knowledgeable citizens demon-
strate more ideological constraint and attitude consistency, they arguably
send sharper signals to politicians about their preferences (Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1996). Those who hold more political information are also better
able to understand the political stories they see in the news and better pre-
pared to translate their political attitudes into action (Graber, 1984; Popkin
& Dimock, 1999).
Although political information helps citizens meet the demands of citi-
zenship, we do not have decisive evidence that levels of political knowl-
edge promote policy responsiveness. Although individual voters with
political information are better equipped to hold politicians accountable,
this does not guarantee that knowledgeable electorates collectively are
more successful at obtaining representative policy outcomes from elites. In
fact, a common refrain in political science is that ideological policy repre-
sentation comes despite the knowledge levels of the public. Surveys dem-
onstrate the profound limits to Americans’ knowledge of politics—about
20% can name the three branches of government, about half know what a
filibuster is, and usually less than half can name their representative in
Congress (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). But even as people struggle with
Jaeger et al. 909
the facts of how government works, we also see that government responds
to the demands of the public. Public preferences explain the policy out-
comes of government at the national level as well as at the state and local
level (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Palus, 2010; Stimson, MacKuen,
& Erikson, 1995).
This suggests that policy responsiveness does not require a knowl-
edgeable public. Instead, citizens might obtain representative policy out-
comes through strategies of low information rationality—using heuristics
to approximate fully informed decision making (Lupia, 1994) or by rely-
ing on online processing, where people can make informed decisions
even absent the ability to recall the specific evidence that informed their
judgment (Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995). Policy responsiveness
could also reflect the wisdom of crowds, where the opinions of the collec-
tive are coherent and informative even if many of the underlying opinions
of individuals are nonattitudes or noise (Converse, 1990). Or, policy
responsiveness might be maintained through political institutions that act
in the public interest—whether the collective representation offered by
political parties or the scrutiny of journalists as a check on politicians
(Hochschild, 2010).
We argue that the level of political knowledge held by the public pro-
motes the quality of policy representation. Even though an informed public
may not be a necessity to secure representative outcomes from government,
we believe that it helps. To explore the consequences of political knowledge
for representation, we focus our attention on variations in knowledge across
the states, and how these differences affect the connection between citizen
liberalism and state policy outputs. States are an important case to examine,
given the substantial policy responsibilities held by the states as well as the
trend toward increasing state responsibilities over time. Because both levels
of state political knowledge and the quality of policy representation vary
across the states (Lyons, Jaeger, & Wolak, 2013; Lax & Phillips, 2012;
Pacheco, 2013), examining state policy outcomes provides an excellent
opportunity to examine the quality of representation across contexts. We
expect that when state electorates hold more political information, they
obtain policy outcomes that are closer to their ideological leanings. Using
national surveys and multilevel logit and Poisson models with post-stratifi-
cation, we create multiple measures of state political knowledge. We then
test the conditioning effects of aggregate knowledge on ideological repre-
sentation using variations in public policy outputs across the 50 states. We
find that collective political knowledge strengthens the connection between
citizen ideology and state policy outcomes. Political knowledge promotes
ideological policy representation.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT