Political exchanges of value and the stakeholder concept: Implications for public affairs

Published date01 May 2020
AuthorRobert P. Ormrod
Date01 May 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2084
ACADEMIC PAPER
Political exchanges of value and the stakeholder concept:
Implications for public affairs
Robert P. Ormrod
Department of Management, Aarhus BSS,
Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
Correspondence
Robert P. Ormrod, Department of
Management, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University,
Aarhus, Denmark.
Email: rormrod@mgmt.au.dk
The political marketing exchange is triadic in structure, as promises given by political
actors in the context of an election campaign can only be reciprocated if 1. the politi-
cal actor is selected, 2. has influence over legislation negotiations, and 3. is in a posi-
tion to deliver on these promises. In each of these three interaction marketplaces,
political actors are indirectly influenced by stakeholders. These indirect stakeholders
are often public affairs practitioners engaged in lobbying activities in the political
sphere. This paper integrates the triadic interaction model of political marketing
exchange with the political marketing stakeholder concept and highlights how public
affairs practitioners can target their efforts for maximum benefit. This aim is moti-
vated by a need to increase our understanding of how political marketing theory can
help political actors and their stakeholders to optimise the resources that are used on
marketing activities across the electoral cycle.
1|INTRODUCTION
Advances in political marketing theory have seen the gradual
development of a number of concepts away from their origins in
the commercial marketing literature and towards an acceptance of
the idiosyncratic nature of the political marketplace (Harris & Sun,
2017; Lock & Harris, 1996; Ormrod, Henneberg, & O'Shaughnessy,
2013). The concept of exchange in the political context is one
example; instead of a dyadic exchange relationship, Henneberg and
Ormrod (2013) argue that each political exchange of value is triadic
in structure, as promises given by political actors in the context of
an election campaign can only be reciprocated if the political actor
(a) is elected, (b) has influence over the legislation formulation
negotiations, and (c) is in a position to deliver on these promises.
In each of these three interaction marketplaces(Henneberg &
Ormrod, 2013), political actors are indirectly influenced by stake-
holders (Ormrod, 2017). These indirect stakeholdersare often
public affairs practitioners engaged in lobbying activities in
the political sphere (e.g., Bitoni & Harris, 2017; Brown, 2016;
De Bruycker, 2019).
The aim of this paper is to integrate Henneberg and Ormrod's
(2013) triadic interaction model of political marketing exchange with
Ormrod's (2017) political marketing stakeholder concept and to high-
light how public affairs practitioners can target their efforts for
maximum benefit. This aim is motivated by a need to incr ease our
understanding of how core concepts in political marketing theory
can help political acto rs to optimise the resour ces that are used on
marketing activitie s across the electoral cy cle, to help stakehol ders
such as commercial organi sations and lobby groups p lan their public
affairs activities to ga in the maximum of influenc e, and to help
researchers to be more s pecific when selecting which actors
political or otherwiseto focus on as part of their empirica l investi-
gations. In this way, we hope to contribute to the literature on the
political activity of organisations (Getz, 2001).
2|THE POLITICAL EXCHANGE OF VALUE
Commercial marketing is concerned with understanding mutually ben-
eficial exchanges of value between two actors, with the fundamental
exchange possessing a dyadic structure (Bagozzi, 1975; Grönröos,
2006; Lusch & Vargo, 2006; Sheth & Uslay, 2007; Vargo & Lusch,
2004, 2008). In addition to the basic exchange dyad, some authors
have argued that each exchange is embedded within a wider system
of supporting interactions (Ford, 1980; Ford & Håkansson, 2006;
Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996). Vargo and Lusch (2004) class
these noncustomer, supporting interactions as indirect exchanges,
whereas Ford and Håkansson (2006) argue that there is only one
DOI: 10.1002/pa.2084
J Public Affairs. 2020;20:e2084. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 1of9
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2084

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