Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers

• Author: Shane Martin,Daniel M. Smith
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12146
• Date: 01 February 2017
• Published date: 01 February 2017

DANIEL M. SMITH

Harvard University

SHANE MARTIN

University of Essex

Political Dynasties and the

Selection of Cabinet Ministers

We investigate whether politicians whose family relatives previously served in

parliament and cabinet enjoy a competitive “legacy advantage” in progressing from the

backbenches to cabinet. This advantage may stem from two potential mechanisms: a

direct effect attributable to the informational advantages of legacies or an indirect effect

that operates through greater electoral strength. We evaluate the relative contribution of

each mechanism using candidate-level data from Irish parliamentary elections and cabi-

nets from 1944 to 2016. Our results reveal that politicians with a family history in

cabinet do enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, and that this advantage cannot be

attributed simply to greater electoral popularity.

1

Under parliamentarism, the cabinet “emerges from” the legislature

and represents the apex of political power. Scholars have thus long

sought to understand which political parties win cabinet seats, particu-

larly in coalition governments, as the interparty distribution of

ministerial portfolios can impact policy outputs (B€

ack, Debus and

Dumont 2011; Laver and Schof‌ield 1998; Strøm, M€

uller, and Bergman

2003). Yet cabinets are ultimately composed of individual politicians

within parties. Despite this fact, and the potential for signif‌icant individ-

ual ministerial autonomy and discretion (Laver and Shepsle 1994; 1996),

we know relatively little about the intraparty distribution of ministerial

portfolios.

Multiple factors may be involved in determining how positions of

power are distributed to members of parliament (MPs). All parties and

legislatures, like most organizations generally, are structured according

to some form of hierarchy, such that some MPs are promoted to a f‌inite

number of positions of power in the party, parliament, and government,

while others continue to warm the backbenches, sometimes for their

entire careers (Strøm 1997). Existing research suggests that the probabil-

ity of promotion to cabinet is related to an MP’s length of time in

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 42, 1, February 2017 131

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12146

V

C2016 Washington University in St. Louis

parliament (seniority), electoral popularity (in preferential electoral

systems), education, gender, policy preferences, and other less tangible

personal traits (e.g., Blondel and Thi

ebault 1991; Dowding and Dumont

2008; 2013; Laver and Shepsle 1994).

2

In this study, we consider one previously unexplored source of

potential inequality of opportunity in ministerial selection: the existence

of powerful family dynasties within parties. Dynasties are common in

many democracies, and tend to enjoy signif‌icant electoral advantages

over other candidates under electoral systems with candidate-based vot-

ing (e.g., Asako et al. 2015; Dal B

o, Dal B

o, and Snyder 2009; Feinstein

2010; Ishibashi and Reed 1992; Laband and Lentz 1985; Querubin

2016; Smith 2012). The existing literature attributes this electoral

advantage primarily to the informational cue that family “brand” or

name recognition provides to voters. Building on this literature, we

investigate whether and how MPs who come from such dynasties, who

we call “legacies,” also possess advantages over nonlegacies in promo-

tion from the backbench to the cabinet.

3

Anecdotal evidence of a legacy advantage in cabinet selection is

abundant. For example, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, son of

former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, reached the apex of power in

2015 at age 43—after only serving two previous terms in the House of

Commons. In 2008, Yuko Obuchi, daughter of former Japanese Prime

Minister Keizo Obuchi, was similarly appointed to cabinet in her third

term, at the age of 34. Most Japanese MPs are not considered for a cabi-

net position until at least f‌ive or six terms. In Norway, former Prime

Minister Jens Stoltenberg, son of Minister of Defense and Minister of

Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, had only served two years as a

substitute member in the Storting (parliament) before being appointed to

the cabinet in his f‌irst full term in 1993, at the age of 34. A brief glance

at recent presidential politics in the United States also suggests a legacy

advantage in executive politics outside of parliamentary regimes—the

2016 presidential primary featured a Clinton, a Bush, and a Paul; all

familiar names from previous contests.

4

A legacy advantage in cabinet selection, we hypothesize, may

result from two potential mechanisms. The f‌irst can be considered a

direct effect of dynastic ties that includes the intergenerational transmis-

sion of political knowledge, connections, and resources, as well as the

informational cue of family name and reputation to party leaders

involved in ministerial selection. For simplicity, we call this the informa-

tional advantage. The second potential mechanism is an indirect,

mediating effect of dynastic ties that operates through the greater

electoral strength of legacies. We call this the electoral advantage.

5

132 Daniel M. Smith and Shane Martin

We distinguish between two types of legacies among MPs: cabinet

legacies whose predecessors had experience as cabinet ministers and

noncabinet legacies whose predecessors never advanced beyond the

backbenches. We argue that, while both types of legacies may enjoy sig-

nif‌icant electoral advantages in their districts, cabinet legacies should be

expected to enjoy a larger intraparty informational advantage over fellow

MPs in gaining promotion from the backbenches to the cabinet. This is

because cabinet legacies inherit the knowledge, political resources, high-

level connections, and family track record in cabinet that helps them to

stand out above their copartisan peers in ministerial selection. In contrast,

legacies whose relatives did not serve in the cabinet may inherit the

knowledge, connections, and name recognition to be successful elector-

ally in their districts, but this knowledge does not necessarily provide the

same informational advantage in terms of leadership promotion within

the party. As such, cabinet legacies can be expected to reach ministerial

off‌ice faster than both noncabinet legacies and nonlegacies.

We test our prediction that cabinet legacies are advantaged relative

to other MPs in advancement from the backbenches to cabinet with new

candidate-level data from Irish parliamentary elections and cabinets

from 1944 to 2016. Members of the Irish D

ail (the lower and more

important chamber of the bicameral Houses of the Oireachtas) are

known as Teachta



ıD



ala (TDs) and are elected via the single-

transferable vote (STV) electoral system in multimember districts, with

an average district magnitude (M) of four seats.

6

In such a system, dis-

trict races usually feature multiple candidates from each of the larger

parties, and this intraparty competition weakens the value of the party

label and encourages the development of dynasties, whose members can

inherit the bailiwicks of their predecessors and enjoy considerable elec-

toral advantages (Smith 2012). As a result, members of dynasties have

accounted for a sizable percentage of candidates, TDs, and cabinet min-

isters in Ireland (Figure 1). Among all candidates from 1944 to 2016,

14% were legacies of one type or the other. Among elected TDs, the pro-

portion increases to 25%. Yet among cabinet ministers, the proportion is

even higher: 29%, on average, and in some cabinets higher than 40%

(including the current cabinet of Prime Minister Enda Kenny, at 44%).

The increase is mostly attributable to more cabinet legacies getting

appointed. One minister, Kevin Boland, the son of Gerald Boland (a

13-term Fianna F

ail member and former Minister of Justice), was appointed

Minister of Defense after his very f‌irst election to the D

ail in 1957.

The overrepresentation of cabinet legacies in ministerial positions

indicates that, in addition to the well-known legacy advantage in elec-

tions, there may also be a legacy advantage in cabinet promotion.

133Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers