Political Distrust and Conservative Voting in Ballot Measure Elections

• Date: 01 September 2010
• Author: Joshua J. Dyck
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912909331427
• Published date: 01 September 2010
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly
63(3) 612 –626
Political Distrust and Conservative
© 2010 University of Utah
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Voting in Ballot Measure Elections
DOI: 10.1177/1065912909331427
http://prq.sagepub.com
Joshua J. Dyck1
Abstract
Over the past thirty years, the cumulative effects of direct democracy have served to decrease both levels of taxation
and spending in the American states. Yet conservative budgetary policy measures passed during this time period were
likely to occur in liberal states. Using data on over thirty separate ballot issues, the author offers a solution to this
puzzle, demonstrating that distrusting government serves as a consistently robust predictor of conservative policy
choice. The implication of this finding is that citizens often choose conservative policy outcomes because they believe
that government is functionally incapable of giving them what they want.
Keywords
direct democracy, political trust, Proposition 13, fiscal policy
1. Introduction
the findings from the extant literature, I demonstrate that
political distrust plays a prominent role in predicting
This article asks a simple, relevant, and yet unanswered
conservative policy choices in ballot measure elections,
question: why has direct democracy produced conserva-
particularly those that deal directly with tax-and-
tive policy in the United States? The work of Matsusaka
spend policy or have significant fiscal implications. In
(1995; 2004) and others (e.g., Camobreco 1998; Besley
concluding, I suggest that distrust as a motivator of
and Case 2003) demonstrates that states that have adopted
conservative voting behavior clarifies the mechanism of
ballot initiatives tend to spend and tax less, on average,
preference formation in ballot measure voting and poses
than states without direct democracy. While some have
a solution to the puzzle that liberal states seem to adopt
questioned whether this shift can be interpreted as policy
conservative policy via the ballot initiative process.
responsiveness (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996;
Camobreco 1998), a growing body of literature argues
2. Voter Choice in Direct
that public policy produced by direct democracy is
responsive to reasonable preferences by members of the
Democratic Elections
electorate (Matsusaka 2004; Gerber 1996, 1999; Lupia
Currently, the literature has identified several ways to pre-
and Matsusaka 2004). In other words, direct democracy
dict systematic choice in ballot initiative elections. The
produces more majoritarian democratic policy because it
choice problem, as defined by Magleby (1984), is that
is more democratic/majoritarian.
American politics research has demonstrated repeatedly
With this argument as a backdrop, I engage another
that voters know very little about politics (Campbell et al.
literature—that on the policy implications of political
1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
trust (Hetherington 2005)—which argues that public
Given that the average ballot initiative requires a gradu-
preferences about social programs have become more
ate-level education to comprehend (Magleby 1984), how
conservative not because of a conservative shift in
can voters possibly behave rationally under such condi-
ideology but because of declining levels of confidence in
tions? The problem is exacerbated by the fact that initia-
government to faithfully and efficiently execute these
tives are policy issues and do not contain explicit partisan
programs. A key component to this argument is that
cues on the ballot. Literature over the last twenty years,
conservatism and distrust are not the same thing, but
both play important roles in shaping policy preferences.
1University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
In this article, I test whether political trust influences the
Corresponding Author:
way in which individuals choose in ballot initiative
Joshua J. Dyck, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
elections. While instrumental and political determinants
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
remain important in these elections, confirming many of
Email: jdyck@buffalo.edu.

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Joshua J. Dyck
613
however, has demonstrated that (1) low-information vot-
levels of taxation and spending in direct democracy
ers behave as if they had higher levels of knowledge
states, as compared to states that do not have direct
(Lupia 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998), (2) voters are in
democracy. While some have suggested that direct
some instances able to vote instrumentally or express self-
democracy policy results in seemingly irresponsible and
interest (Sears and Citrin 1982; Bowler and Donovan
irrational antitax/pro-spending behavior (cf. Schrag
1998), (3) when they are unsure of the meaning of initia-
1998; Broder 2000), the public opinion data, to date, have
tives, voters default to “no,” thus preserving the status quo
not backed up this claim of irrationality (Lupia 1992,
(Key and Crouch 1939; Bowler and Donovan 1998), and
1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998). Additionally, in
(4) despite the lack of explicit textual partisan cues on the
subsequent analysis, Matsusaka demonstrates that direct
ballot, explicit partisan cues are readily available in the
democracy has not historically uniformly decreased
information environment, and partisan voting behavior is
the size of government. Using data from 1902 to 1942, he
the rule, not the exception, in ballot measure elections
shows that direct democracy states experienced more
(Branton 2003; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997; Smith and
rapid growth in revenues and expenditures over this early
Tolbert 2001).
period (Matsusaka 2004, 73-79). It stands to reason then,
More specifically, the extant literature has attempted to
that direct democracy is not inherently conservative or
assuage many of the primary concerns of direct democracy
liberal but rather reflects shifts in public opinion.
opponents. For instance, the perception that voters will
Therefore, when conservative policy is produced, it has
support any initiative is a false one. The reason for this is
been reasonably inferred that it reflects the conservative
that voters must be convinced to vote yes but do not have to
preferences of the electorate.
be convinced to vote no. Historically, about 40 percent of all
One source of cues that remains largely unexplored
ballot initiatives put before voters have passed.1 Individual-
relates to citizens’ views about the functional com-
level studies have suggested that when voters find an
petence of government, or trust. While cues may come
initiative is too complicated, incomprehensible, or vague,
from party, elite, or interest group endorsements, I argue
the modal response is caution; the status quo position for
that political distrust can also underscore the way in
a large majority of voters is the no vote (Bowler and
which individuals have come to think about politics and
Donovan 1998). In his well-cited study of competing
ultimately reason in initiative elections. While direct
and complicated insurance initiatives, Lupia (1994)
democratic policies do, in fact, appear to reflect the
found that less knowledgeable voters who knew the
wishes of the public, those wishes are rooted in the
information cue reasoned and behaved similar to those
complex attitude of political distrust.
voters with encyclopedic knowledge of the issues.
That the generally politically uninformed, nonissue voter
3. Theory: Trust and Voting in
can be characterized as careful rather than irresponsible is an
important claim in understanding what sorts of policies direct
Ballot Measure Elections
democracy produces. The emergent scholarly consensus is
Political trust has been in decline for half a century but
that the status quo no is normatively a good thing, as it
only recently have scholars begun to understand
demonstrates that the worst fears of initiative opponents are
the political implications of this decline (Hetherington
subsided when we observe actual behavior.2 Even pro-
2005, 18). Initially, it was thought that since the decline
initiative organizations point to this fact in defense of the
in political trust mirrored the decline in political partici-
institution.3 The large number of rejected initiatives also
pation, the two must be related. Yet studies have repeat-
lends credibility to initiatives that do pass; if most initiatives
edly found that political distrusters are no more or less
fail, then those that do pass must be taken more seriously, as
likely to participate than trusters (Citrin 1974; Rosen-
more likely reflecting the policy preferences of the majority.
stone and Hansen 1993). Perhaps such an expectation
This is also important in light of the fact that the policies
was somewhat naive, given long-held under standings
considered in ballot initiative elections tend to come from
that citizens are likely to become political particularly
elite agenda setters (Lupia 1992; Smith 1998; Ellis 2002).
when they feel that their self-interest is at stake (Dahl
Thus, while the source of ballot initiatives is not “populist”
1961, 223-8; Gamson 1968). Rather, trust seems to be
in nature, the masses act as gatekeepers to which policies are
predicted by a series of short- and long-term components
passed and which are not. Therefore, when scholars have
that include skepticism,...