Political Authority: Its Exercise and Possession

DOI10.1177/106591296101400301
Date01 September 1961
Published date01 September 1961
AuthorC.W. Cassinelli
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-18b8NWx2zdC5qE/input
POLITICAL AUTHORITY: ITS EXERCISE
AND POSSESSION
C. W. CASSINELLI
University of Washington
HE
CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY is central to the study of politics,
since descriptions of governmental institutions, public policy, and patterns
JL of political power must assume at least a distinction between the presence
and absence of authority, while broader issues like the nature of the state, the
law, and political obedience require a clear definition of authority for their
satisfactory treatment. Political theorists have always recognized this, but the
modern disciplines of sociology and public administration have provided much
new information and many new insights regarding authority. Nevertheless, the
theory of authority still contains certain weaknesses stemming from lack of in-
formation and analysis.
The present essay will be concerned with one of these ambiguities of analysis.
It appears to me that the failure to distinguish between what I shall call the
&dquo;exercise&dquo; of political authority and its &dquo;possession&dquo; has impeded our understand-
ing of the relationship between political authority on the one hand and obedi-
ence, coercion, and popular attitudes on the other. Moreover, if the distinction is
made and kept in mind, many apparent discrepancies of evidence and disagree-
ments of argument about political authority itself seem to disappear. The exercise
of political authority requires the citizen to obey uncritically and without con-
sidering the possibility of coercion; the possession of political authority depends
upon his critical acceptance of the use of coercion, and it is compatible with his
occasional disobedience.
THE FUNCTION OF THE GOVERNOR
Although political authority -
the authority possessed and exercised by the
governor’ -
may be fundamentally similar to the authority of the expert, cleric,
or parent, it still differs from these other authorities because it is political and
they are not. An analysis of political authority must therefore begin by defining
&dquo;political.&dquo;
The governor exercises and possesses political authority only when his special
competence is specifically related to ordering, regulating, shaping, or determining
the behavior of a limited group of human beings. Since this statement also applies
to other &dquo;authorities,&dquo; his special competence and thus his particular function
must be more or less precisely described. Social theorists have defined the func-
tion of governing by reference to the aspects of human behavior the governor
regulates, the scope of his regulation, or the methods which he may use.
1
When we say that someone other than a governor has political authority, we mean either that
he has political influence in general or, more likely, that he has influence upon those who
have governmental authority. In either case, however, the word "authority" does not seem
to be applied properly.
635


636
Defining the governor’s function in terms of the kind of behavior he regulates
is unsatisfactory, for it founders on the obvious fact that all governments, from
totalitarian to democratic, control and direct practically every activity in which
men normally engage. The statement that government has a limited sphere of
competence is usually normative rather than descriptive.
The second type of definition says that the governor makes decisions which
apply to the whole society, in contrast to the limited scope of the decisions of
other possessors of influence.2 This definition is also unsatisfactory. In the first
place, decisions by people who are not governors successfully regulate the be-
havior of the whole society. The theological and moral pronouncements of
clerics in single-faith societies are the most obvious examples, but decisions by
&dquo;experts&dquo; in matters such as dress and &dquo;manners&dquo; may also have a similar scope.
Secondly, not all decisions by government &dquo;allocate values for the whole society&dquo;;
they may deal with special subgroups (like the inhabitants of the Tennessee Val-
ley) or even with individuals (like the subjects of &dquo;relief&dquo; bills of the United
States Congress) .3 Finally, the notion of the &dquo;whole society&dquo; is extremely vague.
On first glance it seems to refer to all the people of the state, but since the state
is usually defined by reference to the scope of governmental control, the &dquo;whole
society&dquo; must be something else. If the &dquo;whole society&dquo; is defined in terms of
relatively intensive human interaction,4 then no account is taken of the fact
that the governor’s jurisdiction stops at the boundaries of his state, no matter how
socially and economically artificial these boundaries may be.
The method of regulation which the governor may use provides, on the
contrary, a useful definition of his function. His ability to attach to his directives
the threat to utilize physical coercion against those who do not comply with them
clearly distinguishes his function from that of any other regulator of human be-
havior.5 This statement is not affected by pointing out that this threat may be
only a minor factor in the governed’s motivation to comply with the governor’s
directives, or that in order to accomplish certain purposes the latter may rely
extensively upon non-directive techniques like persuasion
6
The increasing im-
portance of the governor’s new &dquo;positive&dquo; tasks -
social welfare, public works,
aid to foreigners, etc. -
also does not affect the issue, because they are all based
upon his old task of raising revenue which is always connected with his ability
to use coercion.
Moreover, every act of the governor in his capacity as governor is accom-
panied by at least an implicit reference to this ability to use physical coercion.
2
E.g., David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 133. Easton’s concept
of politics as the "authoritative allocation of values" means, when developed, "making deci-
sions which bind the whole society."
3
See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 14-
17, and the references there cited.
4
Society is "the broadest grouping of human beings who live together and collectively undertake
to satisfy all the minimum prerequisites of group life." Easton, op. cit., p. 135.
5
Cf. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1945), p. 18; and Frederick M. Watkins, The State as a Concept of Politi-
cal Science (New York: Harper, 1934), pp. 47-49.
6
Cf. David Easton, "The Perception of Authority and Political Change," in Authority, ed. Carl
J. Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 183.


637
Any of his acts which do not imply such coercion are performed in some other
capacity, such as &dquo;leading citizen,&dquo; party politician, or symbol of the national
community. Therefore, political authority, the authority attached to the function
of governing, is always conjoined with the governor’s ability to use physical coer-
cion. The principal analytical problem is to clarify the relationship between
political authority and coercion and to relate both to the behavior and attitudes
of those subject to regulation. Making a distinction between exercising and pos-
sessing political authority seems to solve at least some aspects of this problem.
THE &dquo;EXERCISE&dquo; OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
The concepts of &dquo;exercising&dquo; and &dquo;possessing&dquo; political authority are intro-
duced to take account of a more-or-less implicit distinction often made in dis-
cussions of authority and to correspond to certain facets of authority which upon
analysis are seen to have different characteristics. The possession of authority and
its exercise are both necessary and sufficient for one another, but the tendency
to refer to them as if they were identical - or, more usually, to fail to distinguish
between them - has led to some confusion.
When the governor exercises political authority he performs an overt act
aimed at regulating his governed’s behavior. In order to perform such an act,
he must (as we say) have authority, but his possession is clearly not the same
thing as his act. The latter, when authoritative, is a relationship containing a
communication, its issuer, and its recipient, each of which should be described
in some detail.
The Actions and Motivations of the Governor
An
exercise of political authority is initiated when the governor issues a com-
munication to the governed...

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