Political Ambition in 14 Presidential Democracies

• Date: 01 May 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12131
• Published date: 01 May 2016
• Author: Theresa Kernecker

THERESA KERNECKER

University of Vienna

Political Ambition in 14

Presidential Democracies

This article captures the nature of legislators’ ambitions and explores to what

extent their career paths within a context of party competition lead to progressive versus

static ambition. The findings show that their previous career path and retrospective

loyalty towards the party influences which offices they seek. Progressively ambit ious

legislators also seek offices in less competitive environments, but this finding holds for

the regional executive branch or the presidency. An additional robust finding shows that

ideologically conservative legislators tend to be statically ambitious. This is a first step

towards mapping out ambitions in Latin America by drawing on cross-national data.

To what extent do legislators draw on party versus personal resour-

ces in attaining their career goals within a context of party competition?

This article tackles the nature of political ambition and legislators’ behav-

ior in 14 Latin American democracies. A closer look at the ambitions

that individuals harbor merits attention for two main reasons: First, avail-

ability of individual data has allowed transcending parties as unitary

actors and advanced the study of individual behavior in roll-call voting

(Morgenstern 2004), party-switching (Desposato 2006), party unity

(Carey 2007, 2009), coalitions (Altman 2000), ministerial appointments

(Camerlo 2013, 2014), or the role of ambition in legislative behavior

(Botero 2008; Chasquetti 2010; Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014; Micozzi

2013; Samuels 2003, 2011). Second, recent institutional reforms aiming

at improving the quality of representation have encouraged politicians

to bring in a more personalized focus to politics (Karvonen 2009),

emphasizing the importance of strategic politicians “in tandem” with a

trend toward candidate-centered politics (Jacobsen 1989).

Politicians aiming for a long-term political career can’t depend

solely on their parties in determining their fate. When planning career

moves, they can either use their party as a vehicle to get further in their

career or rely on personal resources to build their personal reputation

independent from their party (Carey 2007). Studies have modelled how

legislators adopt party or faction-oriented behavior versus enhancing

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 41, 2, May 2016 393

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12131

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C2016 Washington University in St. Louis

their own image (Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014) or how cosponsorship

ref‌lects provincial and municipal-level ambitions in the Argentine con-

gress (Micozzi 2014). Case studies have relayed novel f‌indings but have

maintained variance mainly at the institutional level. Given institutional

fragility in Latin America, individual, party, and subnational dynamics

actually confer more information (Luna 2007). This article aims at

advancing this approach.

This article provides a framework to analyze the individual deter-

minants of ambition based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that

legislators’ retrospective and prospective loyalty and previous career

paths have a party- versus personal-centered character. Second, it

assumes that these differences facilitate access to different off‌ices within

a context of interparty competition. Based on these assumptions, the arti-

cle f‌inds links between off‌ice goals, party- versus personal-centered

career paths, and how legislators react to the level of competition in their

environment from a cross-national perspective.

The article proceeds as follows: First, it discusses a theoretical

framework for conceptualizing the rational politician and ambition

theory. Second, it discusses different types of ambitions and discusses

extant work on Latin America. Third, it discusses the dependent variable

and intervening factors in a politician’s decision to seek a certain off‌ice.

Fourth, it presents the data and the model used in the analysis. Last, it

discusses the results and shows that party competition and party- versus

personal-centered career paths affect different off‌ice goals.

Which Ambition?

Schlesinger (1966) def‌ines three types of ambition: (1) static, (2)

progressive, and (3) discrete ambitions—reelection, moving on to other

off‌ices, or leaving off‌ice, respectively. Herrick and Moore (1993) add

the intrainstitutional category and criticize Schlesinger’s focus on off‌ices

rather than positions in congress. Another category based on the Brazil-

ian experience underscores dynamic (Samuels 2003) or regressive

(Leoni, Pereira, and Renn

o 2004) ambition. Here, the legislature is not

an ultimate goal but rather a stepping-stone in a longer career outside of

the legislature, which leads to a central point brought up by Rohde

(1979): most legislators harbor progressive ambition, but it depends on

the risks an individual is willing to take at a certain point in time.

Theory has mainly focused on the causes and consequences of

ambition. Research on the causes of ambition explores the effects of

legislative resources on ambition (Maestas 2000), or the determinants

of the initial decision of running for off‌ice (Fox and Lawless 2005).

394 Theresa Kernecker