Political Activism of the National Security Council in Turkey After the Reforms

• Date: 01 July 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16642775
• Published date: 01 July 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article
Armed Forces & Society
2017, Vol. 43(3) 523-544
Political Activism of the
ª The Author(s) 2016
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National Security
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16642775
journals.sagepub.com/home/afs
Council in Turkey After
the Reforms
Ays¸egu¨l Kars Kaynar1
Abstract
Since the early 2000s, civil–military relations in Turkey have been tremendously
overhauled. The National Security Council (MGK) lay at the crux of this transfor-
mation. This semi-military council was considered to be the principal formal channel
that allowed the military to intervene in politics. Therefore, the reforms toward
more civilian domination in the MGK were extensively hailed and reckoned as the
end of the military’s protracted political role. However, subsequent developments
did not verify this initial optimism about the demise of the old pattern of strong
military presence in politics. This study examines the political activism of the
reformed MGK. It suggests that the reforms trimmed the military’s power through
subjecting its functions to civilian control. Nevertheless, this shift proved insufficient
to end MGK’s political role. The MGK still actively takes part in politics and pre-
serves its executive authority, although this authority is now performed concertedly
by civilians and the soldiers.
Keywords
arms control, civil–military relations, democracy, law, political science, Turkey
1 Department of Political Science and Public Administration, European University of Lefke, Mersin 10,
Turkey
Corresponding Author:
Ays¸egu¨l Kars Kaynar, Lefke Avrupa U
¨ niversitesi, Gemikonag˘ı Kampu¨su¨ _Iktisadi _Idari Bilimler Faku¨ltesi
Kat:2 Oda:6, Lefke, KKTC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), Mersin 10, Turkey.
Email: akaynar@eul.edu.tr

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Armed Forces & Society 43(3)
Introduction
Discussions on the power and influence of the military over politics have been one of
the most debated topics of Turkish political history. Nevertheless, these discussions
gained pace with the coming of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) to power in 2002. Since that day, civil–military relations
in Turkey have been tremendously overhauled. The AKP governments initiated a
series of constitutional and legal reforms that curbed the military’s power over
politics. Some of these reforms targeted military courts and high councils, in which
the military was represented. Yet, an important portion was particularly directed to
the National Security Council (Milli Gu¨venlik Kurulu [MGK]). Until that day, the
MGK was the most effective and significant institutional instrument of the armed
forces’ involvement in the political arena (Shambayati, 2004, p. 258). That’s why
the restructuring of the MGK lay at the heart of the transformation of civil–military
relations.
The military had been the most ardent antagonist of the AKP. Whereas it is
traditionally considered as the bulwark of secularism (Bockel, 2001, p. 53; War-
hola & Egemen, 2010, p. 428), the AKP is an Islamist political party, evolved from
several parties belonging to the National Outlook Movement (Milli Go¨ru¨s¸ Hare-
keti) led by Necmettin Erbakan who lost his life in February 2011. The hostility
between the AKP and the military revealed itself in the incessant speeches of the
top military personnel during the initial years of the AKP’s rule; even on April 27,
2007, the Turkish General Staff interrupted the presidential elections by issuing an
e-memorandum as to obstruct AKP’s candidate Abdullah Gu¨l’s victory. It was not
only that Gu¨l was a formidable Islamist, but also his wife was wearing a headscarf,
which meant that for the first time a headscarf wearing woman would become
Turkey’s first lady. In such a context, e-memorandum stated that the presidency of
Gu¨l would disturb secularism, and the military was ready to intervene if secularism
was put at risk by his election.1 The AKP worried that the military would anytime
organize a ‘‘soft’’ coup through the MGK, just like its February 28, 1997, inter-
vention that toppled Erbakan’s government. Therefore, it deeply felt the need to
reduce the impact of this council over politics if it was to govern and consolidate its
power.
That being said, the article discusses political activism of the MGK after its
reform. It starts with an examination of the MGK’s legal powers, duties, and
constitutional status before the 2000s. The purpose of this retrospective study is
to figure out why the MGK has been a problem for the democratic regime and to
define the presence of this body within Turkish constitutional and parliamentary
system with more substantial concepts than ‘‘tutelage’’ or ‘‘guardianship.’’ In this
framework, the first part of the article argues that, in contrast to its ostensibly
advisory character, in many respects, the MGK had executive authority before the
reforms, which enabled it to act almost as a second executive body beside the
council of ministers. In the second part, the AKP’s reforms are explicated.

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Kars Kaynar
525
The article proceeds with an evaluation of the results of the reforms for the
MGK. Accordingly, it is propounded that trimming of military’s power in the
MGK proved insufficient to end its political involvement. Although functions of
this body are subjected to civilian control in many respects, the MGK reserves
its executive authority and actively takes part in Turkish politics in the
postreform era.
Method
The article questions the effects of the reforms since the early 2001 on the
political activism of the MGK. This institutional study is part of a broader
research on the reform of the Turkish state under the AKP governments. It is
a descriptive study that aims to reveal the association between reforms and
political role of this semi-military institution. In this respect, the study compared
the state of the council’s political activism in the prereform era (1961–2001)
with the postreform era (2001–2015). It identified three elements that played
significant role in the political activism of the MGK. The first one was the
breadth of the term ‘‘national security.’’ The second was the council’s executive
authority and status. The last one was its military character, which was called as
the autonomy of the military. The following four factors were further identified
as the basic components of the autonomy of the military: the status of the
general chief of the staff (GCS), financial autonomy of the military, judicial
autonomy of the military, and ratio of military members to civilian members
within the council. The study compared the state of these elements and factors
in respective periods and thereby analyzed the change that reforms initiated on
council’s political activism.
The key sources of data used to determine the state of these elements and
factors were the related articles of the legal texts, namely, the 1961 Constitution,
the 1982 Constitution, the Law No. 11286 on the MGK (1962), the Law No.
2945 on the MGK (1983), the MGK Directive No. 6/1645 (1963), the MGK
Directive No. 2003/6688 (2003), the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act
No 211 (1961), the Law No. 832 on the Court of Accounts (1967), the Law No.
6085 on the Court of Accounts (2010), and the Code of Criminal Procedure No.
5271 (2004). To demonstrate the outcomes of the reforms on the political
activism of the council, this article collected data from 2010 to 2015. The main
source of data was press releases of the council, the top military personnel, and
the members of the council of ministers. They were reached through the MGK’s
website, media outlets, and journals. To provide insight into the legal and the
journalistic material, ideas of the prominent scholars in the literature (e.g.,
Cizre, Faltas, and Aydınlı) were reviewed. Additionally, reports of organizations
such as the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation and Human Rights
Watch were used.

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Armed Forces & Society 43(3)
Political Role and Status of the MGK (1961–2001)
Advisory Versus Executive Character of the Council
The MGK is a semi-military council established by the 1961 Constitution and
retained in the 1982 Constitution. Both its initial establishment and preservation
in the ensuant constitution are closely associated with its perceived ‘‘guardian’’ role.
Beginning with the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Turkish military presented
itself as the protector of the constitutional order and Kemalist principles: first and
foremost, of the principle of secularism (Greenwood, 2006, p. 38). Throughout
Republican history, it frequently intervened in politics via direct and indirect means
in the guise of this guardian role. Nevertheless, this role is institutionalized for the
first time in the 1961 Constitution. In the 1950 general elections, Democrat Party
(Demokrat Parti [DP]) under Adnan Menderes’ leadership came to power, closing
the long-lasting Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) reign. How-
ever, the DP’s policies that favored Islam such as opening of Prayer and Preacher
Schools and increasing oppression toward political opposition was considered by the
military as threats to secularism and democracy. In May 1960, the military organized
a coup. Afterward, a new constitution was prepared under the aegis of the military
junta. In such a context, the 1961 Constitution created the MGK and hence institu-
tionalized military tutelage. Additionally, Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service
Act was enacted in 1961, which made the military legally responsible for the pro-
tection of the Turkish homeland and the...