Policing and the Politics of Public and Private in Post-Katrina New Orleans

• Published date: 05 December 2007
• Date: 05 December 2007
• Pages: 169-185
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1059-4337(07)00007-5
• Author: Adelaide H. Villmoare

POLICING AND THE POLITICS

OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN

POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS

Adelaide H. Villmoare

ABSTRACT

During the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the onslaught

of flooding, the single most important role for government and the public

sphere was deemed to be law and order, at times to the exclusion of other

public responsibilities. Law and order were articulated almost exclusively

as a policing matter with the emphasis on order rather than law. Policing

took different public and private forms in the early days of the flooding.

This chapter examines the nature of that policing and the unquestioned

presence of private police as a key element of the law and order response

to Katrina in New Orleans.

INTRODUCTION

Although the law and order rhetoric of the 1960s has never completely

disappeared from the political scene, it surfaced with renewed vigor in post-

Katrina New Orleans. During the immediate aftermath of the hurricane and

the onslaught of flooding, the single most important role for government

Special Issue: Law and Society Reconsidered

Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Volume 41, 169–185

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ISSN: 1059-4337/doi:10.1016/S1059-4337(07)00007-5

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and the public sphere was deemed to be law and order, at times to the

exclusion of other public responsibilities. Law and order were articulated

almost exclusively as a policing matter with the emphasis on order rather

than law. And policing took different public and private forms in the early

days of the flooding.

Understandably order was a priority after Katrina. Most foundations of

an orderly society were ripped apart by the flooding and devastatingly slow

and ineffective rescue efforts. Neighborhoods, families, churches, schools,

jobs, the physical infrastructure, and government, including the police,

courts, and jails, were either destroyed or immobilized. Douglas Brinkley’s

The great deluge (2006) describes in intricate detail the fear, death, and

violence the flooding precipitated. Even in the absence of orderly routines of

life, however, many concentrated on help rather than order.

People reached out to one another by using the minimal resources

available them. The New Orleans Louisiana ‘‘homeboys,’’ people who had

refused to evacuate, for example, assisted neighbors they did not know

(Brinkley, 2006, p. 303). They worked on saving lives and doing the best

they could to support their community. When outside help was slow and

inadequate, reporters in New Orleans displayed outrage at government’s

failures at all levels to rescue its people. The failures played out against the

widely recognized ‘‘cleavage of race and class’’ (DeParle, 2005) that was

repeatedly and graphically visualized on television. Comparisons between

the suffering in New Orleans and the lack of help seen in the third world

appeared with some frequency in the media (Geltzinis, 2005).

But order, not help, was the priority of many others. Calls for order

involved little by way of formal law or justice and emphasized policing to

protect property and counter violence. Rumors and realities of looting and

violence, for instance, fueled the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s

(FEMA) heartless and destructive early responses. FEMA’s self-imposed

mandate was above all else to institute order in New Orleans. It refused

offers of help from various governmental and non-governmental bodies

and individuals because it had no secure way to control the organizations

offering assistance. FEMA prevented rescue groups from entering

New Orleans because it deemed the city too dangerous (Dyson, 2006,

pp. 118–123;Horne, 2006, p. 89). FEMA’s concentration on order and its

own authority and control were more important than letting people get into

New Orleans to help.

Policing was to be the antidote to disorder and rumors of looting,

‘‘thuggism,’’ and violence, and policing had a confusing public and a private

face. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), the National Guard,

ADELAIDE H. VILLMOARE170