Michael Polanyi, Alasdair MacIntyre, and the role of tradition.

• Author: Mitchell, Mark T.
• Position: Essay

Introduction

Modernity has reached a dead end. The optimism in which the modern world was conceived and nurtured has been replaced by a thoroughgoing skepticism that denies the possibility of making meaningful truth claims, especially when those claims bear on morality and religion. The irony is that this has occurred as we have become increasingly confident of scientific utterances. Thus, as our facility to grasp the facts of the material world has exploded, our confidence in moral and religious claims has atrophied to the point that we are compelled to speak of them as mere subjective preferences. From a certain vantage, this situation might appear as a stable solution to the interminable wrangling and occasional bloodlettings that moral and religious truth claims spawned. Yet at another level, such a position is simply intolerable, for it is inhuman. It is not possible to deny for long the very things for which human souls most yearn. In fact, if these sorts of claims are denied, they will invariably assert themselves in perverted and often violent ways.

The work of both Michael Polanyi and Alasdair MacIntyre contributes significantly to overcoming the problems posed by late modernity. (1) Unlike some, they harbor no nostalgic illusions about the possibility of returning to a golden past. Yet neither do they believe that skepticism and despair (or apathy) are satisfying alternatives. Both lament the early modern rejection of the role of tradition in enquiry. Such concepts as belief, authority, and the possibility of speaking of the reality of moral and theological truths were, in the wake of Cartesian doubt, undermined and eventually dispensed with altogether. Both Polanyi and MacIntyre argue that what has come to be called postmodernism is a logical continuation of the modern project. Ironically, both believe that the way to move beyond what they perceive as the dead end wrought by modernity is a rediscovery of the central role played by tradition. Thus, a discussion of tradition will provide a vantage point from which to compare the views of these two thinkers and comprehend the complementary way each seeks to remedy the defects of modernism and its postmodern offspring and thereby create a context within which the meaningful discussion of truth can occur. If they are correct, then we do well to attend to their work, for they serve as guides calling us out of the dark woods of modernity and offering the tantalizing possibility of something that is truly postmodern.

In the late 1970s MacIntyre mentions Polanyi with some frequency and discusses him on several occasions. (2) He criticizes him primarily for succumbing to irrationalism, which, according to MacIntyre, results

from Polanyi's fideism. There is a double irony here, for MacIntyre himself has also been accused of irrationalism, (3) and as I will show, MacIntyre's fully developed account of knowledge is, in many important respects, similar to Polanyi's. (4) I should note at the outset that MacIntyre's criticisms of Polanyi seem to have ceased. One might conclude that Polanyi is simply no longer a concern of MacIntyre's, but one can also explain this shift by arguing that, as MacIntyre has become more Thomistic, he has found Polanyi's thought less objectionable. (5) This seems to be evidenced in 1990's First Principles, Final Causes and Contemporary Philosophical Issues in which MacIntyre, now firmly converted to Thomism, makes a positive though fleeting reference to Polanyi, who, MacIntyre argues, recognizes that phronesis requires the possession of the other moral virtues, and, as such, Polanyi's work was in this respect anticipated by Aristotle and Aquinas. (6) If it is indeed the case that MacIntyre's view of Polanyi has modified, then MacIntyre's earlier criticism of Polanyi helps us to track MacIntyre's development as a thinker.

MacIntyre writes, in 1977, that "Polanyi is the Burke of the philosophy of science." MacIntyre does not intend this comparison as a compliment, for he is quite critical of Burke, and by linking Polanyi to Burke he extends those same criticisms to Polanyi, for, as he puts it, "all my earlier criticisms of Burke now become relevant to the criticism of Polanyi." (7) Just what are those criticisms? In MacIntyre's words, Burke "wanted to counterpoise tradition and reason and tradition and revolution. Not reason, but prejudice; not revolution, but inherited precedent; these are Burke's key oppositions." (8) MacIntyre repeats the comparison in another article published in 1978:

But Polanyi, of course--like Burke--combined with his emphasis on consensus and tradition a deep commitment to a realistic interpretation of science. Polanyi's realism rested on what he called a 'fiduciary commitment.' Feyerabend (and less explicitly Kuhn) have retained the fideism; what they have rejected is the realism and with it the objectivism which Polanyi held to as steadfastly as any positivist. (9) We can, perhaps, gain a clearer picture of MacIntyre's view of Polanyi by further exploring MacIntyre's view of Burke. (It should be noted at this point that MacIntyre only mentions Polanyi once in the Virtue Trilogy and then only in passing. (10) In After Virtue, MacIntyre again asserts that Burke contrasted "tradition with reason and the stability of tradition with conflict. Both contrasts obfuscate." In MacIntyre's view, "all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought," and traditions in "good working order" always "embody continuities of conflict." Thus, "when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or dead." (11) In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre notes in passing that "Burke theorized shoddily" and "was an agent of positive harm." (12) Burke, he continues, "ascribed to traditions in good order, the order as he supposed of following nature, 'wisdom without reflection.' So that no place is left for reflection, rational theorizing as a work of and within tradition." (13) In short, we may summarize MacIntyre's reading of Burke as follows: Burke contrasted tradition and reason, and in so doing placed stability, consensus, prejudice, and prescription on the side of tradition. On the side of reason Burke placed conflict, rational reflection, and revolution. Because tradition is separated from any sort of rational reflection, this implies that those who favor the alternative of tradition are necessarily fideists, while those who embrace reason are rationalists (in the neutral sense of the word).

It seems clear that a careful reading of Burke shows MacIntyre's characterization of him is seriously flawed. And while it is outside the scope of this article to explore this errant version of Burke's views, it is necessary that I show how MacIntyre is in error when he equates Polanyi with this version of Burke. (14) In so doing, I will also point out the important similarities between Polanyi's thought and MacIntyre's relative to the concept of tradition. First, Polanyi does not believe that tradition opposes reason; instead, in his view, all reason necessarily occurs within a particular tradition. Second, Polanyi's view of tradition does not imply a commitment to a static view of society; instead, for him, healthy traditions are dynamic. Third, Polanyi does not believe that commitment to a tradition removes all venues for conflict; instead, internal conflict--the ability to rebel against the consensus--is a fundamental element in Polanyi's theory of tradition. (15)

Once Polanyi is distinguished from MacIntyre's version of Burke, several other issues emerge. First, at least in part due to his misreading of Polanyi on tradition, the pre-Virtue MacIntyre accuses Polanyi of being a fideist. While there is a sense in which Polanyi is correctly characterized as a fideist, this is not, as MacIntyre claims, due to the separation of tradition and reason. On the contrary, Polanyi believes tradition and reason are inseparable and that submission to the authority of a tradition is a prerequisite for rationality. MacIntyre, too, especially in his later writings, embraces this view of rationality, and consequently he is far closer to Polanyi than his earlier criticisms allow. Next, the respective alternatives offered by these two thinkers are both grounded in a philosophical commitment to realism. As such both MacIntyre and Polanyi believe that an objective reality exists and can be grasped by human minds but only provisionally and fallibly; thus, for both, all inquiry is open-ended, but the truth toward which inquiry presses is timeless. In this regard, both recognize that realism ultimately has theological implications. Finally, Polanyi and MacIntyre are motivated by a concern about what they take to be the errant direction modern philosophy has taken. The dilemma between enlightenment objectivism on the one hand and postmodern relativism or skepticism on the other is identified by both MacIntyre and Polanyi, and both insist that the dilemma is a false one. Both MacIntyre and Polanyi seek to overcome the dilemma by offering a third alternative. Where MacIntyre offers "tradition," Polanyi gives us "personal knowledge." The alternatives developed by these two men are striking in their similarities, both in terms of specific content as well as in the motivation underlying their respective work, for both seem intent on creating a context within which a meaningful discussion of ethics (not to mention theology) can occur. (16)

Reason, Stasis, and Conflict

Reason. Polanyi does not believe that reason and tradition are opposed to each other. Tradition is, in fact, a necessary condition which makes rational thought possible, for "no human mind can function without accepting authority, custom, and tradition: it must rely on them for the mere use of language." (17) Polanyi stresses his view that all language is tradition-dependent. If this is the case, and if, as he argues, "all human thought comes into...