Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization

Published date01 January 2019
DOI10.1177/0002716218809322
Date01 January 2019
Subject MatterII. Democratic Erosion under New Elites
ANNALS, AAPSS, 681, January 2019 97
DOI: 10.1177/0002716218809322
Poland: A Case
of Top-Down
Polarization
By
HUBERT TWORZECKI
809322ANN THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYPoland
research-article2018
Poland represents a surprising case of democratic back-
sliding since the return to power of the PiS party in
2015, given that positive conditions associated with
democracy are present—consistent strong per capita
economic growth since 1989, moderate inequality, ris-
ing wages, strong preference for democracy, high levels
of happiness, and a parliamentary system with propor-
tional representation. The lack of strong underlying
cleavages indicates the polarization was not bottom up.
Instead, this article argues that polarization was driven
from the top down by a segment of the political class
that donned the cloak of radical populist anti-establish-
mentarianism to gain popular support, win an election,
and rewrite the constitutional rules of the game to its
own benefit. The Polish case points to the importance
of elite cues, and especially the pernicious conse-
quences of system-delegitimizing rhetoric, creating
distrust in the media and institutions.
Keywords: Poland; democratic backsliding; top-down
polarization
Since the elections of 2015, Poland has
joined the ranks of countries experiencing
democratic backsliding. It was a process driven
from the top down by a segment of the political
class that donned the cloak of radical populist
anti-establishmentarianism to gain popular
support, win an election, and rewrite the con-
stitutional rules of the game to its own benefit.
Put differently, Poland’s democratic backsliding
story is essentially one of “establishment insid-
ers ‘breaking bad,’” to borrow a phrase from
Hanley and Dawson (2017). As argued by
Hubert Tworzecki is an associate professor of political
science at Emory University. His research interests
include political parties, elections, and voting in new
democracies. He is the author of Learning to Choose:
Electoral Politics in East-Central Europe (Stanford
University Press 2002), Parties and Politics in Post-
1989 Poland (Westview Press 1996), as well as numer-
ous journal articles.
Correspondence: htworze@emory.edu
98 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
Tworzecki and Markowski (2017), having won by a twist of domestic and interna-
tional circumstances unlikely to be repeated, The Law and Justice Party (PiS) set
about changing the rules so it could carry out what it called an “exchange of
elites” (i.e., rewarding its activists and supporters in a tidal wave of patronage and
clientelism) with both permanence and impunity. In terms of the three patterns
described in McCoy, Rahman, and Somer (2018), Poland therefore fits in the
category of democratic erosion under new elites.
Although Poland is routinely mentioned in journalistic accounts and academic
studies as one of many cases of backsliding or outright breakdown, in important
ways it stands apart from the rest. Indeed, the puzzle presented by Poland is that
it appears to contradict decades of accumulated political science research on
transitions to and from democracy in that it lacks any of the major risk factors
identified by previous literature, such as persistent economic dysfunction, crip-
pling racial or ethnic divisions, polarizing winner-take-all institutions (e.g., presi-
dentialism or single-member-district elections), or pernicious international
entanglements (e.g., trade dependence on nondemocracies).
The Puzzle of Poland’s Democratic Erosion (2015–18)
Contrary to the expectations of theories that associate risks to democracies with
low incomes,1 inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003), or poor
economic performance (Kapstein and Converse 2008; Svolik 2013; Bernhard,
Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003), Poland has seen its per capita GDP increase by
4.1 percent per year since 1989—a remarkable record, matched in the middle/
high income country category only by South Korea (Piatkowski 2018). Economic
inequality in Poland is moderate by European and low by global standards,2 oli-
garchization is a nonissue (the ratio of billionaire wealth to GDP, at 1.3 percent,
is among the lowest in the world; see Brzezin´ ski 2017), unemployment is in single
digits, and incomes have not stagnated, as in some democracies, but risen stead-
ily, if unevenly, across the board.3 Nevertheless, perceptions of inequitable distri-
butions of material gain have created a type of legitimacy deficit for the post–Cold
War system, ably exploited by rising populist parties as described here.
Poland’s membership in the European Union (EU) and dependence on trade
and investment from other EU member states should have resulted, in line with
“linkage and leverage” theories (Levitsky and Way 2006), in significant pressure
on elites to maintain the liberal-democratic package of popular accountability,
transparency, and rule of law.
On the political/institutional side, Poland should have been safe from anyone’s
authoritarian ambitions thanks to a parliamentary system4 and a proportional
electoral law, both of which should have—at least in theory—discouraged the
kind of zero-sum politics characteristic of presidentialism, especially when com-
bined with single-member district legislative elections (Mainwaring and Shugart
1997). Furthermore, Poland’s constitution features a comprehensive set of
checks and balances, along with both domestic (Constitutional Tribunal, truly

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