Pivoting toward Asia.

AuthorLogan, Justin
PositionWorldview - On United States-China relations

THE U.S.-CHINA relationship is the most important one in international politics. Looking into the 21st century, it seems possible that America could be eclipsed in economic--and possibly military--terms by China. According to The Economist magazine, China is likely to overtake the U.S. in gross domestic product at market exchange rates in 2018. To give a sense of China's staggering relative growth, its GDP was one-eighth America's in 2000 and, by 2010, it was one-half

This growth particularly is relevant considering that Washington participated in an enormously costly and dangerous Cold War with the Soviet Union, which, at the height of its relative power, possessed roughly 44% of U.S. GDP. That conflict helped complete the transformation of the U.S. from a federalist republic into a centralized, Bismarckian nation-state. Given the potential impact of U.S.-China competition on security and domestic politics, getting American-Sino relations right is the most important challenge for U.S. foreign policymakers.

In addition to China, India is undergoing rapid economic development, possesses a favorable demographic profile, and is likely to play an increasingly prominent role in regional and global politics. Japan, despite demographic and fiscal difficulties, remains an important world power. A number of Southeast Asian countries are growing rapidly. In short, no other region on Earth is likely to see its share of global power expand as much as the Asia-Pacific region in the decades ahead. To the extent that the concentration of power in the international system shifts toward East Asia, American strategists should focus on that region.

Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the Beltway foreign policy establishment has been focused primarily on the Islamic world and terrorism. Before 9/11, though, important parts of the establishment were looking at competition with China as the big potential problem. Vice Pres. Dick Cheney had read John Mearsheimer's pessimistic view of the future of U.S.-China relations, disliking only the passages he deemed "softheaded": the parts where Mearsheimer hoped security competition between the two countries could be moderated.

At the beginning of Pres. George W. Bush's Administration, it looked like the two states were headed for rough waters. In April 2001, a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter near Chinese territory, and the American pilot and crew were held by the Chinese until U.S. diplomats negotiated their release, but the incident stirred nationalism in both countries. In Washington, historian Robert Kagan and political analyst William Kristol complained that "the exact circumstances" under which the two planes had collided did not matter. Instead, they howled that Bush had brought on the U.S. a "profound national humiliation" by expressing regret for the death of the Chinese pilot and reiterated their prior calls for a policy of "active containment of China." However, after the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the Bush Administration turned its attention to the Middle East.

Slowly, Washington policy elites have come back around to the position that the most consequential...

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