Picking Up the Pieces: A Call for Federal Structural Inspection Laws in the Aftermath of the Surfside Condominium Collapse

• Date: 01 April 2024
• Author: Spencer L. Woods

Forum on Construction Law The Construction Lawyer Volume 43, Number 2 Picking Up the Pieces: A Call for Federal Structural Inspection Laws in the Aftermath of the Surfside Condominium Collapse By Spencer L. Woods Spencer L. Woods, a 2024 graduate of the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, is the winner of the ABA Forum on Construction Law’s 2023 Student Writing Competition. Around 1 a.m. on June 24, 2021, Iliana Monteagudo awoke in her sixth-floor condo in the Champlain Towers South in Surfside, Florida, and noticed a crack forming in the ceiling. 1 Ms. Monteagudo threw on some clothes and ran with her son to a stairwell; however, she did not take the nearest stairwell as she did not know about it. 2 As she raced down the stairs, she heard the building crash down around her. 3 Within seconds, her unit and dozens like it were gone, but the staircase she was in remained standing, allowing her to make it out of the building. 4 The “mistake” that she committed saved her life: The closer stairwell collapsed. 5 The building collapse started when a part of an unprotected concrete slab fell in Champlain South’s parking garage. 6 Within minutes, the east wing of the 13-story tower collapsed, killing 98 people in an unprecedented disaster in the United States. 7 Officials and engineers said that it is unlikely that just one issue within the building brought it down by itself, but rather that the cumulative effects of the flaws in design and construction ultimately doomed the structure. 8 Officials searched rubble for nearly 14 days before calling off the search; they had removed almost seven million pounds of concrete while using dogs, sonar, and cameras in hopes of finding survivors. 9 The collapse was described as a “pancake collapse,” where the building floors collapsed directly on one another, leaving little to no space for someone to survive. 10 No one had been pulled alive from the rubble for the duration of the formal survivor search. 11 The search for survivors soon turned into a search for human remains as rescuers worked tirelessly to peel away layers of rubble. 12 Pathologists and rescuers alike had to balance the rigors of their duties with the victims’ loved ones’ desperate need for closure. 13 Updating the families consisted of delivering bad news of their discoveries, with bodies rarely found intact. 14 The collapse triggered the most significant non-hurricane-related emergency response in the history of the state of Florida. 15 The victims reflected the area’s rich cultural diversity, and the tragedy reached an international scope as it touched members of a tight-knit Jewish community and families as far away as Argentina, Paraguay, and Colombia. 16 The victims’ ages were as old as 92, and the youngest victim was just one year old when she perished along with the rest of her family. 17 Many of the victims’ families spoke out following the collapse, and after the release of chilling security footage from a building nearby that showed the moment of the collapse. 18 Some of the building’s residents expected to see their families just days before the collapse. 19 Many people blamed systemic issues in the condominium and cooperative housing industries in Florida and beyond. 20 The main issues brought to the discourse were the need for reserve fund requirements for shared building repairs and the lack of laws requiring structural checks of aging buildings. 21 This Published in The Construction Lawyer Volume 43, Number 2, ©2024 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Forum on Construction Law The Construction Lawyer Volume 43, Number 2 article includes an overview of building structural inspection laws in states such as New York and California, where many people live in community development–type buildings such as condominiums or cooperatives. 22 New York City, specifically, has some of the most high-rise buildings in the world. 23 Los Angeles, California, and New York City are the most populous cities in the United States. 24 Some states, such as California, have strict laws regarding structural checks of buildings; however, other states need to catch up to the curve, leaving millions of people at risk, frequently in disaster-prone areas. 25 For example, New York arguably needs more specific requirements for interior structural checks of buildings because many buildings were constructed decades ago, 26 and historically, Florida’s structural inspection laws have not always been strictly enforced by officials. 27 Damage to buildings can be reduced by adopting and enforcing strong building codes that help people keep their homes and businesses following a natural or manmade disaster. 28 More robust codes would also reduce the need for public and private disaster aid and preserve the built environment. 29 Background/History and Aftermath of Surfside Collapse Calls for Action to Repair Champlain Towers South Ignored Prior to the collapse, the president of the association of the Surfside condominium complex previously wrote to residents that the building was in desperate need of repair. 30 The letter stated that a $15 million assessment was needed because Florida law required buildings to be recertified for electrical and structural safety 40 years after construction. 31 Following a structural report in 2018, it was noted that any surface-level issues within buildings are often indicators of extensive interior problems. 32 Government building officials came under scrutiny because of their close involvement and reassurances that the building was in good shape, even though those same officials previously evacuated buildings with similar issues. 33 The ocean is a constant source of danger for beachfront buildings made from reinforced concrete, like the Champlain Towers. 34 Akin to a steel skeleton, rebar rods run through concrete columns and slabs. 35 Saltwater seeping through concrete can cause the steel to rust and expand, causing the concrete to start to crack and increasing the risk of structural failure. 36 Critical Moments Prior to the Collapse An engineering firm’s 2018 structural report of the building revealed a systemic issue that allowed water to pool at its base. 37 The engineering firm that was hired by the condominium board, Morabito Consultants, also found inconsistent waterproofing against saltwater of concrete slabs throughout the building. 38 However, Morabito Consultants later released another report that gave the Surfside building a top grade on several measures, even though some repairs were still required. 39 Local government officials claimed to have never received the troubling report. 40 The conflicting reports were not addressed until after the collapse. 41 The cause of the collapse remained largely unclear because the building did not present problems as a first-rate luxury high rise when it was first constructed; academics and professionals from around the country noted that the cause of the collapse was likely from multiple issues in conjunction with one another. 42 Investigations into the structure of the building have proven difficult because it was built decades ago by people who are now deceased or by people who cannot recall the construction process. 43 Issues like a lack of waterproofing or too little concrete cover are common for South Florida condominiums built in the early 1980s because this was a time when building codes were laxer and engineering science less advanced. 44 The risks of some of the choices made four decades ago during the construction of the Champlain Towers South were well known at the time, but building codes generally gave developers broad leeway. 45 In the 1970s and 1980s, skimping on construction materials when building residential condominiums was an easy way to save money, and developers could easily hide the Published in The Construction Lawyer Volume 43, Number 2, ©2024 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 40 Forum on Construction Law The Construction Lawyer Volume 43, Number 2 shortcuts they had taken. 46 These past shortcuts taken in haste to get a building completed can lead to catastrophic domino effects decades later when a building’s interior structure fails. 47 Aftermath of the Collapse and the Status of Florida’s Community Building Inspection Laws Following the collapse, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) opened an investigation to determine the cause. 48 The mission of NIST is to promote US innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology to enhance economic security and improve quality of life. 49 The National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act authorizes NIST to establish teams to investigate the failure of a building that resulted in substantial loss of life or posed a significant potential for substantial loss of life. 50 About one week following the collapse of the Champlain Towers South in Surfside, another large condominium building seven miles away was evacuated, and officials who performed the recertification cited similar issues of water intrusion problems that plagued Champlain. 51 Among the problems was water intrusion, which weakens a building’s structure, decreasing the load that it can internally bear. 52 People were on high alert when checking buildings due to the Champlain collapse. 53 Subsequently, another set of buildings in Surfside, which were 70 years old, were voluntarily evacuated following an...