Phase 3 empowerment zones: The case of Tucson

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1958
• Date: 01 November 2019
• Published date: 01 November 2019
• Author: Ljubinka Andonoska

ACADEMIC PAPER

Phase 3 empowerment zones: The case of Tucson

Ljubinka Andonoska

Department of Political Science, University of

Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas

Correspondence

Ljubinka Andonoska, Department of Political

Science, University of Texas at El Paso, 500 W.

University Avenue, Kelly Hall, Room 406 El

Paso, TX.

Email: landonoska@utep.edu

Funding information

Arizona State University Graduate College

Completion Fellowship, Grant/Award Number:

N/A

The empowerment zones were the leading federal program for community revitaliza-

tion and economic recovery during the period from 1993 to 2013. Implemented in

three rounds, this program changed its benefits, with the final round offering only

tax‐based incentives. Using a case study design, this paper looks closely at the round

3 empowerment zone in Tucson, Arizona. Utilizing qualitative data, this scholarship

finds that the only performance indicator controlled by the administration was input

oriented, that is, the marketing of program incentives to attract new businesses. Tuc-

son program administrators did not know how well the program was performing. The

program, although defined as comprehensive, in the case of Tucson, was concerned

only with economic development and job creation.

This study is the only known study comprehensively examining round 3 empower-

ment zones.

1|INTRODUCTION

The empowerment zones (EZs) were introduced by the federal gov-

ernment in 1993 with the purpose to revitalize economically dis-

tressed communities (Jennings, 2010, Jennings, 2011; Mulock, 2002;

Rubin, 1994). The EZs' program objectives reflected a strong paradigm

shift toward the new public management model (Osborne & Gaebler,

1992), where the community is empowered and the role of the gov-

ernment is to steer, not row. The EZ program promoted revitalization

through participation and community empowerment (Rich & Stoker,

2010). Economically exhausted communities, however, lacked social

and administrative capacity, often for decades, which prevented revi-

talization. As Jones (1998, p. 102) pointed out, high‐poverty neighbor-

hoods “also face the problems of poor educational systems,

joblessness, single parenthood …” or “simply do not have the capacity

to fully support business and economic growth.”

The EZ program was founded on four principles: economic oppor-

tunity, sustainable community development, strategic vision for

change, and community‐based partnerships. Because of its commit-

ment to both attracting businesses and empowering communities,

the program had comprehensive character (Gittell, Newman,

Bockmeyer, & Lindsay, 1998; Gittell, Newman, & Pierre‐Louis, 2001;

Jenkins & Bennett, 1999; Joseph & Levy, 2002; Mulock, 2002; Law-

rence, Stoker, & Wolman, 2010; Rubin, 1994; Wang & van Loo,

1998). Applicants submitted a formal application and a strategic plan

demonstrating strong collaboration among all anticipated stake-

holders, such as residents, community organizations, businesses, finan-

cial institutions, service providers, and state and local governments

(The U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2004, 2010;

Gittell et al., 2008; Gittell et al., 2001; Hyman, 1998; Smith, 2014;

Wallace, 2003). Designated communities were selected on the basis

of key selection criteria including poverty and unemployment rates,

population limits, and area size (Table A1). The initial period of desig-

nation was 10 years. Subsequently, the program's tax benefits for all

urban EZ communities were extended multiple times before its official

termination in December 2013.

1

Each of the three rounds of EZs had a different funding structure

(see Table A1 for a comprehensive list). The third round EZs operated

exclusively on market‐based incentives (Code of Federal Regulation,

Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2003; Rich &

Stoker, 2010; Mossberger, 2009; Mulock, 2002). Theoretically, the

incentives have great potential because of the associated positive

externalities and the investment multiplier, both of which have posi-

tive effect on the local economy (Kline & Moretti, 2013). The practice,

however, is far from conclusive. Although too many programs offer tax

incentives, many communities remain economically deprived for

decades (Mossberger, 2009; Rubin, 1994).

After the EZs expired in December 2013, they were replaced with

an updated federal program called Promise Zones under President

Obama's administration and later with Opportunity Zones under

Received: 1 April 2019 Accepted: 2 April 2019

DOI: 10.1002/pa.1958

J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1958.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1958

© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of11