Pesticides, Water Quality, and the Public Trust Doctrine

• Date: 01 October 2015

45 ELR 10938 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10-2015

A R T I CL E S

Pesticides,

Water Quality,

and the Public

Trust Doctrine

by Joel Reschly

Joel Reschly holds a 2015 J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law

School with a certicate in environmental and natural resources

law. is Article won the 2014–2015 Beveridge & Diamond

Constitutional Environmental Law Writing Competition.

Summary

e public trust doctrine is an ancient legal principle

undergoing a modern resurgence. Under it, govern-

ments hold certain natural resources in trust for the

benet of present and future generations, and have a

judicially enforceable legal obligation to protect trust

resources and the public’s interest in them. is Article

argues that courts could use the public trust doctrine

to enforce regulation of water pollution caused by

pesticides because the current regulatory framework

is insucient to protect human health, the environ-

ment, wildlife, or water quality. e author also argues

that the federal environmental statutes regulating pes-

ticides do not preempt the public trust doctrine, at

least when the claim is brought under state law.

I. Introduction

America ns apply over one-half billion pounds of pesticides

each year—80% of which is for agricu ltural purposes, to

increase crop production and reduce insect-borne diseas-

es.1 A recent study of major rivers and streams by the

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) detected one or more

pesticides in over 90% of the surface waters sampled

and in one-third of major aquifers.2 Federal regulation of

pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, a nd

Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)3 is not based on human health

or safety4; instead, FIFRA uses a risk-benet approach

that allows the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) to register pesticides that oer sucient economic

benets.5 Federal regulation of discharges to water under

the Clean Water Act (CWA)6 divides the sources of water

pollution into point sources a nd nonpoint sources, regu-

lating only point source discharges. e source of pol-

lution is irrelevant, however, to the environment and to

the wildlife it reaches. If pesticide regulation were instead

based on the adverse eects it causes to public natural

resources, water quality would improve and stabilize

throughout the United States.

Both point source and nonpoint source discharges of

pesticides adversely aect water quality and wildlife. Until

2009, EPA exempted certain point source discharges of pes-

ticides applied directly to waters of the United States7 from

national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES)

permitting requirements if the applicator used the pesticide

in compliance with FIFRA. e U.S. Court of Appeals for



guidance and edits to this Article.

1. U.S. G S (USGS), P  U.S. S  R-

: O  T D 1992–2011 (2014) [hereinafter

USGS S]; Press Release, USGS, 20-Year Study Shows Levels of Pesti-

cides Still a Concern for Aquatic Life in U.S. Rivers and Streams (Sept. 11,

2014) [hereinafter USGS Press Release], available at http://www.usgs.gov/

newsroom/article.asp?ID=3997#.

2. USGS S, supra note 1. e study tested water samples for pesticides

and pesticide degradates, also known as pesticide breakdown products, the

still-toxic compounds that break down in the environment until eventually

reaching undetectable levels. Id. Budget constraints limited the monitoring

to fewer than one-half of the more than 400 pesticides used in agriculture.

USGS Press Release, supra note 1.

3. 7 U.S.C. §§136–136y (2012), ELR S. FIFRA §§2–35.

4. N C.  A  P, N G

 S 1 (2002) [hereinafter N G  S], available

athttp://www.pesticide.org/get-the-facts/ncap-publications-and-reports/

general-reports-and-publications/journal-of-pesticide-reform/journal-of-

pesticide-reform-articles/eparegis.pdf.

5. Id.

6. 33 U.S.C. §§1251–1387 (2012), ELR S. FWPCA §§101–607.

7. ese discharges included applications of pesticides on, over, or near juris-

dictional waters for the purpose of pest control. National Cotton Council

of Am., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 931–32, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir.

2009), reh’g denied (2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010) (citing40

C.F.R. §122.3(h)).

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

10-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10939

the Sixth Circuit struck down EPA’s exemption in 

-

tection Agency.8e Obama Administration chose not to

appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the indus-

try’s petition for certiorari, eectively making a signicant

number of point source pesticide discharges nationwide

newly subject to NPDES permit requirements.9 According

to EPA calculations, the     ruling

will increase by 65% the annual number of total discharges

subject to CWA jurisdiction.10

In response to the Sixth Circuit’s decision, in 2011, EPA

issued the Pesticide General Permit (PGP)11 to regulate

without individual permit requirements most direct-to-

water pesticide discharges.12 As discussed below, it is quite

uncertain whether discharges subject to this general per-

mit will actually protect water quality or wildlife. Further,

industry groups have backed several bills in the U.S. Con-

gress to negate   and remove the

need for a PGP.13 Uncertainty also surrounds other point

source discharges of pesticides, such as some aerial sprays,

which are currently considered a point source and therefore

subject to CWA permit requirements, but only in the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.14

8. , 553 F.3d 927.

9. See Charles Franklin, 

, 26 N. R  E’ 18, 19 (Summer 2011);

Elisabeth A. Holmes & Charles M. Tebbutt, 

Story Behind National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. EPA, 41 ELR

10946 (Oct. 2011).

10. Brandon W. Neuschafer, -

der the Clean Water Act, 26 N. R  E’ 23, 23 (2011).

11. Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide

General Permit for Point Source Discharges From the Application of Pesti-

cides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68750 (Nov. 7, 2011).

12. U.S. EPA, Pesticide General Permit (PGP) for Discharges From the Applica-

tion of Pesticides 2011 [hereinafter PGP], available at http://www.epa.gov/

npdes/pubs/nal_pgp.pdf. e permit provides coverage for four “pesticide

use patterns”: mosquito and other ying insect pest control; weed and algae

pest control; animal pest control; and forest canopy pest control. Id. §1.1.1.

When operators satisfy its terms, the PGP authorizes eligible point source

discharges under the CWA. Id. at 1 (“In compliance with the [CWA], any

Operator of a point source discharge of pollutants (i.e., discharge) resulting

from the application of pesticides and eligible for permit coverage under

Part 1.1 ... is authorized to discharge to Waters of the United States in ac-

cordance with the requirements of this permit.”).

13. See, e.g., To Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

Act to Improve the Use of Certain Registered Pesticides, H.R. 6087, 111th

Cong. §2 (2010); A Bill to Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and

Rodenticide Act to Improve the Use of Cer tain Registered Pesticides, S.

3735, 111th Cong. §2 (2010).

14. See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Proj-

ect v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the U.S.

Forest Service’s aerial pesticide spraying over forests and streams was a point

source discharge requiring an NPDES permit, because the discharge “clearly

meets the statutory denition of a point source” and allowing EPA to dene

it as nonpoint source would “contravene the intent of Congress”). 

notes 116–18 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of aerial pesti-

cide spraying. Aerial sprays that meet one of the four pesticide use patterns

would be covered under the PGP. See PGP, supra note 12, §1.1.1.

A 2012 repor t by the Congressional Resea rch Service

estimates that nonpoint source pollution “represents

more than 50% of the nation’s remaining water pollu-

tion problems.”15Operators16typic ally apply pesticides

over large areas, meaning that most pesticide d ischarges

are nonpoint sou rce discharges because they do not orig-

inate from a“conned and discrete conveyance.”17e

result is the same even when excess amounts of pesti-

cides reach jurisdictional waters via runo ; this regula-

tory gap occurs becau se the CWA denes “point source”

to exclude “agricultura l stormwater dischargesand

return ows from irrigated agriculture.”18 Ultimately,

these jurisdictional limits in the CWA prevent the stat-

ute from achieving its stated goals19 of “restor[ing] and

mainta in[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological

integrit y of the Nation’s waters.”20

In 1987, Congress recognized the problem of nonpoint

source pollution when it amended the CWA, eectively

codifying states’ existing police power authority to control

sources of runo, including agricultural pollution.21 How-

ever, state-developed controls authorized by CWA §319

are voluntary and yield mixed results,22 and states face

enormous political pressure from the agricultural indus-

try, which vigorously resists attempts to regulate nonpoint

source pollution.23

Courts are less burdened by political pressure and lob-

bying than are legislatures and agencies, at both the federal

and state levels. e public trust doctrine empowers mem-

bers of the public24 to seek protection for public resources

15. See C C, C. R S., RL30030, C W

A: A S   L 4 (2012), available at http://aquadoc.type-

pad.com/les/cwa_summary_crs_nov2012-1.pdf.

16.  Part II.B., for the denition of an “operator.”

17. 33 U.S.C. §1362(14) (2012).

18. Id.

19. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, e Clean Water Act and the Challenge

, 37 V. L. R. 1033, 1035–38 (2013):

Since agriculture is exempt from most CWA controls ... pollution-

causing agricultural activities are classied as unregulated nonpoint

sources. A regulatory gap is thereby created: e CWA species

technology-based solutions to industrial discharges and sewage

euent from discrete point source conveyances, but it provides

no direct mechanisms to control the agriculture-based nonpoint

source pollution entering “waters of the United States.”

20. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a).

21. 33 U.S.C. §1329 (2012).

22. See Robert W. Adler,      

Futures, 25 E E. L.  P’ J. 77, 80 (2002); Véronique Jar-

rell-King, 

, 23 V.

E. L.J. 1, 19 (2012) (noting the “lack of consequences for failure to

comply with §319”).

23. Jarrell-King, supra note 22.

24. Standing can limit an individual’s ability as a beneciary of the trust to

sue under the public trust doctrine. Compare Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d

251, 261–62, 2 ELR 20049 (Cal. 1971) (determining that the plainti had

standing “as a member of the general public”), with Robinson v. Kunach,

251 N.W.2d 449, 455, 7 ELR 20365 (Wis. 1977) (limiting public trust

standing to plaintis with statutory permission to assert the trust).

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.