Pesticides, Water Quality, and the Public Trust Doctrine

Date01 October 2015
Author
45 ELR 10938 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10-2015
A R T I C L E S
Pesticides,
Water Quality,
and the Public
Trust Doctrine
by Joel Reschly
Joel Reschly holds a 2015 J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law
School with a certi๎€Ÿcate in environmental and natural resources
law. ๎€žis Article won the 2014โ€“2015 Beveridge & Diamond
Constitutional Environmental Law Writing Competition.
Summary
๎€že public trust doctrine is an ancient legal principle
undergoing a modern resurgence. Under it, govern-
ments hold certain natural resources in trust for the
bene๎€Ÿt of present and future generations, and have a
judicially enforceable legal obligation to protect trust
resources and the publicโ€™s interest in them. ๎€žis Article
argues that courts could use the public trust doctrine
to enforce regulation of water pollution caused by
pesticides because the current regulatory framework
is insu๎€œcient to protect human health, the environ-
ment, wildlife, or water quality. ๎€že author also argues
that the federal environmental statutes regulating pes-
ticides do not preempt the public trust doctrine, at
least when the claim is brought under state law.
I. Introduction
America ns apply over one-half billion pounds of pesticides
each yearโ€”80% of which is for agricu ltural purposes, to
increase crop production and reduce insect-borne diseas-
es.1 A recent study of major rivers and streams by the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) detected one or more
pesticides in over 90% of the surface waters sampled
and in one-third of major aquifers.2 Federal regulation of
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, a nd
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)3 is not based on human health
or safety4; instead, FIFRA uses a risk-bene๎€Ÿt approach
that allows the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to register pesticides that o๎€er su๎€œcient economic
bene๎€Ÿts.5 Federa l regu lation of d ischar ges to water under
the Clean Water Act (CWA)6 divides the source s of water
pollution into point sou rces a nd nonpoint sources, regu-
lating only point source discharges. ๎€že source of pol-
lution is irrelevant, however, to the environment and to
the wildlife it reaches. If pest icide regulation were instead
based on the adverse e๎€ects it causes to public natural
resources, water quality would improve and stabilize
throughout the United States.
Both point source and nonpoint source discharges of
pesticides adversely a๎€ect water quality and wildlife. Until
2009, EPA exempted certain point source discharges of pes-
ticides applied directly to waters of the United States7 from
national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES)
permitting requirements if the applicator used the pesticide
in compliance with FIFRA. ๎€že U.S. Court of Appeals for
๎€ข๎–๎•๎‰๎๎“๎€ˆ๎”๎€๎€ฏ๎๎•๎†๎€›๎€๎‡ฒ๎†๎€๎‚๎–๎•๎‰๎๎“๎€ ๎•๎‰๎‚๎๎Œ๎”๎€๎€ฑ๎“๎๎‡๎€๎€๎€ฎ๎Š๎„๎‰๎‚๎†๎๎€ ๎€ค๎€๎€๎€ฃ๎๎–๎Ž๎Ž๎€๎‡๎๎“๎€๎‰๎Š๎”๎€
guidance and edits to this Article.
1. U.S. G๎€–๎€•๎€—๎€•๎€“๎€๎€‘๎€˜๎€— S๎€…๎€’๎€‡๎€–๎€‰ (USGS), P๎€–๎€‹๎€™๎€๎€‘๎€๎€Ž๎€–๎€‹ ๎€๎€” U.S. S๎€™๎€’๎€–๎€˜๎€ˆ๎€‹ ๎€˜๎€”๎€Ž R๎€๎€‡-
๎€–๎€’๎€‹: O๎€‘๎€‘๎€…๎€’๎€’๎€–๎€”๎€‘๎€– ๎€˜๎€”๎€Ž T๎€’๎€–๎€”๎€Ž๎€‹ D๎€…๎€’๎€๎€”๎€“ 1992โ€“2011 (2014) [hereinafter
USGS S๎€™๎€…๎€Ž๎€‰]; Press Release, USGS, 20-Year Study Shows Levels of Pesti-
cides Still a Concern for Aquatic Life in U.S. Rivers and Streams (Sept. 11,
2014) [hereinafter USGS Press Release], available at http://www.usgs.gov/
newsroom/article.asp?ID=3997#.
2. USGS S๎€™๎€…๎€Ž๎€‰, supra note 1. ๎€že study tested water samples for pesticides
and pesticide degradates, also known as pesticide breakdown products, the
still-toxic compounds that break down in the environment until eventually
reaching undetectable levels. Id. Budget constraints limited the monitoring
to fewer than one-half of the more than 400 pesticides used in agriculture.
USGS Press Release, supra note 1.
3. 7 U.S.C. ยงยง136โ€“136y (2012), ELR S๎€™๎€˜๎€™. FIFRA ยงยง2โ€“35.
4. N๎€•๎€’๎€™๎€๎€Œ๎€–๎€‹๎€™ C๎€•๎€˜๎€—. ๎€๎€•๎€’ A๎€—๎€™๎€–๎€’๎€”๎€˜๎€™๎€๎€‡๎€–๎€‹ ๎€™๎€• P๎€–๎€‹๎€™๎€๎€‘๎€๎€Ž๎€–๎€‹, N๎€• G๎€…๎€˜๎€’๎€˜๎€”๎€™๎€–๎€–
๎€•๎€ S๎€˜๎€๎€–๎€™๎€‰ 1 (2002) [hereinafter N๎€• G๎€…๎€˜๎€’๎€˜๎€”๎€™๎€–๎€– ๎€•๎€ S๎€˜๎€๎€–๎€™๎€‰], available
at http://www.pesticide.org/get-the-facts/ncap-publications-and-reports/
general-reports- and-publications /journal-of-pest icide-reform/jour nal-of-
pesticide-reform-articles/eparegis.pdf.
5. Id.
6. 33 U.S.C. ยงยง1251โ€“1387 (2012), ELR S๎€™๎€˜๎€™. FWPCA ยงยง101โ€“607.
7. ๎€žese discharges included applications of pesticides on, over, or near juris-
dictional waters for the purpose of pest control. National Cotton Council
of Am., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 931โ€“32, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir.
2009), rehโ€™g denied (2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010) (citing 40
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
10-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10939
the Sixth Circuit struck down EPAโ€™s exemption in ๎€ฏ๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎‚๎๎€
๎€ค๎๎•๎•๎๎๎€๎€ค๎๎–๎๎„๎Š๎๎€๎๎‡๎€๎€ข๎Ž๎†๎“๎Š๎„๎‚๎€๎€๎€ช๎๎„๎€๎€๎—๎€๎€๎€ถ๎€๎€ด๎€๎€๎€ฆ๎๎—๎Š๎“๎๎๎Ž๎†๎๎•๎‚๎๎€๎€ฑ๎“๎-
tection Agency.8 ๎€že Obama Administration chose not to
appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the indus-
tryโ€™s petition for certiorari, e๎€ectively making a signi๎€Ÿcant
number of point source pesticide discharges nationwide
newly subject to NPDES permit requirements.9 According
to EPA calculations, the ๎€ฏ๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎‚๎๎€ ๎€ค๎๎•๎•๎๎๎€ ๎€ค๎๎–๎ ๎„๎Š๎ r uling
will increase by 65% the annual number of total discharges
subject to CWA jurisdiction.10
In response to the Sixth Circuitโ€™s decision, in 2011, EPA
issued the Pesticide General Permit (PGP)11 to regulate
without individual permit requirements most direct-to-
water pesticide discharges.12 As discussed below, it is quite
uncertain whether discharges subject to this general per-
mit will actually protect water quality or wildlife. Further,
industry groups have backed several bills in the U.S. Con-
gress to negate ๎€ฏ๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎‚๎๎€๎€ค๎๎•๎•๎๎๎€ ๎€ค๎๎–๎๎„๎Š๎ and remove t he
need for a PGP.13 Uncertainty also surrounds other point
source discharges of pesticides, such a s some aerial sprays,
which are currently considered a point source and therefore
subject to CWA permit requirements, but only in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.14
8. ๎€ฏ๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎‚๎๎€๎€ค๎๎•๎•๎๎๎€๎€ค๎๎–๎๎„๎Š๎, 553 F.3d 927.
9. See Charles Franklin, ๎€ง๎€ช๎€ง๎€ณ๎€ข๎€๎—๎€๎€๎‡ฒ๎†๎€๎€ค๎๎–๎“๎•๎”๎€›๎€๎€ณ๎†๎…๎†๎ƒญ๎๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€๎€ง๎†๎…๎†๎“๎‚๎๎€๎€ฑ๎†๎”๎•๎Š๎„๎Š๎…๎†๎€๎€ฑ๎๎๎Š๎„๎š๎€๎€
๎€ฐ๎๎†๎€๎€ค๎‚๎”๎†๎€๎‚๎•๎€๎‚๎€๎€ต๎Š๎Ž๎†, 26 N๎€˜๎€™. R๎€–๎€‹๎€•๎€…๎€’๎€‘๎€–๎€‹ ๎€† E๎€”๎€‡โ€™๎€™ 18, 19 (Summer 2011);
Elisabeth A. Holmes & Charles M. Tebbutt, ๎€ฑ๎๎˜๎†๎“๎€๎€๎€ฑ๎๎๎Š๎•๎Š๎„๎”๎€๎€๎‚๎๎…๎€๎€ฑ๎๎Š๎”๎๎๎€›๎€๎‡ฒ๎†๎€
Story Behind National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. EPA, 41 ELR
10946 (Oct. 2011).
10. Brandon W. Neuschafer, ๎€ฆ๎™๎‘๎‚๎๎…๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€๎€ณ๎†๎ˆ๎–๎๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎€๎๎‡๎€๎€ฑ๎†๎”๎•๎Š๎„๎Š๎…๎†๎€๎€ข๎‘๎‘๎๎Š๎„๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎”๎€๎€ถ๎-
der the Clean Water Act, 26 N๎€˜๎€™. R๎€–๎€‹๎€•๎€…๎€’๎€‘๎€–๎€‹ ๎€† E๎€”๎€‡โ€™๎€™ 23, 23 (2011).
11. Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide
General Permit for Point Source Discharges From the Application of Pesti-
cides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68750 (Nov. 7, 2011).
12. U.S. EPA, Pesticide General Permit (PGP) for Discharges From the Applica-
tion of Pesticides 2011 [hereinafter PGP], available at http://www.epa.gov/
npdes/pubs/๎€Ÿnal_pgp.pdf. ๎€že permit provides coverage for four โ€œpesticide
use patternsโ€: mosquito and other ๎€›ying insect pest control; weed and algae
pest control; animal pest control; and forest canopy pest control. Id. ยง1.1.1.
When operators satisfy its terms, the PGP authorizes eligible point source
discharges under the CWA. Id. at 1 (โ€œIn compliance with the [CWA], any
Operator of a point source discharge of pollutants (i.e., discharge) resulting
from the application of pesticides and eligible for permit coverage under
Part 1.1 .๎€š.๎€š. is authorized to discharge to Waters of the United States in ac-
cordance with the requirements of this permit.โ€).
13. See, e.g., To Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act to Improve the Use of Certain Registered Pesticides, H.R. 6087, 111th
Cong. ยง2 (2010); A Bill to Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act to Improve the Use of Cer tain Registered Pesticides, S.
3735, 111th Cong. ยง2 (2010).
14. See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Proj-
ect v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the U.S.
Forest Serviceโ€™s aerial pesticide spraying over forests and streams was a point
source discharge requiring an NPDES permit, because the discharge โ€œclearly
meets the statutory de๎€Ÿnition of a point sourceโ€ and allowing EPA to de๎€Ÿne
it as nonpoint source would โ€œcontravene the intent of Congressโ€). ๎€ด๎†๎†๎€๎Š๎๎‡๎“๎‚
notes 116โ€“18 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of aerial pesti-
cide spraying. Aerial sprays that meet one of the four pesticide use patterns
would be covered under the PGP. See PGP, supra note 12, ยง1.1.1.
A 2012 repor t by the Con gressional Resea rch Service
estim ates that nonpoint sourc e pollution โ€œrepresents
more than 50% of the nationโ€™s rem aini ng water pollu-
tion problems.โ€15 Operators16 typic ally apply p esticides
over large areas, meaning t hat mos t pesticide d ischarges
are nonpoint sou rce discharges because they do not orig-
inate from a โ€œcon๎€Ÿned and discre te conveyance.โ€17 ๎€že
result is the same even when excess amounts of p esti-
cides reach jur isdictional waters via runo๎€ ; this regula-
tory gap occur s becau se the CWA de๎€Ÿnes โ€œpoint sourceโ€
to exclude โ€œa gricu ltura l stormwater discharges and
return ๎€›ows from irrig ated agriculture.โ€18 Ultim ately,
these jurisdiction al limits in the CWA prevent the stat-
ute from achieving it s stated g oals19 of โ€œrestor[ing ] and
mainta in[ing] the chemical, physic al, and biological
integrit y of the Nationโ€™s waters.โ€20
In 1987, Congress recognized the problem of nonpoint
source pollution when it amended the CWA, e๎€ectively
codifying statesโ€™ existing police power authority to control
sources of runo๎€, including agricultural pollution.21 How-
ever, state-developed controls authorized by CWA ยง319
are voluntary and yield mixed results,22 and states face
enormous politica l pressure from the a gricultural indus-
try, which vigorously resists attempts to regu late nonpoint
source pollution.23
Courts are less burdened by political pressure and lob-
bying than are legislatures and agencies, at both the federal
and state levels. ๎€že public trust doctrine empowers mem-
bers of the public24 to seek protection for public resources
15. See C๎€—๎€˜๎€…๎€Ž๎€๎€˜ C๎€•๎€ƒ๎€–๎€—๎€˜๎€”๎€Ž, C๎€•๎€”๎€“. R๎€–๎€‹๎€–๎€˜๎€’๎€‘๎€ S๎€–๎€’๎€‡., RL30030, C๎€—๎€–๎€˜๎€” W๎€˜๎€™๎€–๎€’
A๎€‘๎€™: A S๎€…๎€ˆ๎€ˆ๎€˜๎€’๎€‰ ๎€•๎€ ๎€™๎€๎€– L๎€˜๎€Œ 4 (2012), available at http://aquadoc.type-
pad.com/๎€Ÿles/cwa_summary_crs_nov2012-1.pdf.
16. ๎€ด๎†๎†๎€๎Š๎๎‡๎“๎‚ Part II.B., for the de๎€Ÿnition of an โ€œoperator.โ€
17. 33 U.S.C. ยง1362(14) (2012).
18. Id.
19. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, ๎€Ÿe Clean Water Act and the Challenge
๎๎‡๎€๎€ข๎ˆ๎“๎Š๎„๎–๎๎•๎–๎“๎‚๎๎€๎€ฑ๎๎๎๎–๎•๎Š๎๎, 37 V๎€™. L. R๎€–๎€‡. 1033, 1035โ€“38 (2013):
Since agriculture is exempt from most CWA controls .๎€š.๎€š. pollution-
causing agricultural activities are classi๎€Ÿed as unregulated nonpoint
sources. A regulatory gap is thereby created: ๎€že CWA speci๎€Ÿes
technology-based solutions to industrial discharges and sewage
e๎€uent from discrete point source conveyances, but it provides
no direct mechanisms to control the agriculture-based nonpoint
source pollution entering โ€œwaters of the United States.โ€
22. See Robert W. Adler, ๎€ธ๎‚๎•๎†๎“๎€ ๎€ฒ๎–๎‚๎๎Š๎•๎š๎€ ๎‚๎๎…๎€ ๎€ข๎ˆ๎“๎Š๎„๎–๎๎•๎–๎“๎†๎€›๎€๎€ข ๎”๎”๎†๎”๎”๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€ ๎€ข๎๎•๎†๎“๎๎‚๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€
Futures, 25 E๎€”๎€‡๎€๎€’๎€•๎€”๎€‹ E๎€”๎€‡๎€™๎€—. L. ๎€† P๎€•๎€—โ€™๎€‰ J. 77, 80 (2002); Vรฉronique Jar-
rell-King, ๎€ธ๎Š๎๎…๎๎Š๎‡๎†๎€๎€๎€ธ๎‚๎•๎†๎“๎€๎€ฒ๎–๎‚๎๎Š๎•๎š๎€๎€๎‚๎๎…๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ฑ๎–๎ƒ๎๎Š๎„๎€๎€ต๎“๎–๎”๎•๎€๎€ฅ๎๎„๎•๎“๎Š๎๎†๎€›๎€๎€ข๎€๎€ฎ๎†๎‚๎๎”๎€๎๎‡๎€
๎€ฆ๎๎‡๎๎“๎„๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€๎€ข๎ˆ๎“๎Š๎„๎–๎๎•๎–๎“๎‚๎๎€๎€ฏ๎๎๎‘๎๎Š๎๎•๎€๎€ด๎๎–๎“๎„๎†๎€๎€ฑ๎๎๎๎–๎•๎Š๎๎๎€๎€ฎ๎‚๎๎‚๎ˆ๎†๎Ž๎†๎๎•๎€๎€ฑ๎๎‚๎๎”, 23 V๎€๎€—๎€—.
E๎€”๎€‡๎€™๎€—. L.J. 1, 19 (2012) (noting the โ€œlack of consequences for failure to
comply with ยง319โ€).
23. Jarrell-King, supra note 22.
24. Standing can limit an individualโ€™s ability as a bene๎€Ÿciary of the trust to
sue under the public trust doctrine. Compare Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 261โ€“62, 2 ELR 20049 (Cal. 1971) (determining that the plainti๎€ had
standing โ€œas a member of the general publicโ€), with Robinson v. Kunach,
251 N.W.2d 449, 455, 7 ELR 20365 (Wis. 1977) (limiting public trust
standing to plainti๎€s with statutory permission to assert the trust).
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT