Persistence or Partisanship: Exploring the Relationship between Presidential Administrations and Criminal Enforcement by the US Environmental Protection Agency, 1983–2019

• Published date: 01 January 2021
• Author: Joshua Ozymy,Bryan Menard,Melissa L. Jarrell
• Date: 01 January 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13295

Research Article

Persistence or Partisanship 49

Abstract: Conventional analysis suggests that enforcement actions meted out by the US Environmental Protection

Agency vary greatly across Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Yet research fails to look beyond

civil actions to explore how the agency engages in the criminal enforcement of environmental crimes over time or

whether and how those outcomes change across partisan administrations. We explore these questions by using content

analysis to build a comprehensive dataset of 2,588 criminal enforcement prosecutions, 1983–2019. The results do

not suggest that outcomes under Democratic presidents are always substantially more punitive or under Republicans

significantly reduced. Outcomes over time better reflect the growing sophistication and institutionalization of the

enforcement process, declining budgetary realities, and the agency’s organizational commitment to deter serious

environmental crimes.

Evidence for Practice

• EPA criminal enforcement outcomes better reflect agency values over time than which party controls the

White House.

• EPA criminal enforcement tends to focus on serious crimes rather than minor offenses.

• EPA may recover from the Trump Administration over time.

Any scholar wanting to learn more about the

ideological differences between Republican

and Democratic presidents and how they

play out in the policy process need to look no further

than 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue. Donald Trump

has both in rhetoric and practice sought to roll

back the power and scope of the US Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA). From his appointment

of Scott Pruitt who openly denies the impact of

humans on climate change, to the approximately 700

staff that have left the agency (Michaelson2017),

or plans to limit new regulations and reverse course

on Obama’s climate change regulations, certainly

the shift in perspective and action across his and the

previous administration could not be more varied.

The same was said regarding Obama and George

W. Bush (Westmoreland2012). Another example

was Reagan’s appointment of Anne Gorsuch to lead

the agency with the goal of reducing enforcement,

cutting budgets and staff, and relaxing regulations.

She assumed this role soon after Reagan took office

and attacked the regulatory apparatus with vigor, only

to resign in 1983 after less than two years at the post

(Carswell2017).

The more general account makes one wonder how

the EPA can even function as a regulatory agency with

such vast variation in commitments across presidential

regimes. While we can examine measures of change

across presidential regimes, such as budgets, staffing,

number of regulations, or civil enforcement (Gray and

Shimshack2011), very few studies explore how the

agency uses criminal enforcement, its costliest and most

punitive tool, generally or to examine the question

of whether and how criminal enforcement outcomes

change across presidential regimes (Brickey2001;

Lynch2017; Lynch et al.2016; Ozymy and

Jarrell2015, 2016).

This article explores the history of EPA criminal

enforcement outcomes, using analysis of its prosecution

case summaries, 1983–2019. Our approach brings to

bear 2,588 cases, which is by far the strongest dataset

assembled in the scholarly literature to answer the

question of whether and how criminal enforcement

outcomes change over time and across presidential

regimes.

Criminal Prosecution in a Political

Environment

The EPA has always worked under the mandate

that it must balance the need to protect human and

environmental health with economic development.

The agency has a vast realm of responsibility without

Joshua Ozymy

Bryan Menard

Melissa L. Jarrell

Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

Persistence or Partisanship: Exploring the Relationship

between Presidential Administrations and Criminal

Enforcement by the US Environmental Protection Agency,

1983–2019

Melissa L. Jarrell is a Professor of

Criminal Justice and the Dean of University

College at Texas A&M University-Corpus

Christi. Her research interests include green

criminology, environmental justice, and

environmental victimization.

Email: melissa.jarrell@tamucc.edu

Bryan Menard recently graduated with

his B.A. in Political Science from Texas A&M

University-Corpus Christi. He is currently

pursuing graduate studies in Political

Science with interests in regulatory politics.

Email: bryanmenard@rocketmail.com

Joshua Ozymy is Director of the Honors

Program and Strategic Initiatives at

Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

and a Professor of Political Science. His

current research focuses on the criminal

enforcement of federal environmental law

in the United States.

Email: joshua.ozymy@tamucc.edu

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 81, Iss. 1, pp. 49–63. © 2020 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13295.