Foreign policy perils: Somalia set a dangerous precedent.

• Author: Carpenter, Ted Galen

WASHINGTON'S decision to send more than 25,000 U.S. troops to Somalia is likely to have far-reaching and potentially dangerous implications for the U.S. and the international community. Not only does the intervention itself entail significant risks, but it sets a precedent for similar humanitarian military crusades--either unilateral or under the banner of the United Nations--elsewhere in an increasingly turbulent world. The American people would be wise to reject the embryonic doctrine of humanitarian intervention as the new U.S. mission in the post-Cold War era. Although such an undertaking undoubtedly appeals to those who have an insatiable desire to correct all the ills of the planet and the hubris to assume that American power can achieve that utopian objective, it inevitably would entangle the US. in an array of bloody conflicts that have no relevance whatsoever to the nation's security interests.

In his Dec. 4, 1992, address to the nation officially announcing Operation Restore Hope, Pres. George Bush stressed both the humanitarian purpose and the limited nature of the U.S. military intervention in Somalia: "Our mission has a limited objective--to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peace-keeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary." He stated further that the US. had no plans to "dictate political outcomes" in the war-torn East African nation.

High-level Administration officials exuded confidence (at least on a "not for attribution" basis) that American forces would be able to complete their mission and return to the U.S. in time for the inauguration of Bill Clinton on Jan. 20, 1993. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and military leaders were more circumspect, indicating that it probably would be approximately three months before "the bulk" of U.S. troops could be withdrawn. Nevertheless, they also offered assurances that American forces would not get bogged down in a Somalian quagmire. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, compared the U.S. mission to having the cavalry ride to the rescue and then transferring responsibility to the "marshals" (i.e., UN peace-keepers) once the situation stabilized.

Even the estimates made by Powell and other military leaders concerning the departure date were overly optimistic. Discussions between U.S. and UN officials in February, 1993, led to an agreement that most American troops would be withdrawn by late April or early May. A residual force of approximately 5,000 personnel will remain indefinitely, however, either in Somalia itself or on U.S. warships offshore, as part of a UN peace-keeping operation. The American personnel will be under UN command, something the Pentagon long has opposed. It is symbolic of the lack of public or Congressional debate about the entire Somalia operation that such a precedent-setting move apparently will take place without serious scrutiny of the possible long-term consequences.

The Bush Administration's optimistic expectations about the short duration of the U.S. intervention and the ability to avoid heavy casualties were dependent on a number of factors. One of the most important was whether this intervention was something more than a publicity gesture to allow Bush to leave office having "done something" about the suffering in Somalia. (The prime-time landing of the Marines in Mogadishu under the blaze of television camera lights also lent credence to the thesis that the Somalia operation at least partly was designed to be promotional advertising for maintaining the current size and budget of the armed forces.) If U.S. policymakers merely intended to make a grand display of American military prowess in overawing Somalia?s feuding militias just long enough to get relief supplies flowing, there always was a reasonable chance that U.S. forces would be able to leave Somalia with minimal casualties. Of course, Somalia probably would revert to chaos once the American troops departed, and the intervention thus would have accomplished nothing of any lasting importance. If Washington's goal was to have a long-term beneficial impact on the suffering in Somalia, however, the risks were appreciably higher.

Even during the initial phases of the Somalia operation, U.S. military leaders discovered how difficult it is to keep the focus on limited humanitarian...