Perfectionism, Reasonableness, and Respect

• Published date: 01 August 2014
• Author: Steven Wall
• Date: 01 August 2014
• DOI: 10.1177/0090591714531493
• Subject Matter: Article

Political Theory

2014, Vol. 42(4) 468 –489

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DOI: 10.1177/0090591714531493

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Article

Perfectionism,

Reasonableness, and

Respect

Steven Wall1

Abstract

In recent work, Martha Nussbaum has exposed an important ambiguity in

the standard conception of political liberalism. The ambiguity centers on

the notion of “reasonableness” as it applies to comprehensive doctrines

and to persons. As Nussbaum observes, the notion of reasonableness in

political liberalism can be construed in a purely ethical sense or in a sense

that combines ethical and epistemic elements. The ambiguity bears crucially

on the respect for persons norm—a key norm that helps to distinguish

political from perfectionist versions of liberalism. Nussbaum contends that

when political liberals affirm a construal of reasonableness that includes

epistemic elements they run into trouble in formulating an account of their

view that sharply distinguishes it from perfectionist liberalism. She contends

further that perfectionist versions of liberalism should be rejected since

they fail to offer an account of respect for persons. This paper responds

to Nussbaum’s challenge. It argues that an adequate account of respect for

persons must make reference to epistemic elements. This being the case not

only explains why political liberals were correct to incorporate epistemic

elements into their accounts of reasonableness but also why it is a mistake

to think that perfectionist liberals themselves cannot present an appealing

account of respect for persons. Nussbaum’s challenge merits careful study

since it both sheds light on the nature of political liberalism and highlights an

important faultline in its structure.

1University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

Corresponding Author:

Steven Wall, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.

Email: stevenwall@email.arizona.edu

531493PTXXXX10.1177/0090591714531493Political TheoryWall

research-article2014

Wall 469

Keywords

political liberalism, respect, perfectionism, reasonableness, subordination

Martha Nussbaum has exposed an important ambiguity in the standard con-

ception of political liberalism—a conception best expressed in the writings of

Rawls and Larmore.1 The ambiguity centers on how the notion of “reason-

ableness” is to be understood when it applies to comprehensive doctrines and

to persons. As Nussbaum observes, the notion of reasonableness in political

liberalism can be construed in a purely ethical sense or in a sense that com-

bines ethical and epistemic elements. The ambiguity is important, since it

bears crucially on the notion of respect for persons—a key notion that helps

to distinguish political from perfectionist versions of liberalism.2 Nussbaum

contends that when political liberals affirm a construal of reasonableness that

includes epistemic elements, they run into trouble in formulating an account

of respect for persons that sharply distinguishes their view from the perfec-

tionist liberalism she associates with Berlin and Raz.3 She contends further

that perfectionist versions of liberalism should be rejected since they fail to

take proper account of respect-based considerations.4

This paper responds to Nussbaum’s challenge. It argues that an adequate

account of respect for persons must make reference to epistemic elements.

This being the case not only explains why Rawls and Larmore were correct

to incorporate epistemic elements into their accounts of reasonableness, but

also why it is a mistake to think that perfectionist liberals themselves cannot

present an appealing account of respect for persons. Nussbaum’s challenge

merits careful study since it both sheds light on the political thought of Rawls

and Larmore and points to a more general conclusion. The notion of reason-

ableness is a fault line in political liberalism. Applying pressure to the fault

line adds to, rather than detracts from, the plausibility of perfectionist

liberalism.

The Costs of Political Liberalism

There are costs to accepting a political conception of liberalism. We need first

to attend to these costs to appreciate the dispute between political and perfec-

tionist liberals, for if there were no costs at all to accepting political liberal-

ism, then it would be hard to understand why the view has attracted and

continues to attract so much critical attention. To bring out the point, imagine

a liberal conception of justice with a definite content. Call it LJ. Now suppose

that LJ in a given society can be presented either as a consequence of a more

comprehensive doctrine or as a free-standing module that can fit within each