Perfectionism, Reasonableness, and Respect
Author | Steven Wall |
Published date | 01 August 2014 |
Date | 01 August 2014 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0090591714531493 |
Political Theory
2014, Vol. 42(4) 468 –489
© 2014 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0090591714531493
ptx.sagepub.com
Article
Perfectionism,
Reasonableness, and
Respect
Steven Wall1
Abstract
In recent work, Martha Nussbaum has exposed an important ambiguity in
the standard conception of political liberalism. The ambiguity centers on
the notion of “reasonableness” as it applies to comprehensive doctrines
and to persons. As Nussbaum observes, the notion of reasonableness in
political liberalism can be construed in a purely ethical sense or in a sense
that combines ethical and epistemic elements. The ambiguity bears crucially
on the respect for persons norm—a key norm that helps to distinguish
political from perfectionist versions of liberalism. Nussbaum contends that
when political liberals affirm a construal of reasonableness that includes
epistemic elements they run into trouble in formulating an account of their
view that sharply distinguishes it from perfectionist liberalism. She contends
further that perfectionist versions of liberalism should be rejected since
they fail to offer an account of respect for persons. This paper responds
to Nussbaum’s challenge. It argues that an adequate account of respect for
persons must make reference to epistemic elements. This being the case not
only explains why political liberals were correct to incorporate epistemic
elements into their accounts of reasonableness but also why it is a mistake
to think that perfectionist liberals themselves cannot present an appealing
account of respect for persons. Nussbaum’s challenge merits careful study
since it both sheds light on the nature of political liberalism and highlights an
important faultline in its structure.
1University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Corresponding Author:
Steven Wall, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.
Email: stevenwall@email.arizona.edu
531493PTXXXX10.1177/0090591714531493Political TheoryWall
research-article2014
Wall 469
Keywords
political liberalism, respect, perfectionism, reasonableness, subordination
Martha Nussbaum has exposed an important ambiguity in the standard con-
ception of political liberalism—a conception best expressed in the writings of
Rawls and Larmore.1 The ambiguity centers on how the notion of “reason-
ableness” is to be understood when it applies to comprehensive doctrines and
to persons. As Nussbaum observes, the notion of reasonableness in political
liberalism can be construed in a purely ethical sense or in a sense that com-
bines ethical and epistemic elements. The ambiguity is important, since it
bears crucially on the notion of respect for persons—a key notion that helps
to distinguish political from perfectionist versions of liberalism.2 Nussbaum
contends that when political liberals affirm a construal of reasonableness that
includes epistemic elements, they run into trouble in formulating an account
of respect for persons that sharply distinguishes their view from the perfec-
tionist liberalism she associates with Berlin and Raz.3 She contends further
that perfectionist versions of liberalism should be rejected since they fail to
take proper account of respect-based considerations.4
This paper responds to Nussbaum’s challenge. It argues that an adequate
account of respect for persons must make reference to epistemic elements.
This being the case not only explains why Rawls and Larmore were correct
to incorporate epistemic elements into their accounts of reasonableness, but
also why it is a mistake to think that perfectionist liberals themselves cannot
present an appealing account of respect for persons. Nussbaum’s challenge
merits careful study since it both sheds light on the political thought of Rawls
and Larmore and points to a more general conclusion. The notion of reason-
ableness is a fault line in political liberalism. Applying pressure to the fault
line adds to, rather than detracts from, the plausibility of perfectionist
liberalism.
The Costs of Political Liberalism
There are costs to accepting a political conception of liberalism. We need first
to attend to these costs to appreciate the dispute between political and perfec-
tionist liberals, for if there were no costs at all to accepting political liberal-
ism, then it would be hard to understand why the view has attracted and
continues to attract so much critical attention. To bring out the point, imagine
a liberal conception of justice with a definite content. Call it LJ. Now suppose
that LJ in a given society can be presented either as a consequence of a more
comprehensive doctrine or as a free-standing module that can fit within each
To continue reading
Request your trial