PERCEPTIONS OF GOOD AND BAD JUDGING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

• Date: 08 November 2001
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/S1521-6136(2001)0000003013
• Pages: 253-270
• Published date: 08 November 2001
• Author: Katherine Cermak,Richard Block

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PERCEPTIONS OF GOOD AND BAD

JUDGING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT

Katherine Cermak and Richard Block

ABSTRACT

The present study utilizes data collected from 385 volunteer judges out of

a total of 859 circuit and associate court judges in the state of Illinois.

Data was aggregated for each judge and the variation between responses

was analyzed for judges whose overall performance is perceived as being

among the most favorable 20% and the least favorable 20% in the state.

Behaviors and abilities that lawyers and court personnel consistently use

to differentiate those perceived as top performing judges from the lowest

performing judges fall into three categories: legal knowledge and ability,

communication skills, and case/docket management.

Every day, judges enter courtrooms with the purpose of serving justice. There

they are generally considered by scholars, journalists, and the judges themselves

to be autonomous lawgivers entrusted to work in the best interest of society.

The independence of judges is viewed as essential for maintaining the autonomy

necessary to make equitable and impartial decisions based solely on the facts

of the case and the relevant law. The ability of judges to render decisions

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Legal Professions: Work, Structure and Organization, pages 253–270.

Copyright © 2001 by Elsevier Science Ltd.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

ISBN: 0-7623-0800-1

without fear of reprisal allows them to enforce the rights of individuals and of

the collective. Within a Weberian frame of reference, the United State’s legal

system is understood as based on rational principles and legal authority. The

grounds upon which the judicial branch rest are “a belief in the ‘legality’ of

patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under

such rules to issue commands” (Weber, 1947, p. 328).

The uniquely American tradition of electing judges was “adopted by the states

in the nineteenth century for the purpose of making the judiciary independent

of the executive and legislative branches of the government” (Carrington &

Reed, 2000, p. 87). Today, justice in the United States continues to be

administered by judges who work within an independent branch of the govern-

ment, with institutionalized procedures intended to promote decisions that will

be deemed objective and universal despite the independence of those rendering

the decisions. Rules and procedures within courts are expected to limit the

individual discretion of judges (Schmidhauser, 1979). However, accountability

to both superiors and to the public is regarded as essential in a democratic

system, but troublesome to initiate and enforce (Carrington & Reed, 2000; Dolch

& Provizer, 1987; Jacob, 1997; Sponzo, 1987). Additionally, judges’ lack of

accountability is often to their own disadvantage. Judges generally receive little

feedback that is free of political implications; particularly in rural areas, where

bar and media polls as well as involvement by public interest groups is less

likely to occur.

In Illinois, strict accountability to supervising judges is uncommon due to

the manner in which members of the judiciary obtain office. Most circuit court

judges initially run for office in partisan elections that the supervising judge

cannot influence positively or negatively. Other circuit court judges may be

appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court to fill a vacancy until elections are

next held and are then required to run in a partisan election. Hence, chief and

supervising judges have little say over who the judges are that they oversee

(Jacobs, 1997). Six years after gaining office through partisan election, all circuit

court judges are required to stand for retention in a noncompetitive election.

Once again, supervising judges are generally not in a position to influence voter

decisions and hence the outcome of the election. Partisan, contested judicial

elections while an attempt to reduce dependence on the legislative and executive

branches and a way in which voters can hold those wishing to become judges

accountable to their records, have shown themselves to have additional

problems. The Task Force on Selecting State Court Judges has reported that,

“voter awareness of candidates’ qualifications has been limited, typically

resulting in low voter turnout. Winning elections often turns on factors irrelevant

to candidates’ credentials, such as an easily recognizable name . . . strong

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254 KATHERINE CERMAK AND RICHARD BLOCK