Perceived Formal and Informal Sanctions in Deterring Cybercrime in a College Sample

• Author: Adam M. Bossler
• Date: 01 August 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/10439862211001630
• Published date: 01 August 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/10439862211001630

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

2021, Vol. 37(3) 452 –470

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/10439862211001630

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Article

Perceived Formal and

Informal Sanctions in

Deterring Cybercrime

in a College Sample

Adam M. Bossler1

Abstract

The threat of formal sanctions is the criminal justice system’s primary tool to

discourage online and offline deviant behavior. Yet, scholars have expressed strong

concerns about the effectiveness of formal sanctions to deter cybercrime. Even more

surprising is the sparsity of deterrence research in the cybercrime literature. This

study examined the effects of perceived formal and informal sanctions on digital

piracy, computer hacking, and online harassment in a large American college sample.

Perceived formal sanctions was negatively correlated with software piracy, media

piracy, password cracking, accessing accounts, sending mean messages privately

online, and posting mean messages. Higher levels of perceived formal sanctions

did not significantly predict any form of cybercrime, however, when controlling for

informal sanctions and deviant peer associations. The implications of the findings for

our ability to deter deviant behavior in cyberspace are explored.

Keywords

deterrence, formal sanctions, informal sanctions, cybercrime, piracy, computer

hacking, online harassment

Introduction

Cybercrime continues to be one of the largest threats to public and financial safety

throughout the world (Dupont, 2019; Holt & Bossler, 2016). The frequency and seri-

ousness of most forms of cybercrime are worsening with billions in financial damages

1Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Adam M. Bossler, Georgia Southern University, 1332 Southern Drive, Statesboro, GA 30458, USA.

Email: abossler@georgiasouthern.edu

1001630CCJXXX10.1177/10439862211001630Journal of Contemporary Criminal JusticeBossler

research-article2021

Bossler 453

and unmeasurable emotional harm. This trend over the last two decades is not surpris-

ing considering more individuals around the world, including both potential motivated

offenders and suitable targets, are obtaining easier access to cheaper technologies and

the internet, which has allowed more daily activities to occur online (Holt & Bossler,

2009). This formula has led to almost an infinite number of criminal opportunities in

the virtual world.

The anonymity potentially afforded by the internet creates significant challenges in

identifying who or what group is responsible for an online act in many cases (Brenner,

2007). This inability to attribute responsibility to a specific person or group is espe-

cially problematic because most nation’s legal systems are based on the Classical

School’s deterrence theory and the ability to prevent crime by threatening formal sanc-

tions against responsible parties (Brenner, 2007, 2010). Most nations, including the

United States, have heavily centered their cybercrime prevention efforts on improving

law enforcement’s capabilities of responding to an increasing amount of cybercrime

(Holt et al., 2015). If cybercrime cannot be attributed to certain actors, a state is not

able to effectively exert its control in cyberspace (Berenblum et al., 2019). Scholars

have therefore been concerned about the effectiveness of deterrence-based strategies

in preventing different forms of cybercrime, including but not limited to digital piracy,

hacking, and online harassment (Brenner, 2010).

Although these strong concerns exist, the effectiveness of threatened formal sanc-

tions in cyberspace has surprisingly not received the same level of empirical testing as

other criminological theories, such as social learning theory and the general theory of

crime (see Holt & Bossler, 2016). The little empirical research examining deterrence

principles in cyberspace has indicated that formal sanctions may have limited to no

significant effects in preventing cybercrime, including digital piracy, hacking, and

online harassment (Holt & Bossler, 2016). In addition, most of these tests only exam-

ined one type of cybercrime offense, such as digital piracy, and not a fuller variety of

cybercrime offenses. Some of this limited research on deterrence in cyberspace has

also examined the role of informal sanctions in the prevention of cybercrime (e.g.,

Bossler, 2019). The limited research indicates that informal sanctions may have stron-

ger effects than formal sanctions in cyberspace, which supports the traditional litera-

ture (Holt & Bossler, 2016). This study adds to our current existing body of knowledge

by examining the effects of perceived formal sanctions and informal sanctions on

software piracy, media piracy, minor forms of computer hacking, and online harass-

ment within the same analyses of college students.

Deterrence and Cybercrime

Deterrence Theory

The Classical School of criminology evolved out of the ideas and arguments promoted

during the Enlightenment era (Paternoster, 1987). Scholars such as Jeremy Bentham

and Cesare Beccaria viewed humans as being hedonistic, rational, and wielding free

will (Beccaria, 1764/1963; Bentham, 1789/1973). The commission of any behavior