Pentagon acquisition rules exacerbate problems.

• Author: Bishop, William Y.
• Position: VIEWPOINT

* The defense industry has launched an intensive lobbying campaign in Washington. It contends that future reductions in acquisition funding will put hundreds of thousands of jobs at risk.

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Industry makes a persuasive case at a time when the government is trying to put people to work. But Defense Secretary Robert Gates has made it clear that the Pentagon will not be able to buy everything it wants. So the expected cutbacks should be viewed as a great opportunity for true acquisition reform.

Defense secretaries have put their weight behind various reform initiatives, but the long term results of those efforts have been dismal. Recent government reports noted that out of 72 major defense programs only 11 were on budget and meeting performance goals.

Any attempt at substantial reform presents a serious political problem because of the entrenched nature of the acquisition bureaucracy.

The recently signed defense acquisition regulation--DOD 5000.2--represents one more of approximately 20 past attempts at reforming acquisition, but it is unlikely to spawn real reform because of two very simple facts: it does not address historical reasons for cost overruns in a systematic manner nor does it shorten weapons development durations.

One fundamental problem with the new DOD 5000.02 is that it does not take into account future funding constraints. It requires two competing contractors to carry out a technology demonstration program. The expectation is that technology maturity and system prototyping prior to a Milestone B engineering and manufacturing development decision will result in more confidence in what the system will cost. The best answer to that expectation is "maybe."

One does not get high confidence levels in cost estimating unless the complete system is prototyped in the "systems of systems" environment. The engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) process is software intensive, and software is like carbon monoxide: you don't know you're in trouble until a heavy dose is sniffed, but by then it's too late.

This approach pushes many of the expensive development activities into EMD where weapon system costs generally face the most severe escalation. DOD 5000.02 ignores the fact that the non-high technology stuff also drives up costs. EMD activity involves integration of the prototyped system with a platform, explosive certifications, training device development, or operation in the system-of-system environment...