Why the Pentagon keeps buying the wrong weapons.

• Author: Erwin, Sandra I.
• Position: DEFENSE WATCH

At the height of World War I, Frederick Lanchester conceived a string of mathematical formulas that helped to predict the outcome of armed conflicts.

His equations gave rise to attrition warfare and the notion that victory is achieved by overwhelming the enemy with sheer numbers and firepower.

Alas, it may be shocking to learn that in this day and age the Lanchester laws--deemed useless in most modern combat scenarios--continue to influence the design and procurement of U.S. weapon systems.

No wonder Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged military officers at the National Defense University last month to "be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models and game theories."

In a politely worded indictment of the Pentagon's weapon acquisition bureaucracy, Gates offered yet more evidence that billions of taxpayer dollars are being wasted on weapon systems that are not needed. Most of next year's $180 billion budget for procurement, research and development, Gates said, funds conventional systems that the military may require some day, but that are not relevant to the current fight against terrorist groups.

"Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress," Gates said.

The secretary is by no means alone in questioning why the Pentagon continues to spend the preponderance of its procurement budget on weapons designed to fight World War III.

"The methods used to analyze weapon performance in warfare situations are incorrect and obsolete; they have been out of date for at least the last 25 years," said Robert A. Frosch, a former deputy director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development.

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey has reached similar conclusions. He worries that the entrenched ways of the weapons procurement bureaucracy will make the military more vulnerable in future wars. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which exposed weaknesses in U.S. equipment, were supposed to fundamentally shake up the culture. But they haven't, Woolsey laments.

The Lanchester models that the Pentagon refuses to relinquish explain why the Air Force will argue that if it buys a fighter jet that is loaded with the latest bells and whistles, it will win the war even if it has a small number of them. The idea that doubling the capability of a jet or a ship means you...