Pennies for Pounds: Soda Consumption and Taxation as a Test of Self‐Interested Voting Behavior

• Author: Kristin J. Kelly,Clare Brock
• Published date: 01 December 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.249
• Date: 01 December 2017

Pennies for Pounds: Soda Consumption and Taxation as

a Test of Self-Interested Voting Behavior

Clare Brock and Kristin J. Kelly

Utilizing 2014 Texas Lyceum Poll data, we determine whether voters would support instating a

soda tax in Texas. We use self-reported statements of political ideology, perceptions of public health,

and soda consumption to examine what happens when voters face conf‌lict between ideological

preferences and consumption habits. We expect that liberals who do not drink large quantities of

soda will support a soda tax in keeping with the liberal philosophy of supporting government

involvement in public health; however, for liberals who more frequently drink soda, we expect they

will be less likely to support a soda tax because it conf‌licts with their f‌inancial self-interest. We f‌ind

evidence in support of these expectations. We also f‌ind that conservatives who view public health as

poor are more likely to think sociotropically and to support a soda tax. These results suggest that

soda-tax advocates should prime public health considerations to garner public support.

KEY WORDS: food policy, health policy, voting behavior

Introduction

The battle over “big soda” is raging across the United States (Lappe, 2016).

From coast to coast, health advocates are contending with the beverage industry

over implementing taxes on sugary drinks in the name of curbing obesity and

improving public health. In November of 2014, Berkeley, California passed the

f‌irst soda tax in the United States—an excise tax that costs consumers one cent

per ounce (Barclay, 2015).

Many of the earliest soda-tax efforts in the United States were defeated in the

courts, at the ballot box, and during the policymaking process. In 2011, mayor

Michael Nutter proposed the f‌irst soda-tax bill to the rest of Philadelphia’s city

council, but the legislation failed to make it out of the chambers (though since

then Philadelphia has become the f‌irst major city

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to approve a soda tax) (Esterl,

2016). Soon after, New York City introduced a ban on sodas larger than 16

ounces, though this was struck down in 2014 by the state Court of Appeals

(Dolmetsch, 2014). More recently, the city council in Davis, California toyed with

the idea of putting a soda tax on its June ballot in 2016, but this idea was rejected

World Medical & Health Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2017

418

doi: 10.1002/wmh3.249

#2017 Policy Studies Organization

(Caiola, 2016). In just the last year, voters in the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico

defeated a proposed soda tax after a costly and contentious campaign, where

over four million dollars were spent by various political action committees

advocating both sides of the issue. The PAC that worked to defeat the proposed

soda tax, Better Way for Santa Fe & Pre-K, spent around $189 per vote on

advertising (Chacon, 2017). All in all, the beverage industry has defeated over 30

soda-tax proposals in recent years (Evich, 2015).

2

In spite of those early failures, the idea of a soda tax has not died. In fact,

over the last 2 years it has gained more traction than ever before. In November of

2016, Boulder, Colorado passed the nation’s steepest soda tax, at two cents per

ounce (Burness, 2016); in Illinois, the Cook County Board passed a penny-per-

ounce “pop” tax to raise an estimated $224 million for the county (Dardick,

2016).

3

The Bay Area cities of San Francisco, Albany, and Oakland have all passed

a penny-per-ounce soda tax on sugary drinks as well (Cho, 2016). Seattle is still

considering local-level soda tax legislation, though it has not yet voted on a

proposition (Beekman, 2017). Federal legislation was proposed in both 2014 and

2015 to levy a tax of 1 penny per teaspoon of sugar on sweetened beverages

across all 50 states, though the current 115th Congress is unlikely to consider

such a measure (Evich, 2015). And as previously noted, Philadelphia has become

the f‌irst large U.S. city to impose a soda tax as of 2016 (Kennedy, 2016).

Internationally, both the United Kingdom and Mexico have introduced sugar

taxes. Mexico’s sugar tax has been in effect for 2 years (Boseley, 2017), while the

British government announced the new tax in 2016. Indeed, soda taxes have

become such a hot topic that even U.S. presidential candidates have weighed in

on the subject. Democrat Hillary Clinton came out in favor, while Democratic

Socialist Bernie Sanders and Republican Ted Cruz expressed opposition to such

taxes on the campaign trail (Evich, 2015; Williamson, 2016; Wright, 2016).

For public health advocates, soda taxes represent the opportunity to

economically incentivize healthier behavior. For political scientists, these taxes

present the opportunity to better understand the pull between economic,

ideological, and sociotropic voting behavior at the ballot box. In this paper, we

use soda taxes as an opportunity to ask: When faced with a direct conf‌lict

between self-interest and ideology, which will dictate voter preferences?

Self-Interest, Sociotropic, or Ideological?

Economic, or self-interest-driven voting behavior has often been diff‌icult for

political scientists to measure (Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979). For one thing, most

policies are complex and abstract in the way that they affect voters, so it is

diff‌icult for voters to understand the specif‌ic impact a policy may have on their

lives. Further, direct referendums on economic policies where voters have the

opportunity to explicitly vote a policy up or down in accordance with their self-

interest are rare.

Soda taxes, presented as ballot propositions, give voters a direct opportunity

to make an economic choice. For voters who identify as conservative, the choice

Brock/Kelly: Pennies for Pounds 419