Peculiar Institutions: Slavery, Sectionalism, and Minority Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.3162/036298005X201509
• Author: GREGORY J. WAWRO
• Date: 01 May 2005
• Published date: 01 May 2005

163The Antebellum Senate

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXX, 2, May 2005 163

GREGORY J. WAWRO

Columbia University

Peculiar Institutions:

Slavery, Sectionalism, and Minority

Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate

This article examines obstruction in the U.S. Senate, focusing on political

conflict in the antebellum period. I consider different theories that predict when

obstruction should occur and conduct individual-level analysis of the use of and

support for dilatory tactics. The analysis investigates how the costs of obstruction,

the probability that obstruction succeeds, the policy preferences of the senator, and

the salience of legislation relate to decisions to obstruct. I find that both sectional and

partisan factors influence obstruction, with the former being especially important for

legislation related to slavery. In particular, Southern senators’ concerns about being in

the minority led them to obstruct to protect their interests in slavery.

Introduction

The ability of minorities to obstruct and inhibit majorities from

working their will is a central feature of the U.S. Senate. Yet scholar-

ship on the causes of minority obstruction, especially for early periods

of the institution’s history, is rather thin. This paper undertakes an

analysis of obstruction in the Senate in the antebellum period, examining

alternative theories that make different, but not necessarily competing,

predictions about the dilatory strategies of minorities and when

obstruction should occur. In particular, I focus on the importance of

sectionalism and issues related to slavery in driving minority obstruction.

Extant research generally examines obstruction through the prism

of partisanship (Binder 1997; Binder and Smith 1997; Binder, Lawrence,

and Smith 2002; Dion 1997). Party-based theories of obstruction have

proven to be successful in explaining obstruction in the modern Senate,

but other factors may be equally or more relevant to explaining this

behavior prior to the Civil War. A substantial amount of historical work

emphasizes the importance of balance in representation in the Senate

between free and slave states for understanding the politics of this

period. Sectional cleavages, particularly over slavery and related issues,

164 Gregory J. Wawro

make it imperative to consider this factor in addition to partisanship in

order to understand minority obstruction. Southerners, regardless of

party, were especially concerned about having minority status in the

chamber because their overwhelming interests in the institution of

slavery were threatened as their relative numerical strength in the Senate

declined. Understanding obstruction in the Senate during this period is

important because the institution has been viewed by many scholars as

crucial in maintaining political stability over the issue of slavery, which

would eventually rend apart the Union. While obstruction is widely

accepted as central to the legislative strategies of Southern senators in

preventing the passage of civil rights legislation during the twentieth

century, the extent to which obstruction was part of their strategies

during earlier periods of history is an open question.

In this article, I investigate the question by examining theories

regarding obstruction and considering the special context of the antebellum

period. I assess the theories using data on dilatory tactics aimed at general

legislation as well as legislation that provoked sectional tensions.1 This study

constitutes the first quantitative analysis at the individual level that exam-

ines which factors predict whether or not a given senator will obstruct.2

Previous studies have examined what factors are related to obstruc-

tion in the aggregate, and thus they are vulnerable to ecological fallacies.

My empirical analysis reveals that sectional interests and the

salience of slavery were significant driving forces behind the use of

dilatory tactics. When Southerners constituted a numerical minority in

the chamber, they exploited the peculiar rules of the Senate regarding

debate to obstruct legislation related to the “peculiar institution” of

slavery. The use of and support for dilatory tactics by Southern senators

increased as they became a smaller minority. The finding that dilatory

tactics were part of the strategy to protect Southern interests during

the antebellum era has deeper historical significance because it indicates

that the use of obstruction in battles over civil rights was part of a long-

standing reliance on dilatory tactics by Southerners to protect against

perceived federal infringements on their section’s social and economic

institutions. Partisan factors are also important predictors of obstruc-

tion involving general legislation, but they are less useful for under-

standing this behavior as it relates to legislation pertinent to slavery.

In the next section, I discuss different theoretical perspectives

that delineate the factors that should influence legislators’ decisions to

obstruct, focusing on the political context of the antebellum period. I

then discuss the empirical analysis of the use of and support for dilatory

tactics by individual senators. I conclude with a review of my findings

and suggestions for further research.