Peacekeeping, Disarmament, and the New Agenda for Peace.

• Date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Ponzio, Richard,Siddiqui, Muznah,Ponzio, Richard^Siddiqui, Muznah
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Ponzio, Richard

The global architecture to manage disagreements and de-escalate conflicts has become weaker. Longstanding commitments, particularly in the areas of nuclear disarmament and strategic stability have eroded. There is no question that this is a difficult time to talk about a New Agenda for Peace. We are under no illusions. And yet, challenging as this task might be, it could not be more vital.

UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo (1)

1 Introduction

In his seminal 2021 report, Our Common Agenda, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres proposed a New Agenda for Peace as one of seven streams of work that Member States could consider in a Summit of the Future, now planned for 22-23 September 2024 in New York. Specifically, to advance efforts to prevent violent conflict and make, keep, and sustain the global public good of peace, the Secretary-General calls for "a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict, a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks." (2) Under the systemwide leadership of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the New Agenda for Peace is anticipated to focus on strategic risk reduction (disarmament), new foresight capabilities, and the future of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, among other critical issues.

In this contribution to Global Governance's special issue on the 75th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping, we examine the changing conflict dynamics at the start of the third decade of the twenty-first century--the backdrop to the Secretary-General's proposed New Agenda for Peace. Practical steps to improve the conditions and tools for the effective management and resolution of deadly and materially destructive conflict are then introduced, giving special attention to suggested peacekeeping and disarmament innovations that simultaneously develop multilateral and local capacities for peace. We conclude with some thoughts on the research agenda ahead for scholars and policy analysts dedicated to studying and advancing peace through more effective approaches to global governance.

2 Changing Conflict Dynamics "Post-Post Cold War"

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the post-Cold War era was characterized by US unipolarity, a considerable decrease in interstate and great-power conflicts, enhanced international peacekeeping and peace-building cooperation, and a rise in new threats to peace and security ranging from ethnopolitical intrastate tensions to nonstate terrorist and criminal syndicates. (3) Conversely, an emerging "post-post Cold War era" is witnessing the return of great-power conflict, noticeably manifested in US-China frictions and NATO's support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, alongside growing ideological differences and new stressors such as climate change and emerging technologies. (4)

Indeed, deadly conflict is intensifying, with a 73 percent increase in explosive weapon use in 2021 and a corresponding 83 percent increase in civilian casualties, fueling a "civilianization" of conflict as both victims and perpetrators. (5) Additionally, 2021 caps seven consecutive years of increasing global arms sales. (6) In 2021, there were approximately 46 active armed conflicts, with the highest number recorded in sub-Saharan Africa (between government forces and one or more armed nonstate groups), and the most deadly occurring in Afghanistan and Yemen. (7)

Equally alarming, the war in Ukraine has increased the risk of nuclear weapons use. (8) In recent public statements, Russian president Vladimir Putin has signaled his country's intention to discontinue participation in the New START Treaty with the United States, and he has further threatened to move tactical nukes into neighboring Belarus. (9) Given the 5,977 nuclear warheads in Russia's care, even a limited nuclear exchange involving Russia, Ukraine, and the NATO countries could inflict maximum damage. (10) In response to Russian nuclear saber rattling and aggression toward Ukraine, French president Emmanuel Macron proposed, on 20 January 2023, to expand defense spending by more than a third, and to "transform France's nuclear-armed military." (11) Similarly, Germany has committed to investing 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense. (12) Concurrently, eighteen NATO allies and candidates, including Denmark, Poland, and Romania, have announced similar increases in their defense budgets, with countries such as Japan pledging to double defense spending to 2 percent of its GDP (approximately 60 percent per annum) by 2027. (13)

The post-post Cold War era is also characterized by the changing nature of conflict through the "hybridization" of warfare. With states and nonstate actors alike utilizing conventional and nonconventional strategies and tools, combat is becoming highly irregular, unpredictable, and nearly impossible to prevent, particularly in cyberspace. (14) The development of new and autonomous technologies, such as artificial intelligence, drones, and armed robots, has further enabled states to carry out remote warfare. (15)

Nontraditional security challenges associated with water insecurity and climate change additionally pose a unique risk to international stability. Regions such as South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are most at risk of water scarcity and climate-induced conflict, which may lead to increased challenges such as migration and growing civil unrest. (16)

Meanwhile, demand for new peacekeeping operations in multilateral conflict management through the United Nations has declined, with the last new UN mission--the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)--initiated in 2014. Currently, twelve UN peacekeeping missions (six of which are thirty years or older) operate across three continents; several are up for review and possible drawdown in 2023. In his briefing to the General Assembly on Priorities for 2023, Secretary-General Guterres underscored that various peacekeeping missions are "under resourced and under attack, with no peace to keep." (17) Meanwhile, during this same period, demand for African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) peace operations has grown, and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs currently manages some twenty-four Special Political Missions and other political services.

3 Innovating Peacekeeping to Keep Pace with Changing Conflicts and Waning Demand

While other scholars in this special issue of Global Governance on the 75th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping have commented on UN peacekeeping's historical record as an effective conflict management tool, (18) this article proposes specific innovations to peacekeeping and disarmament designed to respond to the changing nature of conflict, as detailed above, and waning attention to these two instruments among great powers and traditional donor partners. Great powers and donor countries will find it more compelling to renew their political commitments to and financial investments in multilateral peacekeeping and disarmament efforts, when they view the United Nations as adapting to contemporary conflict management requirements and when they sense that new, nontraditional actors are bringing new capabilities to improve peacekeeping's effectiveness. This further entails redirecting resources toward enabling the world body's field staff to better develop national and local capacities for peace.

Focus also needs to shift from a relatively narrow concern for maintaining international security to improving conditions for a holistic conception that combines the attributes of negative peace (the absence of war) and positive peace (building more just, peaceful, and inclusive societies, in line with Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). (19) Indeed, the Secretary-General's New Agenda for Peace will need to demonstrate, in creative and tangible ways, the inextricable links between peace, sustainable development, and human rights to break new ground conceptually and operationally.

The above arguments--alongside associated global governance innovation reforms proposed for the 2024 Summit of the Future and other global policy for a to improve UN approaches to peacekeeping and disarmament--are briefly introduced below and expanded on in the Henry L. Stimson Center's forthcoming (June 2023) Global Governance Innovation Report 2023: Rethinking Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action, which will feature two new diagnostic tools: a Global Governance Index and a Global Governance Survey. Turning first to steps to revive peacekeeping as an integral instrument in the United Nations' conflict management and prevention toolkit in a fast-changing global context, we recommend: a new capability for civil response, a renewed focus on hybrid and partnership peacekeeping, and the, admittedly, still controversial idea of standing peacekeeping forces.

3.1 A New UN Civilian Response Capability

Matching growing demand for civilian capacity in UN fieldwork--including in UN peacekeeping settings--with supply was the goal of the UN's innovative Civilian Capacity initiative (CIVCAP, 2009-2014) and CAPMATCH, its former online civilian capacity sourcing platform. CAPMATCH was used, for instance, to provide country-level support to institution-building efforts in Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire. (20) Despite CIVCAP's disbandment and the closure of the CAPMATCH platform, the...