Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency: How U.S. Military Doctrine Can Improve Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

• Author: Ashley Leonczyk
• Position: Postdoctoral Associate, Yale Law School
• Pages: 66-143

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PEACEKEEPING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: HOW

U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE CAN IMPROVE PEACEKEEPING

IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

ASHLEY LEONCZYK*

I. Introduction

By nearly all accounts, the largest United Nations (U.N.)

peacekeeping operation in the world is failing. The mission––known

until recently as MONUC1––is based in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo,2 where more than 18,000 U.N. troops3 are engaged in an effort to

quell violence in the world‘s deadliest conflict since World War II.4

Congo is Africa‘s third-largest country—it extends eastward from the

capital city of Kinshasa, near the continent‘s western coast, and

* Postdoctoral Associate, Yale Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Yale

University; B.A., Yale University.

1 Effective 1 July 2010 MONUC‘s name has officially been changed to MONUSCO—the

―Organization S tabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ S. C.

Res. 1925, UN Doc. S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010) [h ereinafter S.C. Res. 1925]. Because

this name change is largely superficial, and because much of this article analyzes

MONUC‘s past practices, the name ―MONUC‖ will be used to avoid confusion. This

acronym is an abbreviation for ―Mission de l‘Organisation des Nations Unies en

République démocratique du Congo‖ (U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo).

2 The De mocratic Republic of the Congo was known as the Belgian Congo until its

independence in 1960. The country was then known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997,

under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko. The country is now commonly referred to simply as

―Congo,‖ or as ―DRC‖ or ―DR Congo,‖ in order to distinguish it from the Republic of

Congo, a neighboring country. In this article, the nation will be referred to as ―Con go.‖

For historical b ackground on Congo‘s name change and conflicted past, see GÉRARD

PRUNIER, AFRICA‘S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING

OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE (2009).

3 As of 30 April 2010, MONUC‘s uniformed personnel strength in Congo includes

18,884 troops, 712 military observers, and 1,223 police. See MONUC: United States

Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC Facts and Figures, available a t

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (last visited June 25,

2010).

4 The International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimates that more th an five million people

have already died as a result o f the conflict. INT‘L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CR ISIS, at ii (2007),

http://www.theirc.org/sites/default/files/migrated/resources/2007/2006-7_congo

mortalitysurvey.pdf. Also, in 2005, the United Nations stated that the conflict in eastern

Congo was the ―world‘s worst humanitarian crisis.‖ Editorial, UN Calls Eastern Congo

Worst Humanitarian Cr isis, VOICE OF AM., Mar. 16, 2005, http://www1.voanews.com/

english/news/a-13-2005-03-16-voa38-67382547.html.

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PEACEKEEPING & COIN IN THE CONGO

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encompasses a massive swath of territory in central Africa. Endemic

conflict in Congo has been raging in the country for decades, and in

1998, it sparked a crisis known as Africa‘s World War, drawing eleven

other African nations into the struggle either as mediators or parties to

the conflict. Violence continues today in Congo‘s east. Despite a strong

U.N. military presence on the ground, a yearly budget of more than $1

billion,5 and a robust mandate authorizing peacekeepers to undertake ―all

necessary operations‖ to ―disrupt the military capability of armed groups

that continue to use violence in [the] area,‖6 the conflict‘s death toll

continues to rise, and sustainable peace and stability do not seem to be on

the horizon.

In fact, as MONUC has ramped up its stabilization efforts under

increasingly aggressive mandates, violence against civilians has actually

seen a marked incr ease in the region.7 In March 2009, MONUC began

backing a Congolese army offensive—known as Kimia II—that aimed to

forcibly disarm one of the region‘s rebel groups. As a result of this

operation and related reprisal violence, more than 1000 civilians were

killed, almost a million people have been forced to flee their homes, and

more than 7000 women and girls have been raped.8 The situation

became so untenable that, on 12 October 2009, eighty-four humanitarian

and human rights groups in Congo issued a joint statement asserting that

the offensive campaign had resulted in an ―unacceptable cost for the

civilian population.‖9 They called on U.N. peacekeepers to ―fulfill their

mandate to protect civilians,‖ or else withdraw support for the

operation.10

Just how MONUC might actually achieve its mandate to protect

civilians, however, is exactly the question that mission commanders, the

5 The MONUC‘s budget from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 was $1,405,912,000. U.N.

GAOR, 63d Sess., 5th Comm., Agenda Item 132, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/63/25.

6 S.C. Res. 1906, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1906 (Dec. 23, 2009).

7 See, e.g., Editorial, DR Congo: Massive Increase in Attacks on Civilians: Government

and UN Peacekeepers Fail to Address Human Rights Catastr ophe, HUM. RTS. WATCH,

July 2, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/02/dr-congo-massive-increase-

attacks-civilians (―Since January 2009, nine Human Rights Watch fact-finding missions

to frontline areas found a dramatic increase in attacks on civilians and other human rights

abuses . . . .‖).

8 Editorial, DR Congo: Civilian Cost of Military Oper ation Is Unaccepta ble, HUM. RTS.

WATCH, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/12/dr-congo-civilian-cost-

military-operation-unacceptable.

9 Id.

10 Id.

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Security Council, and the U.N. Secretariat have been struggling to

answer for more than a decade. The war in Congo is a seemingly

intractable, complex, and multidimensional conflict that has confounded

observers and peacemaking strategists for years. It is related to an

intricate web of political, territorial, and ethnic disputes, many of which

can be traced back for decades, ranging from international political

rivalries to highly localized mining and land quarrels.11 The

conventional wisdom behind MONUC‘s i ncreasingly offensive posture,

expressed in Security Council Resolutions 1565, 1592, 1756, 1794, and

1856, was that a higher degree of operational force would help neutralize

violent rebel groups and therefore prevent attacks on civilians.12

Conventional wisdom, however, has been inadequate to solve Congo‘s

complex security challenges.13 Congo‘s conflict is not a conventional

war.

Nevertheless, the facts surrounding the war in Congo are not entirely

without precedent. In some ways, they are uncannily similar to those of

Iraq, circa 2002: Once governed by a brutal dictatorship, the diverse

nation is now plagued by violence based largely on entrenched cultural

divisions and the scapegoating of a previously elite minority group.

State security forces are in disarray, rival militia groups massacre and

abuse civilians, and a continuous cycle of violence and instability

prevents the formation of any broad-based governing coalition.

Residents align with ethnic gangs out of necessity, since police

protection is nonexistent and militia patronage offers the only credible

11 See, e.g., Séverine Autesserre, D. R. Congo: Explaining Peace Building Failur es,

2003-2006, 113 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 423, 429 (2007).

12 See S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004) (requesting ―rapid

deployment of additional military capabilities for MONUC‖); S.C. Res. 1592, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005) (encouraging MONUC ―to make full use of its mandate‖

and stressing that it ―may use cordon and search tactics . . . to disrupt the military

capability of illegal armed groups‖); S.C. Res. 1756, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1756 (May 15,

2007); (authorizing MONUC to ―support‖ offensive operations undertaken by the

Congolese army); S.C. Res. 1794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1794 (Dec. 21, 2007) (encouraging

MONUC to ―use all necessary means‖ to support the Congolese army in disarming

―recalcitrant‖ armed groups); S.C. Res. 1856, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008)

(expressing ―extreme concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights

situation‖ in Congo and authorizing MONUC to “coordinate” offensive operations that

will be ―led by and jointly planned with‖ the Congolese army).

13 See P eter Uvin et al., Regional Solutions to Regional P roblems: The Elusive Sear ch

for Security in the African Great Lakes, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 67, 68 (2005)

(arguing that ―conventional wisdom has been insufficient to address key security

challenges‖ in Congo).