Paths or Fences: Patents, Copyrights, and the Constitution

AuthorDerek E. Bambauer
PositionProfessor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law
Pages1017-1078
1017
Paths or Fences:
Patents, Copyrights, and the Constitution
Derek E. Bambauer*
ABSTRACT: Congressional power over patents and copyrights flows from the
same constitutional source, and the doctrines have similar missions. Yet the
Supreme Court has approached these areas from distinctly different angles.
With copyright, the Court readily employs constitutional analysis, building
fences to constrain Congress. With patent, it emphasizes statutory
interpretation, demarcating paths the legislature can follow, or deviate from
(potentially at its constitutional peril). This Article uses empirical and
quantitative analysis to show this divergence. It offers two potential
explanations, one based on entitlement strength, the other grounded in public
choice concerns. Next, the Article explores border cases where the Court could
have used either fences or paths, demonstrating the effects of this pattern. It
sets out criteria that the Court should employ in choosing between these
approaches: counter-majoritarian concerns, institutional competence,
pragmatism, and avoidance theory. The Article argues that the key normative
principle is that the Court should erect fences when cases impinge on
intellectual property’s core constitutional concerns—information disclosure
for patent and information generation for copyright. It concludes with two
examples where the Court should alter its approach based on this principle.
I.INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1018
II.DIFFERENT PATHS ....................................................................... 1022
A.COMMON PROBLEMS AND SOURCE ......................................... 1022
1.Circumvention ............................................................. 1025
2.Rent-seeking ................................................................ 1026
3.External Constraints ................................................... 1028
4.Theoretical Indeterminacy ......................................... 1029
B.EMPIRICAL TEST ................................................................... 1030
*
Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. Thanks for
helpful suggestions and discussion are owed to BJ Ard, Jane Bambauer, Paul Bennett, Andy Coan,
Dan Hunter, Kristine Huskey, Gavin Milczarek-Desai, Thinh Nguyen, Michael Risch, Chris
Robertson, Carol Rose, Roy Spece, Allan Sternstein, Alan Trammell, Mark Verstraete, Tammi
Walker, and Megan Wright. I welcome comments at derekbambauer@email.arizona.edu.
1018 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1017
C.HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS .......................................... 1033
1.Entitlement Strength .................................................. 1033
2.Public Choice .............................................................. 1038
III.BOUNDARY CASES ........................................................................ 1040
A.INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 1040
B.PATENT ................................................................................ 1040
1.Patentable Subject Matter .......................................... 1040
2.Inventorship ................................................................ 1041
3.Novelty ......................................................................... 1042
4.Obviousness ................................................................. 1045
5.Utility ............................................................................ 1047
C.COPYRIGHT ........................................................................... 1048
1.Authorship ................................................................... 1048
2.Copyrightable Subject Matter .................................... 1052
3.Fair Use ........................................................................ 1053
4.Idea-Expression Dichotomy ........................................ 1054
IV.NORMATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................................. 1055
A.CRITERIA .............................................................................. 1055
1.Counter-majoritarian Concerns ................................. 1056
2.Institutional Competence ........................................... 1057
3.Pragmatism .................................................................. 1060
4.Avoidance .................................................................... 1062
B.DISCLOSURE AND GENERATIVITY AS CORE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ................................................. 1065
V.THE PATH LESS TRAVELED BY ..................................................... 1068
A.INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 1068
B.PATENT ................................................................................ 1069
C.COPYRIGHT ........................................................................... 1073
VI.CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1078
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided a number of high-profile
patent and copyright cases, on topics ranging from jurisdiction1 to subject
1. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–71 (2010) (discussing
jurisdiction and copyright); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95–103 (1993)
(discussing jurisdiction and patent).
2019] PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1019
matter eligibility2 to the right to a jury.3 Although the two intellectual property
(“IP”) doctrines often present similar questions,4 and even though both flow
from the same constitutional grant of authority to Congress,5 the Court has
shown a markedly different pattern in how it adjudicates copyright and patent
cases.6 The Court has displayed a willingness to demarcate the constitutional
boundaries for copyright law and a reluctance to do so for patent law. Instead,
the Court grounds its patent jurisprudence in statutory analysis, even when it
treats analogous questions as constitutional ones for copyright.7 This pattern
has held true since the first Patent and Copyright Acts were passed in 1790,
and shows no signs of changing, despite the hopes and pleas of scholarly
commentators.8
Put simply, the difference between the Supreme Court’s copyright and
patent precedent is the difference between creating paths and building
fences. Paths show the traveler (here, Congress) one possible course to follow,
but the wanderer remains free to strike out on her own, perhaps at her peril.
Fences, by contrast, constrain completely: The explorer cannot lawfully
2. See, e.g., Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1008–09 (2017)
(discussing subject matter eligibility and copyright); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
215–27 (2014) (discussing subject matter eligibility and patent).
3. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342–55 (1998)
(discussing the right to a jury and copyright); Markman v. Westview Inst ruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
372–91 (1996) (discussing the right to a jury and patent).
4. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 888 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“The constitutional power over copyrights is found in the same clause that governs
the issuance of patents . . . . [m]any of the same interests underlie both grants of power.”).
5. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017) (noting
the “historic kinship between patent law and copyright law” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984))).
6. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A . Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1596
(2003) (“[R]ecent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that even though congressional power
to create patents arises from the same constitutional clause as the power to create copyrights,
copyright and patent can be treated differently under the Constitution.”).
7. Compare Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
563 U.S. 776, 782–93 (2011) (determining inventorship based on federal statute), with Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54–61 (1884) (deciding scope of Congressional
power to confer authorship based on constitutional considerations).
8. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 950–64 (2010) (discussing the subject matter of patents); Dan L.
Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 150–58 (2000) (discussing possible reform to patents
based on copyright developments); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 523 (2003) (advocating for changes to categorical exclusion);
Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA. L. REV. 625, 671–80
(2014) (discussing patent reform related to genetics); Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law:
Principles and Institutions, 93 NEB. L. REV. 901, 947–49 (2015) (discussing the constitutional
complexity of modern patent law). But see Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV.
591, 635–37, 651–52 (2008) (rejecting a constitutional basis for limits on patentable subject
matter). See generally Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Powe r: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (discussing
Constitutional limits on congressional powers vis-à-vis the intellectual property clause).

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